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Due to increasingly complex and uncertain environments, businesses must deal with 
multiple competing and often opposing models, what we may call ‘ontological 
relativity’.  To deal with this, the practice of innovation management requires a new 
type of practical-epistemology. The best insight into these new types of knowledge is an 
exploration of lived experience of innovation management practitioners. This research 
then explores the phenomena involved in the practice of business model innovation in 
the context of two innovation projects. To achieve these goals, a phenomenological 
method is used to uncover fundamental aspects of the innovation process. The outcome 
of the inquiry is a set a set of phenomena that hope to contribute to the discourse around 
this emerging field of management knowledge. 
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Introduction 
Situation of Concern 
 
Martin and Moldovenau (2008), in their book The Future of the MBA, call for a restating 
of the managerial role and in so doing the redefinition of organizing practice itself.  In 
particular they articulate the need for the high value decision maker of the future to 
move from an arbiter to a designer. They further explain this point in relation to the 
markets from which these functions emerge. An arbiter is squarely situated in both the 
market and the area of concern, taking action reactively to some dissonance in order to 
re-establish or repair that market. This dynamic cannot produce the new concepts 
necessary for the high value decision maker (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008). What is 
needed is a thinking discipline focusing on synthesis and integration, one in which new 
concepts may be disclosed (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008; Senge, 1990; 1994. 
Johannisson, 2011; Varela, Thompson, & Rosch, 1993).   
 
They continue by situating this movement as emerging within the postmodern era, 
articulating in particular how “the demise of the master narratives” (Martin & 
Moldovenau, 2008) which is characteristic of this time has allowed the plurality of 
meaning and sense to emerge. We find ourselves within “many value systems, many 
ways of knowing, many ways of acting and relating – many ways of managing – and 
many ways of choosing among them” (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008, p. 26). This 
underpinning dynamic describes at once the complexity and variegation of the 
postmodern milieu and consequently it highlights the lack of any self-evident or a priori 
truth – “no single way is evidently valid to everyone in virtue of its claims. 
Monoparadimacity is a cultural relic…” (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008, p. 26). 
Furthermore they point out that this position is precisely the one in which managers and 
decision makers find themselves, and in which they need to act.  Facing the seemingly 
impossible and indeed the paradoxical, managers must evolve their thinking and foster 
a new disposition. Legitimacy of action cannot be purely a factor of logic but rather of 
plausibility. Without this crucial understanding – that is, that “legitimacy is made, not 
given” (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008, p. 26) – we would have to admit that any other 
instrumental action would be inept and inadequate. 
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To act successfully, the manager must certainly exercise a level of cognition that is able 
to deal directly with uncertainty; moreover, it is required that he act skilfully. Martin 
and Moldovenau (2008) point out that the high value decision maker of the future- 
 
“must act in the face of the breakdown of certainty and self evidence for the 
reasons of action; must think in the face of the looming paralysis induced by an 
awareness of the multiple ways of thinking available to him or her; must 
experiment and tabulate results in a disciplined fashion in the face of doubts 
about incontrovertibility of ‘data’ and the ultimate meaning of those data vis-à-
vis a particular set of reasons for action; must believe in his or her grounds for 
acting in order to induce the right motivation to act in others; and must act  in 
order to produce the right beliefs in him- or herself and others – all without 
falling into the epistemic and moral relativism that empties him or her of the 
vital trust that a better outcome is possible and  achievable” (p. 26). 
 
Scharmer (2009) goes further to suggest that what is needed is a capacity for 
precognition – “to sense and actualize emerging potentials” (p. 3). “This kind of 
knowledge can be thought of as tacit knowledge prior to its embodiment, or self-
transcending knowledge” (Scharmer, 2009, p. 3). In his article, Self-Transcending 
Knowledge, Scharmer (2009) explains how this capacity is needed now due to the 
postmodern condition, in which we find ourselves; “the logic of competition has shifted 
from markets with decreasing returns to markets with increasing returns driven by 
positive feedback loops” (Arthur, in Scharmer, 2009, p.3). 
 
Following this we see the emergence of an organizing style that embraces uncertainty 
in the deepest manner – with uncertainty itself as the seed of discovering resolution and 
order. “The high value decision maker of postmodernism is, we claim, an accomplished 
experiential epistemologist”  (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008). 
 
It is from this perspective that we ascertain that business model innovation is a deeply 
creative act, one that is reliant on the traits of cognitive plasticity and volition to 
innovate with both guided creativity as well as analytical skill. Moreover it is a process 
that attempts to sculpt perception and cognition, continuously eliciting meaning and 
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creating value in the arena of social systems. Central to this concept is the notion that 
seeing meaning and value as an emergent property of the human-activity-system 
(shared praxis) is key to unlocking both the success of a project and to an understanding 
of why that success is attained. To elucidate briefly, by creating shared meaning, the 
causes and conditions for success are set into motion.  
This highlights the significant role of the high value decision maker (Martin & 
Moldovenau, 2008) as a central agent for self-organization and perceptual coherence 
(or vision). This is the agent who works to uncover dissonant elements with the aim of 
creating disclosive spaces from which new worlds of action and being may emerge.  
Martin and Moldovenau (2008) however emphasize the need for an authentic 
investigation (in management science) into the as-lived experience of these high value 
decision makers, with the ultimate goal of gaining deep understanding of the cognitive 
modes at play. They indicate that management science currently is largely a set of 
prescriptive techniques abstracted from the practice itself:   
 “Management science is a net importer of theories and models from disciplines, 
such as psychology, that are deemed to be more ‘basic’. Thus it is not surprising 
that the study of managerial cognition proceeds by processes similar to those 
encountered in the history of cognitive psychology. The appropriation of the 
methods of the mother field proceeds in the study of managerial cognition by 
one of two steps: by direct use of the results of behavioural design theory as 
explanatory variables in management of managerial phenomena…and by the 
use of normative models of cognitive science and behavioural decision making, 
in conjunction with well documented deviations from these models to derive 
prescriptive approaches” (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008, p. 75). 
They go on to indicate the value of the accounts of “field epistemologists who chart the 
still-unknown ways in which skilled managers make sense of the unknown and make 
critical decisions with only limited, foggy, ambiguous, doubtful and fuzzy information 
or from insightful practitioners themselves” (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008, p. 76). 
 
In a more practical way, this research explores these larger themes within the immediate 
practical context; this is the development of a digital learning and collaboration 
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platform. The end-users and diverse stakeholders involved indicates the complex nature 
of the design process. In conjunction with this, the need for new innovative approaches 
to crowd dynamics employing new disruptive crowd technology approaches makes this 
a project that deals with the uncertainty of new technology innovation. Furthermore 
underlying this a new type of business model is required – one that deals with new 
forms of monetisation, public-private partnerships and novel forms of organising.  
It is with this understanding that the central aim of this research is to make an inquiry 
into these modes of cognition, into perception and apperception at play in business 
model innovation. It is hoped that the outcome of to the inquiry will contribute towards 




This section gives a detailed description of the methodological processes undertaken 
with respect to the research question – What is the as-lived experience of business model 
innovation?  
 
To begin to answer this question we must first gain some clarity into the exact meaning 
of what a business model is. A business model refers principally to the underlying logic 
of a business, and describes the core assumptions beliefs and modes of operating of that 
business (Teece, 2010). These models have existed as long as markets have (Teece, 
2010) and have mutated, adapted and evolved in line with the complexity of the markets 
they serve. Magaretta (2002) relates the business model to Drucker’s questions: 1) Who 
is the customer?; 2) What does the customer value?,3) how does make money in this 
business?, 4) what is the basic logic of this business, that is how can be deliver value 
for a reasonable cost? 
 
Although this is a good foundation for the conception of business models, the advent 
of new disruptive technologies, ecological implications and social purpose no must also 
be considered (Chesbrough, Ahern, Finn, & Gueraz, 2006; Seelos & Mair, 2007; 
Yunus, Moingen, & Lehman-Ortega, 2010; Wustenhagen & Boehnke, 2006).  It is this 
larger conception and understanding of a buisness models that we hope to work with, 
one that will accompany a new cognitive and practical capacity to the art and scirnce 
of business model innovation. 
 
The research question addresses three interlocking concepts: 1) as-lived experience, 2) 
business models and 3) innovation. This is significant because it points to three distinct 
concepts that we are here attempting to integrate, and investigate. 
 
The As-Lived Experience 
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The term ‘as-lived’ indicates that this research inquiry is phenomenological, that is, it 
is an inquiry into the phenomena of the experience itself.  Our investigation is interested 
specifically in the thinking discipline needed, within the innovator, to act purposefully 
when faced with a complex and uncertain terrain. As we have explored earlier, our 
inquiry finds itself within the post-modern milieu – an era of many meanings, many 
ways of knowing and many ways of being, or what we may call ontological relativity 
(Martin & Moldoveanu, 2008).   
 
As Martin and Moldovenau (2008) indicate, this situation has emerged with the demise 
of the master narratives, which are based on positivistic foundations and dogmatic 
justification. Seemingly all at once the world has found itself grappling with a dynamic 
plurality of meanings. Following this we find that instrumental, rational and generalized 
explanations of reality are increasingly inept at providing insight and value in 
addressing complex social realities. 
 
This ontological relativity demands a new managerial competence (Martin & 
Moldoveanu, 2008) – one that can deal with a multiplicity of thinking mechanisms or 
logic(s): 
“…Different domains of expertise are embedded in fundamentally different 
modes of inference (inductive, deductive, abductive) and different logics 
(modal logic – granting epistemic and ontic status to possibilities; declarative 
logic – denying such status; second-order logics, allowing statements about 
statements, etc.). The (modal) logic of design used by the system architect must 
be brought – through the medium of our manager – into dialogue with the non-
modal language(s) of the programmer and the network theorist; the (inductive 
and abductive) logics of the marketer and the product line manager must be 
brought into dialogue with the (deductive) logic of the hardware engineer” 
(Martin & Moldoveanu, 2008, p. 46). 
 
This new integrative management style therefore is plastic and allows the manager to 
be present within this ontological relativity, to make sense of these competing 
narratives, and to propose legitimate actions for their integration (Martin & 
Moldoveanu, 2008).  
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We find that this is facilitated by a disposition of inquiry into the machinery of thought 
itself – thinking about thinking (Martin & Moldoveanu, 2008). The integrative thinker 
then is one who inquires not only into the phenomena that present themselves but also 
the mechanisms that generate them. It is for this reason that a phenomenological 
approach is adopted as the primary research method. 
 
The phenomenological method is concerned with describing the structure of experience 
and furthermore with enquiring into what that experience signifies or means. In contrast 
to positivist traditions of inquiry, which aim to map generalities, laws or universalis, 
the phenomenological method aims to transcribe directly the substance of experience.  
 
The term ‘phenomenology’ is synthesized from two root words, ‘phenomenon’ and 
‘logos’ (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011), whose juncture means the science of 
phenomena, or what we may term in a more current vernacular as the science of 
consciousness.  
 
Traditional scientific inquiry is focused on uncovering some underlying universal truth; 
that is to be eventually discovered through some path of experimentation, using a 
prescribed methodology. Phenomenology in contrast has no such prescriptive method, 
but can be found among the writings of Husserl (2012), Heidegger (2011), and 
Merleau-Ponty (2005).  Rather phenomenology reinforces the belief that knowledge is 
developmental and emergent; knowledge is made through experience. 
 
Husserl’s (2012) phenomenology asks for a return to the lived experience itself, with 
the recognition of its primacy in the construction of knowledge; before the objective 
world appears there is a subject that is apprehending, assembling and constructing it.  
Husserl proposes that this science of consciousness must have a distinct approach to 
that of the natural sciences, because it is not a study of things but of experiences. In this 
proposition he is not denying the existence of the objective world but instead attempting 
to venture into the world of sense. As Heidegger (2011), a student of Husserl, articulates 
- phenomenology is not the study of what but of how. 
 
Phenomenology emerged at the end of the 19th century in reaction to a crisis within 
philosophy and also within the human sciences (Merleau-Ponty, 2005). Increasingly 
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the positivist perspective was unable to answer the questions that arose within the 
human sciences. Durkheimian Positivism in particular believed in the logical 
continuation of the natural sciences into the realm of human activity – that human 
sciences would maintain the same objectivity, rationality and causality. Husserl’s 
formulation of the phenomenological method emerged from a critique of positivism, 
and in an attempt to integrate these two systems – the world of science and the life-
world – rather than supplant one upon the other.  
 
The ‘life-world’ here refers to the pre-reflexive state of the intervener that permits 
questioning of the world. Husserl’s belief was that subject and phenomenon are linked 
inexorably – because if there is a phenomenon there is a subject that experiences it 
(Husserl, 2012). Phenomenology then is a mode of inquiry whose emphasis lies in the 
experience and the interpretations thereof – rather than statistical correlations – for an 
understanding of causality (Sadala & Adorno, 2002). 
 
Martin Heidegger (1997) in Being and Time gives insight into the etymology of the 
word ‘phenomenon’: 
 
“The Greek expression phainomon, from which the term “phenomenon” 
derives, comes from the verb phainesthai, meaning, “to show itself.” Thus 
phainomenon means to show itself, the self-showing, the manifest. Phainesthai 
itself is a “middle voice construction of paino, to bring into   daylight, to place 
in brightness. Phaino belongs to the root pha-, like phos, light or brightness. 
i.e., that within something can become manifest, visible in itself . Thus the 
meaning of the expression “phenomenon” is established as what shows itself in 
itself, what is manifest. The phainomena, “phenomena,” are thus the totality of 
what lies in the light of day or can be brought to light” (Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, 2011, p. 31). 
 
Phenomenology then is the study of what is manifest, what shows itself in itself, the 
totality of what is disclosing itself before us. So the phenomenological method is the 
‘return to the very things’ – an engagement to the state before reflexive thought, the 
pre-reflexive state. Therefore the researcher must attempt to be present wholly to what 
is unfolding, emerging and becoming; this presence is what we may call a 
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phenomenological stance (Sadala & Adorno, 2002). This stance allows the researcher 
to gather descriptions of these unfolding phenomena with necessary openness and 
authenticity – to live that experience as a Gestalt – “in its wholeness, by trying to 
prevent any judgment from interfering with [his/her] openness to the description” 
(Sadala & Adorno, 2002, p. 283). 
 
By doing this, the researcher is placing the phenomenon in epoche; that is, searching 
for this phenomenon’s essence (the thing itself) to describe the most invariable aspects 
of it. Merleau-Ponty indicates that  
 
“Phenomenology is the study of essences; and according to it, all problems 
amount to finding definitions of essences: the essence of perception, or the 
essence of consciousness, for example. But phenomenology is also a 
philosophy, which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to 
arrive at an understanding of man and the world from any starting point other 
than that of their ‘facticity’” (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. vii).  
 
The essence then is the very essential nature of the thing that is being questioned. 
 
The intentionality of consciousness is the direction, coordination and movement of 
consciousness; this is central to generating meaning in the world (Sadala & Adorno, 
2002). “Through the intentionality of consciousness all actions, gestures, habits and 
human actions have a meaning. Consciousness, through such intentionality, is 
understood as the agent that attributes meaning to objects. Without these meanings it 
would be impossible to talk either about an object or an object’s essence” (Sadala & 
Adorno, 2002, p. 283). 
 
It is the role of the researcher then to study the intentionality of the phenomenon, and 
ascertain how meaning is created through this movement. This phenomenal reduction 
allows for a reliable description of the phenomenon because it highlights the intentional 
character of consciousness. It is not so much the reduction of noise but rather the ability 
to hold a phenomenon in mind and be present to it. This bracketing of phenomena is to 
move beyond subject and object to the transempircal realm of essences. Thus eidos is 
the necessary structure of a thing – its principle integrity.  Eidetic reduction also uses 
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free variation, meaning that it is not reliant on mental constructs or objects themselves 
but takes its starting point in the knowledge of that object.  By becoming present in this 
way, the researcher allows for imaginative variation – that is, what is given immediately 
and indubitably. Through this presencing – of being present to that which reveals itself 
– the researcher finds that series of variations overlap and precisely at that point of 
overlapping s/he may find the essence of that phenomenon. Thus by starting with 
evidence within the perceptual sphere and then moving to evidence within the 
imagination – what could be true – the researcher arrives at the invariable and essential 
nature of that thing.  
 
“It is a transcendental philosophy which places in abeyance the assertions 
arising out of the natural attitude, the better to understand them; but it is also a 
philosophy for which the world is always ‘already there’ before reflection 
begins—as ’an inalienable presence; and all its efforts are concentrated upon 
re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that 
contact with a philosophical status. It is the search for a philosophy, which shall 
be a ‘rigorous science’, but it also offers an account of space, time and the world 
as we ‘live’ them. It tries to give a direct description of our experience as it is, 
without taking account of its psychological origin and the causal explanations 
which the scientist, the historian or the sociologist may be able to provide” 
(Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. preface vii). 
 
Importantly, eidetic reduction is neither induction nor deduction, nor is it abstraction; 
it defers from the actual existence of object, subjects and other substantive measures – 
rather it holds the experience itself, bracketing it in process of elucidation. 
 
So the researcher begins with the as-lived experience and then engages in a significant 
discourse around this experience, and thus unravels the essence of that thing by 
understanding its intentionality – “consciousness is only consciousness when it is 
turned towards an object” (Sadala & Adorno, 2002, p. 285). We may further venture 
that consciousness is only consciousness when it is turned towards an object from a 
background of experience, or from a Self. Thus Husserl defines phenomenology as the 




Merlau-Ponty in his existential phenomenology extends Husserl’s work significantly – 
it is existentialist because it conceives of people acting within a pre-existing given 
world. He explains phenomenology as the study of essences, but argues that these 
essences present themselves to a historical self. He “proposes the task of returning to 
the very thing in a search for the essences of objects, their qualities, but seeing these as 
part of the lived and experienced world, which is a world of things that have not been 
reflected upon, and on which sciences are constructed upon” (Sadala & Adorno, 2002, 
p. 286). A fundamental point here is that truth is not found in the inner space of ‘man’ 
because this inner space is not there – rather we are people in the world, and truth is 
made through our engagement with the world. This worldview does not deny the inner 
world as empiricists do, nor does it deny the outside world as idealists do – but rather 
it transcends the traditional notions of a self-contained consciousness: 
 
“The prereflexive, lived experience of a human being in the world (eˆtre-au-
mond) in the sense of being thrown into the world, with its intentionality, in an 
already-existing world, ready but not thoroughly ready – these are the founding 
conceptions of Merleau Ponty’s phenomenology, which seeks to understand 
people as beings in a situation, never fully free but in a world never fully 
finished either: being born is simultaneously being born from and in the world. 
The world has already been formed, albeit never completely. However, this 
analysis is still abstract because we exist in both relationships simultaneously. 
There is never either determinism or full choice; I am never a thing nor pure 
consciousness” (Sadala & Adorno, 2002, p. 286). 
 
This underlying incompleteness is the fundamental proposition of Merleau-Ponty’s 
phenomenology: that things are in an ongoing dialectic between universal and private 
worlds.  Merleau-Ponty further proposes that the body is the anchor between these two 
worlds – the body itself is the interface of this engagement. Therefore there is a 
dialectical relationship between the body, as a body of apprehension, and the world in 
which it finds itself (cf. Autopoietic model). The conditions of the world do not have a 
deterministic relationship with this body but rather limit the possibility of action. People 
use this dialectic to afford themselves a level of self-determinism – this is the 
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fundamental existential proposition – that of an overarching responsibility for one’s 
own existence (and the world one finds oneself immersed in).  
 
This dialectic relationship between perceiving the world and being in the world 
proposes that we are simultaneously perceiving the world and perceiving ourselves; it 
is from this perceptual dialectic that we are thrown into the world. Merleau-Ponty calls 
this dialectics without synthesis, or what we may interpret as the ambiguity and 
incompleteness of things. There is no absolute truth, nor are there certainties, nor is 
there universally applicable knowledge – rather the question and the investigation 
remain open and in transformation (Sadala & Adorno, 2002). This is a perpetual 
movement of meaning making, and so people are seen as eternally becoming, in a 
dialectic without synthesis. 
 
“By relating with the world’s objects, beings and things, a person is a being who 
perceives the world from different standpoints depending on the situation in 
time and space, who perceives particular perspectives that vary accordingly to 
the perceptual field – which is a horizon, that is, the place of perceptual 
experiences. We can perceive objects from different places, at different 
moments” (Sadala & Adorno, 2002, p. 287). 
 
This realization of eternal becoming points to a new reckoning of experience, one in 
which self and world are fundamentally intertwined, woven into a continuum, a dance 
between self, other and world. This suggests that upon a continuum of change we 
impute the notion of a stable self, and further we impute the boundaries of self and the 
world outside it. 
 
We may understand a self then to be that on-going process of uniting these perspectives 
into a continuum.  Then when we engage in the world, and engage in the worldviews 
of others, these multiple subjectivities affect each other and limit each other – creating 
an objective-subjectivity. This is a key insight, for it leads us to see that any objective 
experience of the world is founded in our own intimate understanding of it  – it is this 




“Probably the chief gain from phenomenology is to have united extreme 
subjectivism and extreme objectivism in its notion of the world or of rationality. 
Rationality is precisely proportioned to the experiences in which it is disclosed. 
To say that there exists rationality is to say that perspectives blend, perceptions 
confirm each other, a meaning emerges. But it should not be set in a realm apart, 
transposed into absolute Spirit, or into a world in the realist sense. The 
phenomenological world is not pure being, but the sense which is revealed 
where the paths of my various experiences intersect, and also where my own 
and other people’s intersect and engage each other like gears. It is thus 
inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when 
I either take up my past experiences in those of the present, or other people’s in 
my own (Merleau-Ponty, 2005, p. xxii). 
 
Classical phenomenology has recently gained a newfound wave of interest and 
applicability (Lawlor, 1998). We could infer that this has occurred due to a greater 
interest into the complexity of precisely this intersubjectivity and due to a desire to gain 
a more profound exploration of it. So, has phenomenology succeeded in fulfilling this? 
 
 Deleuze (1994) has confronted classical phenomenology with two oppositions with 
regard to this theory of intersubjectivity. These are the challenge of immanence and that 
of difference. The challenge of immanence is in what Deleuze has called the univocity 
of being – or that there is no two-world ontology, that essence does not lie outside 
presentation or appearance.  We see that much of phenomenological inquiry alludes to 
this: that as we delve into a world of subjective appearances, rather than recovering 
some essential nature, we find an infinite set of interlocking and interdependent 
meanings that are reliant on each other.  So rather than finding an integral principle or 
essence of a phenomena, we find a thread within a much larger fabric of experience. 
Moreover we find that the phenomenological stance fundamentally explores this 
immanence as the unraveling of the self – which itself undermines the transcendental 
approach of phenomenology:  
 
“Interestingly we find that the challenge of immanence indeed is the exact 
starting point of the phenomenological inquiry the challenge of immanence, 
however, appears to be nothing less than the challenge with which 
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phenomenology confronts traditional metaphysics; the epoche is a process in 
which one switches off the belief in things in themselves in order to arrive at a 
plane of immanence: being is phenomenon. Despite this similarity, Deleuze 
argues that phenomenology reinstates a dative; it relates the plane of immanence 
back to a subject that constitutes the given (Lawlor, 1998, pp. 15-16). 
 
Here Deleuze argues that because the phenomenological inquiry is grounded in a 
subject that it aims to transcend, it necessarily undermines immanence. The whole 
transcendental argument is reliant on a subject to which a thing is being unravelled – 
but Deleuze (1994) asks “how can there be a given, how can something be given to a 
subject, and how can the subject give something to itself?” . Therefore the critique is 
empirical because after situating ourselves in a purely immanent point of view we ask 
ourselves, how is the subject constituted in the given? This questioning is what Deleuze 
calls radical empiricism. 
 
The second challenge, that of difference, takes its inspiration from Heidegger:  
“According to Heidegger’s ontological intuition, difference must be 
articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without 
any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, analogous or the 
opposed. There must be a differentiation of difference, an in-itself which is like 
a differentiator, a Sich-unterscheidende, by virtue of which the different is 
gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance, 
identity, analogy or opposition” (Deleuze G. , 1994, p. 117). 
 
Here Deleuze asserts that the difference is not to some essential nature but to the 
simulacrum itself – it cannot be the difference of some generality, ideal or essence. 
According to this there must be heterogeneity between ground and grounded; the 
ground must be different from that which it grounds.  
 
These two challenges bring us to Deleuze’s transcendental empiricism – that infers that 
experience is always in the process of exceeding our concepts by presenting novelty. It 
is the role of philosophy then, not to pursue an essential nature, truth or universalis, but 
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to create new concepts. This generative process is engendered by a primal encounter 
with the world – ‘something in the world forces us to think.’ 
 
 The fundamental point relevant to our investigation is in the explication of essences, 
whose description and analysis is the core of our methodology. Deleuze’s critique of 
phenomenology then does not necessarily ask us for an abandonment of essences but a 
reawakening to them. Rather than positing an essential nature, he asks to see them as 
the simulacrum itself, repeated and concreted through perceptual acts.  So rather than 
uncovering some fundamental logos, we are rather uncovering an eternal thread – what 
Hofstdater and Sander  (2013) have termed an n-dimensional knot (or a tangled 
hierarchy), or what Deleuze and Guttari term a singularity within a structured field of 
possibilities. 
 
As we explore this realization we gain an understanding that creativity is an ontological 
imperative. Further we see that intuition and sense function as the movement of creation 
– to resolve what is experienced  (empirical) to that which is asking to become 
(transcendental). This process is at its heart is abductive inference, what we may 
propose in this context as the ultimate goal of the researcher, innovator and 
entrepreneur. 
 
From a methodological perspective, our investigation is phenomenological in that it is 
exploring the as-lived experience. However instead of an attempt to uncover the 
essential nature of business model innovation we are rather trying to 1) understand the 
experience as one that lies at the intersection of a set of ontological narratives, 2) be 
present to this experience in its totality – being present to that which the world is asking 
us to do, and 3) transcribe this experience, not as a sterile artefact that has long forgotten 
the life of experience, but as a generative, creative act. 
 
In this way our methodology is distinctly Deleuzian and this is not odd for it follows 






The term ‘business model’ is comprised of two concepts: ‘business’ and ‘model’. 
‘Business’ refers to a set of value-generating activities, the equipment that enable these 
activities, the identities that carry out these activities and the overall purposes they 
pursue. Moreover what is implied by ‘business’ is also the coordination of these in a 
style of organizing (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). A ‘model’ is way of 
representing these activities, identities, purposes and their overall coordination. 
 
Importantly, we are interested here in the relationship between experience and its 
representation. There are three further concerns here 1) what is the epistemological 
process of modelling? 2) How does representation capture meaning, experience and 
sense? And 3) how does this process engender systemic change and history making? 
 
At its essence a business model is a representation of a set of phenomena relevant to 
the enterprise it is describing – a conceptual model.  Although its purpose(s) may be 
varied, it is fundamentally a representation that consolidates shared values and 
generates common meaning, and gives the sufficient reason for action (strategic, 
tactical and operational action). 
 
 This reveals a far richer reckoning of what we call a ‘business model’, and we may 
propose that the noun ‘model’ is largely a misnomer, for an object in of itself does not 
have the necessary currency to create meaning. Rather we are seeking to describe an 
underlying ‘ongoing creative organizing’ and its concretion and crystallization into a 
legitimate and understandable taxonomy. To be more precise, we are describing the 
perceptual acts of the intervener and his ability to affect history.  
 
From this perspective we may venture that that the traditional conception of both 
businesses and the models that describe them needs a more relevant appropriation … 
but an appropriation from whom and to what?  Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus (1997) 
suggest that we have inherited a legacy on instrumentality, a technical rationality 
founded on a Cartesian view.  This Galilean tradition has given birth to the modernist 




In contrast to this we find ourselves amongst an emerging postmodern, hyperreal world; 
the ground of meaning that allows us to develop an overall sense of purpose, identity 
and integrity has been challenged by the advent of a new virtual sphere of social 
interaction (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997).  This has had two consequences 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997) – 1) we are developing practices for enjoying 
change for its own sake and 2) this improvisational way of being challenges the 
development of any stable meaningful identity within society. 
 
In the introduction to Disclosing New Worlds, called History or the End of History, 
Spinosa et al. (1997) suggest that we find ourselves lodged between two ineffectual, 
unproductive and non-historical paradigms: that of the modernist legacy of reductive 
explanation and that of the post modern anti-historical future. We are faced with the 
choice to either deny our histories passively or resign ourselves to the futility of merely 
coping with the emerging future (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). 
 
Interestingly we find the basis of the modernist tradition is positivist, and in violent 
reaction to this technocracy, we now witness the birth of a nihilistic cultural disposition. 
Here, it is important to draw the link between these two ontologies. The positivistic 
regime is concerned with the systematic eradication of the human subject in the search 
for forever more abstract assertions about reality. In this process we have also 
systematically disempowered individuals and societies to act systemically, 
purposefully and meaningfully. Following this understanding, we could venture that 
these two paradigms are in fact two sides of the same coin – that of existence and non-
existence.  
 
The key to finding the resolution between these two dissonant ontological stances lies 
in the concept of history – a thing’s historical contingency validates the existence of it. 
Things do not exist independently but neither do they lack existence completely – they 
emerge as relational entities within a worldhood (Heidegger, 2011).  To take this 
thinking further, history validates identity and purpose, providing the necessary reason 
to take purposeful action.  
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Spinosa et al. (1997) maintain “the choice for us now is between the style of flexibility 
toward which we seem to be drifting and resuscitation of our historical skill. Almost 
every action each of us in the West takes draws us one way or the other. We need to 
develop sensitivity to where we are going if we are to make choices instead of just 
following the drift” (p.15). Spinosa et al. (1997) call this type of action history-making: 
the skill that underlies entrepreneurship, citizen action and solidarity cultivation.  
 
But what exactly is history making?  To gain this understanding, we acknowledge that 
this text (Disclosing New Worlds, 1997) has its foundations in Heideggerrian 
philosophy. Three Heideggerrian concepts are relevant here – background, throwness 
and breakdown. History making then is the ability to affect the pre-reflexive state (or 
background) of a situation by seeking and articulating breakdown of throwness.  
 
Let’s explore this a little further. Spinosa et al. (1997) use the example of the feminist 
movement in the last century. They maintain that the real value of this movement was 
not in only changing the way we think about woman in our society, but primarily in 
how the feminist movement has affected the pre-reflexive state of societal perceptions: 
“feminism has changed the way we see women prior to our reflexive judgments. Such 
changes at the heart of perception are the ones we designate as history-making” 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 2). 
 
The next question is, how do these changes happen, or more specifically, how do we 
attempt to engage in this profound change?  The answer is a distinctively existential 
turn, emphasizing the roles of identity, purpose, passion and situatedness (Spinosa, 
Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). The central point here is that our current notions of reality 
give us no room to become the empowered history-makers we should be – they are 
either dominated by inflexible modernist concepts or the ineffectual postmodern 
disposition.  
 
Spinosa et al. (1997) propose that what is needed is a set of perceptual tools (founded 
on Heideggerrian philosophical concepts) that help us disclose much more about our 
world, and what action that world is calling us to do. Moreover they maintain that our 




“In a general sense we try counter the tendency to look at human experience 
from the point of view of individual agents who generate action and instead 
look at common human practices and skills into which we are socialized and 
that in turn produce people, selves and worlds. The basic intuition, then, is that 
shared human practices tend to gather together into organizations we recognize 
as worlds, peoples and selves. Once those organizations gain consistency and 
effectiveness, we as people and selves bring them into sharper focus…” 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 16). 
 
Spinosa et al. (1997) term this underlying structure of existence ‘the ontological 
structure of everyday history-making’.  They go further to describe a disclosive space 
as “any set of practices for dealing with oneself, other people, and things that produces 
a relatively self-contained web of meanings” (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 17)  
– a set of interlocking and interdependent meanings that allow the world to ‘show-up’. 
This worldhood containing equipment, identities and purposes is coordinated in a more 
than equipmental manner – this overall coordination of the system is what allows 
things, people and selves to show up as meaningful (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997).  
 
Following this Spinosa et al (1997), propose articulation, reconfiguration and cross-
appropriation as processes in which we may facilitate profound change within this 
overall coordination of practices (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). What makes this 
change plausible is that it is historical, in other words that it is historically contingent. 
Therefore meaningful, purposeful and inclusive change aims to facilitate continuity 
through the elicitation of new meanings (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997). This is 
change that is facilitated as an emergence rather than that which is imposed or 
supplanted, which we may call discontinuous change. 
 
Following this we can begin to fathom the extent of our role as history-makers and 
particularly our role as disclosers. Spinosa et al. (1997) call the ability to be sensitive 
to the disclosing one is doing as disclosing that one is a discloser. They maintain here 
that there is fundamental difference between those of us who consciously act as 
disclosers and those of us who do so passively: 
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“We engage in disclosive activity all the time, whether we are aware of it or not, 
whenever we deal with things or people (disclose them) as the things or people 
that they normally are in our culture. But we are only sensitive to disclosing as 
our way of dealing with things and people when we are engaged in articulating, 
reconfiguring, or cross-appropriating. When we engage in these history-making 
activities, we are engaging in changing the coordination in the practices of some 
domain we inhabit, and then we are dealing with ourselves as the kinds of beings 
who can disclose things, people, and selves in various ways, coordinated by 
various styles. Normally we simply deal with ourselves and the people and 
things around us according to the role we happen to have. On reflection – of the 
sort in which we are engaging in here – we may be able to deduce that we can 
deal with or disclose ourselves in a variety of ways, but only in history-making 
do we actually deal with or disclose ourselves as disclosers and not, for example 
as Cartesian subjects with a substantive nature” (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 
1997, p. 29). 
 
This excerpt is centrally relevant to our investigation as it points directly to the 
phenomena that we are trying to understand – the lived experience of the discloser.  So 
from a perspective of methodological considerations, we are concerned with describing 
the experience of the discloser in articulating, reconfiguring, or cross appropriating in 
this process of history making. 
 
In addition this research attempts to shed light on why this ability to disclose has 
remained hidden for so long.  Spinosa et al. (1997) propose three reasons for this. Firstly 
those structures (cf. Heidegger’s forestructures) of commonsense, and in particular the 
ontological assumptions on which this common-sense emerges, limit our ability to be 
sensitive to our role as disclosers. What they are not saying here is that this common-
sense is not without purpose; in fact common-sense is the very thing that allows us to 
operate within a domain – “we are indebted to this common-sense understanding, for 
without it our practices would lack coordination and our lives would lack meaning and 
direction. But the common-sense practices that make our lives intelligible cover up the 
fact that everyday common-sense is neither fixed nor rationally justified” (Spinosa, 
Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 29). This points to the realization that a ground of 
intelligibility is not a fixed thing but is based solely on a set of shared practices, social 
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norms and shared language. This is a key phenomenon of our investigation – there is 
no right way of doing things rather they are socially inscribed. Moreover this realization 
makes change, development and innovation possible. 
 
Secondly there is a structural reason for this blindness (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 
1997): “once we become habituated into a style it becomes invisible to us” (p.29). Due 
to this blindness we are not aware of style, other styles and how they intersect in our 
world(s). In fact, this does not afford us the choice to be empowered disclosers; we are 
simply subservient to some dominant style.  Also when we encounter other people we 
engage them within the confines of our own hermeneutic machinery – we ask them to 
explain themselves in terms we can understand. “In this way, our very concern with 
coping successfully with things (which always includes coping with other people) 
motivates us to bring others under the dominance of our style. We thus unwittingly 
inculcate others in that style while remaining focused on coping with everyday life” 
(Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 30).  
 
The third reason is particularly profound, “because we do not cope with our culture’s 
or company’s or generation’s style directly – we have no direct way to handle it or 
come alive to it and transform it,” and this is primarily because, “we are interested in 
the things we disclose and not in the disclosing” (Spinosa, Flores, & Dreyfus, 1997, p. 
30).  It is this last point, which is most relevant to this investigation because we are not 
inquiring into business models per say but rather into how they may be disclosed. 
 
From this perspective we find that what we are asking is for is a broader scope of 
perception – a broader scope of what is relevant – coupled with a newfound sensitivity 
to the marginal, occluded and unusual. We could venture that this inclusivity - of being 
coupled with a view of things as becomings - is the foundation on which to create 
purposeful and meaningful societal change; what Spinosa et al. (1997), call 
“entrepreneurship, citizen virtue and drawing people together into a community” 
(p.30). 
 
 “This sensitivity generates the art, not the science, of invention in business, interpretive 
speaking, not persuasive speaking, in politics, and the courageous acceptance of 
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cultural circumstances, not utopian hopes, that creates solidarity” (Spinosa, Flores, & 
Dreyfus, 1997). 
 
So in exploring a somewhat sterile notion of ‘business model’ we see that what is more 
relevant to our investigation is to see these models as concretions of an activity of 
existential venturing (cf. Johannison, 2013). However, these are not merely concretions 
but creative and generative acts that in turn engender further trajectories of thought and 
create new syntheses of shared meaning. This is what Deleuze & Guttari (A Thousand 
Plateaus, 1988) would name as the process of stratification, or the emergence of the 




Lastly, ‘innovation’ is a term liberally used within contemporary culture, and 
concomitantly is an emerging field of study within business management sciences. And 
so we have many claimants to the title but few that define it comprehensively; therefore 
we should aim, at best, to venture a contextual definition. 
 
We may propose that innovation is concerned with creativity and in this context how 
creativity may be applied to business models in two ways: 1) to adapt current value 
generating mechanisms to the emerging needs of the markets and societies they serve, 
or 2) to conceive disruptive or novel value propositions that engender new (and more 
inclusive) social dynamics, and the new markets they generate. Ultimately however, 
we may propose that innovation is a form of co-creative leadership that deals with the 
unknown, with an emerging future – what Scharmer (2013) calls ‘leading from the 
emerging future.’ 
 
Scharmer & Kaufer (2013) articulate that we have entered an age of disruption, one that 
affords critical choice as a global culture: 
 
“Our moment of disruption deals with death and rebirth. What’s dying is an old 
civilization and a mindset of maximum “me” – maximum material 
consumption, bigger is better, and special-interest-group-driven decision 
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making that has led us into a state of organized irresponsibility, collectively 
creating results that no one wants… What is being born is less clear but in no 
way less significant. Its something that we can feel in many places across Planet 
Earth. The future is not just about firefighting and tinkering with the surface for 
structural change. It’s not just about replacing one mindset that no longer serves 
us with another. It’s a future that requires us to tap into a deeper level of our 
humanity, of who we really are and who we want to be as a society. It is a future 
that we can sense, feel, and actualize by shifting the inner place from which we 
operate” (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013). 
 
Following this, Scharmer & Kaufer (2013) propose that this ability – to presence this 
emerging future possibility – is at the core of innovation leadership work today. This is 
the work that will facilitate the movement from ego-system to eco-system. It is a shift 
from a place of concern with oneself to that of a concern for the whole. This age of 
displacement and disruption then is the indication that the current habits of thought and 
the actions they engender are insufficient to create this evolutionary change. 
 
Scharmer and Kaufer (2013) propose that the symptoms of this disruption show 
themselves in three divides – 1) the ecological divide, 2) the social divide and 3) the 
spiritual-cultural divide. 
 
The ecological divide is the systemic pathology of how we continue to deplete our 
natural resources on a massive scale – we are depleting our natural resources at 50% 
more than our planet can regenerate. The social divide can be seen by the incredible 
poverty we now experience as a global community with more than two and a half billion 
people living below the poverty line. Simultaneously we see the polarization of wealth, 
with the top 1% having more wealth that the combined wealth of the 90% below them. 
The most profound insight here is what Scharmer and Kaufer (2013) call the socio-
cultural divide. This divide reflects a fundamental disconnect between self and the 
emerging future Self, which represents one’s greatest potential. 
 
There are 8 systemic disconnects (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013) that give rise to these 
symptoms and great divides: 
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1. A disconnect between the financial and the real economy – this disconnect 
represents the damage speculative investments have had on the economies of 
the world 
2. A disconnect between the infinite growth imperative and the finite resources of 
Planet Earth 
3. A disconnect between the haves and the have nots – the increasing polarization 
of wealth has not allowed the creation of equal opportunities while limiting 
access to basic public service 
4. A disconnect between institutional leadership and people – this disconnect 
refers mainly to overall failure of leadership to be collaborative and co-creative, 
while creating an overall sense of helplessness and disempowerment 
5. A disconnect between gross domestic product (GDP) and well being – this 
disconnect refers to a bubble of material consumption that is not in anyway 
related to greater sense of improving the basic well being of individuals 
6. A disconnect between governance and the voiceless in our systems – the current 
governance structures fail to serve the people who they espouse to serve, rather 
the governance structures keep disempower the voiceless further 
7. A disconnect between actual ownership forms and the societal use of property 
– both private and state use of property are not used in ways that serve the 
broader ecosystemic and ecological needs  
8. A disconnect between technology and societal needs – this disconnect refer to 
the technology bubble which is centered on serving an elite few in an already 
overserved market. What is need is the leveraging of technology to deal with 
broader social impact issues 
 
These structural pathologies are indicative of a system with delayed or even broken 
feedback loops – this does not allow learning to take place and also does not allow 
decision makers or leaders to truly understand the extent of their actions. As result 
change happens very slowly, if at all. 
 
Although these structural pathologies are central to the overall failure of many global 
socio-economic systems the real problem are the mental models underlying them. We 
have inherited a set of thinking practices and logic(s) that reinforce the traditional 
economic operating system. What is needed then is an upgrade of our economic thought 
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– we need to update the essence of economic logic and thought (Scharmer & Kaufer, 
2013). 
 
Scharmer and Kaufer (2013) propose four levels of the evolution of economic thought: 
 
1.0:The state-centric models, characterized by coordination through hierarchy 
and control in a single-sector society 
2.0: the free market model, characterized by the rise of a second (private) sector 
and coordinated through the mechanisms of market and competition 
3.0: the social- market model, characterized by the rise of a third (NGO) sector 
and by negotiated coordination among organized interest groups 
4.0: The co-creative eco-system model, characterized by the rise of a fourth 
sector that creates platforms and holds the space for cross-sector innovation that 
engages stakeholders from all sectors. 
 
Scharmer & Kaufer (2013) suggest that we accept existing economic law as natural 
law, but that these mainstream economic notions transform when the quality of 
awareness within the system is transformed. Therefore to explore the evolutionary 
trajectory through these economic systems we must move the awareness within the 
system from ego-system to eco-system. This means three fundamental processes 
(Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013) – 1) a better relating to others; 2) a better relating to the 
whole system; and 3) a better relating to oneself. 
 
These three processes require participants to go to the edges of the system (Scharmer & 
Kaufer, 2013).  This means engaging with those things which would traditionally seem 
unimportant or irrelevant, to seek out the unusual and irregular parts of the system for 
indication of its evolutionary change.  
 
“Exploring the edges of the self means shifting the inner place from which one 
operates. It means opening the mind, the heart, and the will. It means suspending 
old habits of judgment. It means empathizing. And it means letting go of what 
wants to die in oneself and letting come what is waiting to be born” (Scharmer 
& Kaufer, 2013). 
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Fundamentally this brings us to the main proposition here, “that the success of the 
intervention depends on the interior condition of the intervener” (Scharmer & Kaufer 
referencing Bill O’ Brien, 2013).  
 
From a systemic point of view, this means that the behaviour of a system cannot be 
transformed unless we transform the quality of attention that people apply within the 
system.  
 
“The quality of results produced by any system depends on the quality of 
awareness from which people in the system operate. The formula for a 
successful change process is not “form follows function” but “form follows 
consciousness,” the structure of awareness and attention determines the 
pathway along which a situation unfolds” (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013). 
 
One way of engaging with this consciousness is through the practice of presencing. 
Presencing is a word that combines sensing and presence – sense refers to the future 
possibility while presence is the state of being present in moment. Presencing then 
means “sensing and actualizing one’s highest future possibility – acting from the 
presence of what is wanting to emerge” (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013). 
 
The principles of presencing are as follows (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013): 
1. Energy follows attention – wherever you place your attention that is where the 
energy of the system will go. 
2. Follow the three movements of The U 
a. Download and immerse yourself in the places of most potential 
b. Retreat and reflect, become present to what wants to emerge 
c. Act in an instant – develop a prototype, a small easily-constructed idea 
of what might be emerging 
3. Go to the edges of the self – this awareness based technology asks us to operate 
with three characteristics – 1)an open mind, 2) an open heart and 3) an  open 
will. With an open mind we can suspend old beliefs, with an open heart we can 
empathize and with an open will 
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4. Pass through the eye of the needle – at the heart of the presencing work is asking 
for a fundamental transformation – to connect with your best possible future 
Self and also with what Work you need to engage in to get there 
5. Transform the three enemies – 1) The voice of judgment, 2) the voice of 
cynicism and the voice of fear 
6. Always start by attending the crack – look for the opening for what is trying to 
emerge in front of you.  
7. Hold the space for transforming the fields of conversation – from debate to 
dialogue to collective creativity 
8. Strengthen the sources of presencing in order to avoid the destructing dynamics 
of absencing. 
 
Lenses of Intervention 
 
The method employed here involves three basic processes – 1) the encounter with the 
experience itself, 2) being present to this experience and 3) the transcription thereof. 
The aim here is to describe the phenomena of the business model innovation process in 
a rich and generative manner. In particular we are interested in describing the 
epistemological processes of presencing (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013) within a complex 
and uncertain environment. 
 
Given the above discussion, the following major conceptual themes construct the lenses 
of the intervention. It is important to note here that these lenses construct a overall 
structural approach to the intervention(s), but are not all simultaneously applicable. 
They are documented here to orientate the reader to the latter part of the thesis, which 
is centred on exploring the phenomena encountered, due to this structural disposition 
 
The As-Lived Experience 
 
The phenomenological method’s primary object is to describe the full structure of the 
experience lived. As this research is primarily qualitative, generalizations are not 
intended here; rather attention must be paid to how phenomena appear and then to what 
they mean contextually. 
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The first step is the phenomenological description, and is intended to give rich 
description of the participant’s experience: 
 
1. What are the phenomena that present themselves? 
 
The second point is phenomenological reduction, a critical reflection on this 
experience: 
 
2. Keeping this description in its original format the researcher attempt to keep it 
in brackets (epoche) – to try to bring to focus the essence of what is being 
described 
3. The next stage involves a radical gestalt view– how can we look at the totality 
of experience here while exploring the transempircal relationship between 
subject and object  
a. What is the intentionality of consciousness? 
b. What emerges as significant and salient within this context? 
c. What are the units of significance (Sadala & Adorno, 2002)? 
 
The next stage focuses on the prereflexive state, or the world that exists prior to 
reflection: 
 
4. How is the world pregiven 
a. What is the ontological structure of the everyday 
b. The main aim of this stage it understand the intervention in terms of the 
scientific inquiry – how are everyday features and overall coordination 
of the system relevant? 
 
The third stage is phenomenological interpretation, in which the four stages of 
hermeneutic procedures are identified: 
 
5. Locating those elements which are explicit and those things which can be 
uncovered through the description itself (Sadala & Adorno, 2002). 
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6. The radical cogito (Sadala & Adorno, 2002) – the researcher’s effort to uncover 
the phenomenon’s totality – it’s gestalt. 
7. The understanding of preconscious phenomena  
8. The final result of the hermeneutic judgment, that is related to the meaning of 
the phenomena that is uncovered in the research process 
 
Existential phenomenology then asks the relevance of the phenomena to a fundament 
existence of the being experiencing it. 
 
9. This existential phenomenology, “ focuses on this person’s conscious 
experience, which allows epistemological limits to be defined – that is, 
determining the way subjects know about their own experience – at a descriptive 
level. By using logical inferences, reduction of the conscious experience 
enables the researcher to locate those elements of meaning that are empirically 
present in the situation and are perceived and expressed through the 
participants’ discourse” (Sadala & Adorno, 2002, p. 291). 
 
Transcendental Empiricism asks specifically how experience has engendered thought: 
 
10. What is asking to be created or born? 
11. What is this field evolving to and what has  it evolved from? 
 
 Business Model 
 
In the process of understanding businesses as socially embedded organization, the 
following framework will be used to facilitate our role as disclosers: 
 
1. What are the equipment, purposes and identities relevant to the inquiry? 
2. How are these organized in an overall style and/or coordination? 
3. How may we apply the processes of articulation, reconfiguration and cross-






In the process of systemic evolution, the following framework will be use to facilitate 
our role as co-creative leaders: 
 
1. How is the observed systemic phenomena related to the three divides (Scharmer 
& Kaufer, 2013) 
2. Which of the eight structural disconnects are relevant to the social phenomena 
being described (Scharmer & Kaufer, 2013)? 
3. How may do we improve the overall quality of awareness within the system to 
facilitate the evolution of societies from1.0 to 4.0? 
4. How may we apply the principles of presencing to raise the awareness within a 
group of people to affect the overall system? 
 
 
A Note on Writing Methodology 
 
It is centrally important at this point to describe the structure of this work in its 
assemblage, goals and medium of explication. Although the general structure of this 
work shows a somewhat traditional structure – that of Introduction, Methodology, 
Literature Review and so on – the pieces of the work have been written in different 
spaces of time and from differing contexts. The linear structure presented here in in this 
way, is purely ornamental. Furthermore the reader when engaging in this work is 
unlikely to read it from beginning to end. Rather readers will scroll though, navigate 
through the contents page or search for words. It is these aspects that I wish to not 
ignore in the writing and presentation of this text.  
 
In this way both the writer and reader stumble upon, reconfigure and search for meaning 
in a non-linear manner; and so it is the aim of this piece of writing to emphasise this – 
by not suppressing this innate organic configuration. Following this understanding, 
there are two Deleuzian concepts that are relevant here: the first is the rhizome and 
secondly the assemblage.  The concept of rhizome in Deleuze’s work emphasises that 
wholes (moments of individuation) emerge from intensive difference; moreover that 
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these differences come together in a rhizomatic fashion, In particular, a rhizomatic 
structure is contrasted to an arborescant structure. The arborescant structure has a 
system of roots (its foundation) and a trunk that gives rise to a series branches and 
smaller branches; and then eventually leaves and fruit. Deleuze and Guttari use this as 
a central analogy of Western thought, from the Aristotlean tradition to modern scientific 
thought – which knowledge is built in developmental manner. To explore this further, 
this analogy for as epistemological system highlights a few insights: 
 
 Knowledge is built on a set on first principles (ontology), which are the 
foundation upon which new knowledge can be created (epistemology) 
 This knowledge is built in a developmental manner, structurally building new 
concepts based on interpretation of experience through basic ontological and 
epistemic principles 
 This structure has a definitive beginning and definitive end and is ordered in a 
hierarchical form 
 Most distinctly this knowledge is an imposed structure – it is an ideal form of 
which research is expected fulfil 
 
A rhizome in contrast is a horizontally branching underground stem that expands in a 
disjunctive and striated manner. Its major operation is in establishing connections to its 
immediate environment, forming assemblages that due to their virtual properties bring 
about emergent phenomena. As Deleuze and Guttari say: 
 
Any point of a rhizome can be connected to anything other, and must be.... A 
rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, social sciences, 
and social struggles (1988, p. 7). 
 
From this perspective we could venture the following points as the basic ‘form’ of a 
rhizome: 
 Rather than proposing axioms or first principles, a rhizome’s ‘first principles’ 
are that first principles can be and must be established. In this way the 
ontological assertions are not to first principles but to that which allows first 
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principles to form. This is a core theme in this work and we explore this notion 
as groundlessness, emptiness, interdependent origination; and in the case of 
Deleuze and Guttari, difference-in-itself. 
 Furthermore knowledge is built within a context of understanding, specifically 
from understanding things as emergent and historically contingent 
 An important aspect of rhizomatic forms is that they are dependent on intensive 
differences within a field of intensities – that these differences produce novelty, 
autonomy and organization 
 
The last point to see in this contrast is that arborescant structures emerge from 
rhizomatic interactions. The mistake of the Aristotlean tradition was not in depicting 
ordered, regular forms but in the understanding that these forms are eternal and ideal. 
Rather they emerge particularly from the differences within the historical context of the 
emergent phenomena.  
 
So in writing this work, I have aimed to not try ‘smooth over’ the rough edges between 
many heterogeneous philosophical, methodological and domain specific systems. 
Rather I have assembled the parts of this work as I have read and understood them – as 
an assembly of different lands, some more exotic and others well travelled. Each of 
these systems has their own basic ontologies, knowledge generating and sense making 
machinery – domains of experience. The rationale for this is that this ontological 
relativity is the exact problem of the innovator and high value decision maker must deal 
with. Therefor in disrupting the notion of arborescence, I am aiming to reveal an 
underlying isomorphism between rhizomatic production, innovation and philosophical 
writing (or what Heidegger would call thinking). 
 
This brings us to the second Deleuzian concept, assemblage. This concept in essence 
describes a relational structure whose constituent parts give rise to emergent properties; 
moreover these cannot be reduced to the properties of its parts. In writing this work, I 
had to foster a deep coupling with the several different mediums, forming assemblages 
that afforded different experiences, insights and perspectives – the phenomena of the 
process. It is these phenomena that I have attempted to transcribe here.  
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What I noticed is that these phenomena where not limited to immediate practical 
engagement with the innovation projects, but that some phenomena emerged in 
retrospect while reading a certain philosophical text, for example. So although this text 
is divided into three sections Ontology, Epistemology and Phenomenology; the 
phenomena, which I aim to articulate, occur embedded and interwoven within the text. 
This is significant because instead of formulating propositions and claims that are a 
result of a structured research programme (built on a set of axiomatic truths), the object 
of this work is the space between.  
 
Therefore in reading this, the reader forms an assemblage with the text – bringing ones 
own sense-making apparatus to bear upon the conceptual architectures of the text. In 
so doing new concepts are created due to the new assemblage; if the reader becomes 
aware of this in itself, they would have revealed the object of the work.  
 
I would like to make one further appropriation of Deleuzian philosophy, that of 
territorialisation.  Deleuze articulates the self, world and environment as a process of 
mutual codification and transcription. In this way our apperceptions, beliefs and 
perceptions are the result of a territorialisation of what he calls a field of immanence or 
intensities. In the writing of this, I underwent a process of deterriorialisation – the 
process of deconstruction of ontological and epistemological assumptions. Then 
through the process of reconfiguration due to these experiences of dissolution, a re-
territorialisation is required. This is akin to the alchemic notion of Solve et Coagula 
(dissolve and coagulate) – that the process of dissolution and then (re)formation creates 
resilience, adaptivity and tensegrity. This is the fundamental evolutionary operation in 
concepts and ideas, philosophies, individuals, societies and species – it is the central 
aspect of innovation. 
 
In this way, this work should be read experientially and not only explicitly- it is hoped 
the reader will allow to be taken with the text. The work has been written then as a 
mechanism of deterriorialisation and re-territorialisation, to create the tension for the 
reader to explore the innate truth of creativity within them. Therefore the basic form 
here is a form of disclosure, whose fundamental aim is to unconceal thinking in the 
context of innovation. I have aimed to steer clear of a clear set of propositions and 
claims (a closure) – in favour of the construction of ‘an opening’.  
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Lastly if we are to take this as a ‘formal system’, then we see that if we propose a set 
of axiomatic truths and then also definitive conclusions we limit the resilience of the 
system. Rather if we acknowledge the incompleteness of the system, our aims are 
centrally that of ontological design. This is the design of the generative mechanisms 
from which a domain of experience is produced. Therefore this work’s most important 
aim is to construct ontology, but specifically to construct an opening within 
metaphysics (a deconstruction in metaphysics).  
On the Ontology and Epistemology of the Research 
 
The compilation of the literature review has been directed by a pragmatic inquiry into 
the experiential dimension of business model innovation.  Initially the research began 
as an investigation into current methods of business model innovation. This process 
assembled a repertoire of thinking styles, methodologies and philosophies to ground 
the innovation practice, which will be explored in the second section of the Literature 
Review, titled ‘Epistemology’. 
 
It soon became apparent that these models of innovation, while explaining the process 
of innovation, fell short of describing the true experience and cognitive state of the 
innovator. Therefore, the first part of the literature review will explore thinking through 
a practice-directed inquiry into the nature of being – titled ‘Ontology’. 
 
It is this relationship between ontology and epistemology, which lies at the heart of our 
journey. Moreover what has emerged within this research is an intimate braiding of 
these two fields of study resulting in the understanding that the nature of being is 
becoming, and moreover that a theory of knowledge is indeed, a theory of being. 
 
Zizek (2004) articulates this well:  
 
“The traditional opposition between epistemology and ontology should be left 
behind. It is no longer that we, Subjects of a scientific investigation engaged in 
a difficult path to getting to know objective reality by gradually approaching it, 
formulate and solve problems, while reality is just out there, fully constructed 
and given, unconcerned by our slow progress. In a properly Hegelian way, our 
painful progress of knowledge, our confusions, our search for solutions, that is 
to say, precisely that which seems to separate us from the way reality is out 
there, is already the innermost constituent of reality itself. When we try to 
establish the function of some organ in an animal, we are thereby repeating the 
objective process itself through which the animal has ‘invented’ this organ as 
the solution of some problem. Our process of approaching constituted objective 
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reality repeats the virtual process of Becoming of the reality itself. The fact that 
we cannot ever ‘fully know’ reality is thus not a sign of the limitation of our 
knowledge but the sign that reality itself is “incomplete,” open, an actualization 
of the underlying virtual process of becoming” (p. 50). 
 
This ‘approach to the problematic’ is then the N-dimensional knot (cf. Hofstadter, 2013; 
Deleuze, 1994) that is at the heart of our journey. It is the process of invention, creation 
and objectification that creates our own identity and our reality via the simulation of 
virtualities (or possibilities). It is also this that bridges the infinite chasm of the 
unknown (cognitive breakdown), from ourselves to the shore of the known. 
 
Thus it is the main aim of this review to construct this bridge of sense. Furthermore the 
review hopes to show that innovation, creativity and cognition itself are not only means 





The Transcendent Self 
 
Scharmer (2000), in his article Self-Transcending Knowledge, delves into ontological 
themes of contemporary philosophy during the postmodern era. He notes that this time 
has ushered in a new reckoning of how we view ourselves, of how we view the world 
we perceive, and of how we act in this perceived world (Scharmer, 2009). At the heart 
of this underlying theme of twentieth century philosophy, and at the heart of the 
thinking of Martin Heidegger, Edmund Husserl, Kitaro Nishida, and Friedrich 
Nietzsche, is a fundamentally different way of sensing, approaching, and conceiving of 
reality (Scharmer, 2000). 
 
Heidegger (1993) asks the question, “why are there beings at all, and why not rather 
nothing?”.  This marks a direct inquiry into the nature of Self, and how we name and 
impute it into existence. Heidegger is coaxing us to consider the world without this 
concept and indeed without beings.  As we reflect on this, we immediately ask 
ourselves, Where is my self and where are other beings [or objects and things we 
encounter]?”. 
 
We may begin by saying that we are our bodies or our minds or both, but these are 
entirely unsatisfying answers. For example, if we consider our bodies and minds as our 
self, we may ask ourselves whether the bodies and minds we called our self when we 
were born are the same as those we experience today, but plainly this is not the case. 
The more we investigate, the less we find.  
 
The paradox we encounter here is in trying to uncover a truly inherently existing object, 
the Self.  We find that the very notion of Self is insubstantial, changing, and without 
locus. It is also for this reason that we can say that this is the main criterion for 
perceiving an inherently existing object –that through this conceptual imputation of 
inherent existence, we find the object exists in some ideal way that cannot be known 
directly, but subsists in some material substrate – whose nature itself when investigated 
cannot be found. We find then reality, Self, and other as this creative tension between 
existence and non-existence. 
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With this, Heidegger attempts to radically reassess our locus of Self and Being:  
 
“With this question Heidegger tries to conceive of reality from the locus of 
origin, from a space in which being emerges out of nothing, out of no thing. 
This locus allows Heidegger to approach reality in a radically different way. 
From this point of view, reality is not simply “out there.” Rather, reality is 
brought forth from absence into presence, from concealment into 
unconcealment. The process of ‘presencing’ and disclosing reality is the essence 
of true thinking” (Scharmer, 2009, p. 14). 
 
Scharmer (2000), continuing his exploration of the notion of Self, moves to the concept 
of Pure Experience according to Nishida (1990). This has three properties, it : 
“1) precedes the subject-object distinction, 2) conceives reality from within, and 
3) accomplishes a union of knowledge, feeling, and volition” (Scharmer, 2000, 
p. 14).  
 
Nishida (1990) articulates “reality is that which constitutes itself into a single system. 
The unifier of reality is the self. The self is not a thing but an activity. The activity in 
which the self unites with things is called love. Hence, real knowledge is based on the 
unity of subject and object –that is, on love” (Nishida, 1990, in Scharmer, 2000, p. 14). 
 
Nishida expands this notion of pure experience to self-consciousness and later to the 
notion of Basho – which is neither subject or object but a place or field of emerging 
relationships – the given-in-intuition prior to analysis and expression (Nishida and 
Carter, 2000, in Scharmer, 2000). The Basho is the primal source from which 
knowledge emerges. 
 
Nishida (1990) goes on to describe three interlocking and nested Bashos that give rise 
to the three types of knowledge as described above. The first Basho, the ‘universal of 
judgment’, gives rise to knowledge about judgment. This first Basho, because it is 
related to things in an objective way, can be related to the epistemological notion of 
explicit knowledge. The second Basho, ‘the universal of self-consciousness’, is deeper 
than the first and contains it.  The second Basho is concerned with how the content of 
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the judgment arises in consciousness and self-consciousness, while relating to tacit-
embodied knowledge. This second Basho, because it surfaces knowledge about things 
and their relationship to Self, may be thought of the epistemological notion of 
reflection-on-action. The third Basho, ‘the intelligible universal’, is more fundamental 
than both these two and is concerned with the relationship between self and self-
consciousness, and to acts of consciousness in which the self is no longer the focus 
(Nishida, 1990, in Scharmer, 2000). This last Basho relates to self-transcending 
knowledge (Scharmer), reflection-in-action (Schon), action-intuition (Nishida) and 
what Rosch (1999) calls ‘primary’ knowing. “It transcends the current self toward the 
most ultimate common ground (source) that is prior to subject-object distinctions” 
(Scharmer, 2000, p. 15). 
 
Primary Knowing differs significantly its means of surfacing knowledge because it 
knows : 
 
“by means of interconnected wholes (rather than isolated contingent parts) and 
by means of timeless, direct, presentation (rather than through stored re-
presentations). Such knowing is ‘open‘ rather than determinate, and a sense of 
unconditional value, rather than conditional usefulness, is an inherent part of 
the act of knowing itself. Action from awareness is claimed to be spontaneous, 
rather than the result of decision making; it is compassionate, since it is based 
on wholes larger than the self; and it can be shockingly effective” (Rosch, 1999, 
in Scharmer, 2000, p. 15). 
 
Lastly Scharmer looks at Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, relating the three 
metamorphoses described there to the three Bashos described above.  The three 
metamorphoses relate to three states: the camel, the lion and the child. Scharmer (2000) 
anthropomorphizes the three Bashos as these three animals.  
 
“In the first metamorphosis the spirit becomes the camel by submitting 
completely to the external reality, bearing whatever it must … The lion relates 
to his will-based reality from within, which is isomorphic to how the knowledge 
of the second epistemology (or Basho, respectively) relates to the reality that it 
denotes: from within” (Scharmer, 2000, p. 18). 
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 The last metamorphosis moves the will-based reality to that of the innocence and 
forgetting of a child. “The way the child relates to his "sacred Yes" is isomorphic to 
how the knowledge (knower) of the third epistemology relates to reality (known): both 
from outside and from within at the same time, or, as Rosch puts it, as two aspects of 
the same primary field” (Scharmer, 2000, p. 18). 
 
 
The Turn in Heidegger’s Philosophy  
 
We find a very significant and fascinating turn in Heidegger’s thought, which 
essentially dealt with a turn away from the human subject as essential to the exploration 
to the notion of Being.  However this may a bit of a simplification of the aims of 
Heidegger here. In his Letter on Humanism (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011), 
Heidegger explains that the main reason he seeks a new way of posing the question of 
Being was due to the failure of language – but particularly what he called the “language 
of metaphysics.”  If we examine Being and Time closely, we notice that his approach 
remains metaphysical in its basic ways of inquiry and questioning. This is in particular 
reference to his transcendental approach to the question of being  - specifically in the 
notions of ‘transcendence’, of ‘horizon’, of ‘condition of possibility’ and of course in 
the ‘ontological difference’ (Vallega-Neu, 2003). 
 
So we find that fundamentally Heidegger’s pursuit in Being and Time is to approach 
the question of Being, through locating Dasein. Soon after this, Heidegger began to see 
his approach here as  ‘humanist’ or an anthropomorphic mistake (Cahoone, 2010) – in 
essence a turn from many of the existential notions, which populated his earlier work.  
 
So in Heidegger’s later work we find a greater usage of terminologies and etymologies 
of Greek philosophical terms. The reason for this was that he came to see most of the 
western philosophical tradition from the Greeks and up until his time as a mistaken 
approach to being (Cahoone, 2010). He also outlines that this mistaken notion is in 
many respects linked to the notion of fallenness, articulated in Being and Time 
(Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011).  This notion (fallenness) is the structural aspect of 
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Dasein that is responsible for dealing with presence, the set of things to deal with the 
here and now. To explain this, it is useful to contrast the difference between ready-to-
hand and present-at-hand, these two aspects relate to two very different approaches to 
phenomenological and scientific inquiry. Present-to-hand refers to engaging into the 
ontic status of a thing – to describe its qualities, parts and facts. This description is 
disinterested in its usefulness, history or its relationship to Dasein. Ultimately this is 
what we see at the breakdown in the continuity of experience, or throwness. In contrast 
ready-to-hand is a concept more ‘primordial’ or prior to reflection, describing a deep 
engagement with the world around us, without theorising. Heidegger (2011) further 
explores this notion of present-at-hand as found in the now or in eternity which he calls 
presence; that has become a foundational aspect of scientific inquiry, because it occurs 
in a neutral mood or what he calls the metaphysics of presence. By posing the question 
of being within this mood we disclose only a sterile version of the world, and Heidegger 
(2011) shows we cannot mount any honest ontological investigation from this limited 
grounding. Moreover the mode of operating from this mood of neutrality leads to 
fallenness (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011),  
 
 This fallenness means Being-with-one-another to the degree that we are engaged in 
idle talk, curiosity and ambiguity; and it is through this disclosure that we may further 
understand the meaning of inauthenticity (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011).  Although 
in Being and Time Heidegger explains this as necessary aspect of Dasein, in later works 
he suggests that what is a needed is a deep unearthing of these modes of Being, which 
have been carried throughout the western philosophical tradition. 
 
So Heidegger sets out in the Destruktion of this metaphysics of presence and aims to 
return to the ‘fork in the road’ so to speak – to the origin of its appropriation.  It is from 
this place that Heidegger deconstructs this traditional disposition in an unremitting 
critique, whose primary aim is to liberate Being from the language of metaphysics.   
 
This concept of the metaphysics of presence is a central one and needs a little further 
understanding.  The main proposition Heidegger makes in Being and Time, and then 
again in much greater depth in his later work, is that the Western philosophical 
traditions have privileged a direct or immediate access to meaning – ultimately this is 
the privileging of presence over absence. Specifically, this disposition was established 
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in Aristotle’s Physics (1984), which gave a detailed account of the phenomenon of time 
defined as “the number of movements with respect of before and after” Through this 
conception Aristotle places primary importance to presence, and Heidegger asserts that 
this allows for a very static and unrevealing notion of Being -  that it is understood 
within a definite mode of time, the present. Moreover, Heidegger asserts that this 
understanding of time has been accepted throughout the philosophical tradition since 
Aristotle and so a major theme of his work is an exploration of time itself. Heidegger’s 
central proposition (with regard to time and being) is that time and being are 
inextricably linked, not in a discrete manner as Aristotle suggests but in a unity of the 
three ecstases  - the past, the present and the future. 
 
This leads us to explore term ecstasis (ek- stasis) in the Heideggerrian conception of 
time. The term literally means being outside of itself, and it is in this definition of 
temporality that we find a very distinct association with the notion of transcendence.  
This is a central pattern of meaning within Being and Time and we may argue that the 
evolution of this aspect of Dasein is what brings about Heidegger’s abandonment of 
temporality as the foundation of metaphysics and ultimately the notion of a fundamental 
ontology. 
To really grasp the thinking behind this we must first explore this notion of 
transcendence and with this the unity of the ecstasis in Heidegger’s Being and Time. 
He explains that with resoluteness we are enabled to separate inauthenticity from 
authenticity through the experience of anxiety (Evans, 2009).  This angst is the most 
appropriate mood from which to recover the question of Being.  In this attunement 
Dasein perceives the world as empty and without meaning, further the anxiety 
experienced has no object. It is this ‘nothing’ that is a necessary condition for the 
objectification of the world (Heidegger, 1995).  In the case of objectification according 
to Kant, this nothing is what creates the ‘space’ for the union of intuition, understanding 
and transcendental imagination. In the context of the discourse within Being and Time, 
this nothing is the silence from the idle chatter (Gerede) of das Man; and it is in this 
silence that awakens to the conscience of Dasein to find authentic resoluteness.  
  
The desire for a structural unity, which surpasses the notions of subject-object, is found 
in what Heidegger calls the existentential constitution of Dasein. This constitution is 
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unified in its temporality by the structure of care  (sorge) – in both authentic and 
inauthentic Dasein.  The fundamental structure of care can be found in the words 
“before “ and “ahead of” which indicate the care is fundamentally about the 
potentiality-of-being (Heidegger, 2010). As Heidegger (Being and Time, 2010) says, 
“The self-project grounded in the “sake of itself” in the future is an essential quality of 
existentiality. Its primary meaning is the future.” (Heidegger, 2010, p. 313) 
 
In the inauthentic understanding of Dasein, the structure of care is one that is of things 
manifesting as our apprehension of things, which are ready-to-hand - things, which are 
next to (bei), and with (mit) other beings. In the authentic understanding, Dasein has 
answered the call of conscience and gained a totality or authentic understanding of its 
temporality. It is after this resoluteness that the three ectsases reveal themselves as the 
true structures of temporality (Heidegger, 2010); and so we can further explore this in 
relationship with a traditional notion of time as a succession of instances. 
 
This is a key juncture for Heidegger because he is suggesting, that to even begin a 
discussion into the meaning of Being, we must abandon the very propositional and 
formal logic that philosophers, up to that point have engaged in. Indeed Heidegger 
believed that in some sense Being can be equivalent to nothing (no-thing) – that it is 
neither a thing, nor an entity at all and so requires a fundamentally different approach. 
It is from this juncture that Heidegger embarks on what he calls the ‘kehre’ or ‘the 
turning’ – central to this move is his concept of aletheia or truth. 
 
Heidegger first explores his conception of truth in Being and Time using the term 
aletheia meaning disclosure or unconcealment. Through this reframing of truth, 
Heidegger is suggesting that truth is not a mere characteristic of propositions or ideas 
but rather what truth is most fundamentally, that things are revealed. In Being and Time, 
Heidegger calls the human state as “ the clearing” or Lichtung  - this is to mean that 
Dasein is the place where Being reveals itself.  After ‘the turn,’ Heidegger deconstructs 
the notion of revealing, to that, which reveals itself in itself. So the way he describes 
the possibility of the ‘human being’ as discloser is to say that Being itself is what 
discloses to unconcelment and also that which conceals. This means that truth is when 
Being reveals itself and falsehood is when Being conceals itself. 
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In Heidegger’s essay, On the Essence of Truth, (1943; 1949) Heidegger explores this 
terrain in some depth by reframing the traditional notion of truth as correspondence 
(Heidegger, 2011).  This notion holds that whether a representation, proposition or 
belief is true depends on its relation to reality, as Aristotle claims, “to say that that 
which is, is and that which is not is not, is true" (Aristotle, 1984). Heidegger 
problematizes this claim, by showing that truth, when approached from the question of 
Being, is not necessarily only validated by correspondence. 
 
Propositions, mathematical formula and physical laws may be deemed to be true, so 
too could purely subjective experiences such as dreams and visions be deemed to be 
true; in conjunction to this there are pragmatic truths or falsehoods which are neither 
purely subjective truths nor truths of correspondence. What is the way that these 
differing avenues to truth may be in some sense the same?  So it is Heidegger’s aim in 
this essay to deconstruct what is tacitly posited in this notion of truth as correspondence 
and in so doing disclose a far more fundamental nature (of truth). 
 
And it is in this inquiry in effect that Heidegger answers the question that truth is found 
in the quest of truth – it is this self-referentiality that pervades the mood of Heidegger’s 
discussion.  He proposes that the true meaning of truth can be found in phenomenology 
(Heidegger, 2011) – ‘taking beings out of their concealment and letting them be seen 
in their unconcealment.’  Further the discovery of being is always a disclosedness of 
world (and Dasein) and disclosedness is always unconcealment – it is this 
unconcealment (or disclosedness), which is truth.  
 
In the last section of this essay (9. Note), Heidegger articulates with great artistry and 
truly profound insight, the question of truth: 
 
“The question of the essence of truth arises from the question of the truth of 
essence. In the former question essences understood initially in the sense of 
whatness (quiditas) or material content (realitas), whereas truth is understood 
as a characteristic of knowledge. In the question of the truth of essence, essence 
is understood verbally; in this word, remaining still within metaphysical 
presentation, Beyng is thought as the difference that holds sway between Being 
and beings. Truth signifies sheltering that clears [Lichttendes Bergen] as the 
 49 
basic characteristic of Being. The question of the essence of truth finds it answer 
in the proposition the essence of truth is the truth of essence. After our 
explanation it can easily be seen that the proposition does not merely reverse 
the word order so as to conjure the spectre of paradox. The subject of the 
proposition – if this unfortunate grammatical category may still be used at all-
is the truth of essence. Sheltering that clears is – i.e., lets essentially unfold – 
accordance between knowledge and beings. The proposition is not dialectical. 
It is no proposition at all in the sense of a statement. The answer to the question 
of the essence of truth is the saying of a turning [die Sage einer Kehre] within 
the history of Being. Because sheltering that clears belongs to it, Being appears 
primordially in the light of concealing withdrawal. The name of this clearing is 
aletheia.” (Heidegger, 2011, p. 81) 
 
In this passage Heidegger directly deconstructs the problem of ‘metaphysical 
representation” and in so doing discloses the essence of truth. Proposing that 
representation (or concealment) itself is only possible due to the nature of truth, but that 
this representation is not truth, it is concealment.   
 
Heidegger goes on to say in this note (the amendment in 1949) at the end of the essay 
that his original project for this work was for it to be a two-part lecture. The second part 
called, On the Truth of Essence (a reversal of The Essence of Truth), which was not 
completed because of his ‘turn’ in his thinking (he references here another work called 
the Letter on Humanism).  This points to a distinct change in his approach of truth as 
found particularly and uniquely within the human condition. 
 
Moreover he asserts that the project of the truth of Being remains unintentionally 
undeveloped (Heidegger, 2011). The reason for this is to point out that this line of 
question ‘remains within the line of metaphysics’. However he asserts that this line of 
questioning deconstructs the notion of truth such that it facilitates a fundamental change 
in questioning that leads to the overcoming of metaphysics. 
 
As Heidegger articulates the first step here is in the question of being, that is Dasein, in 
which man ‘can enter’. It is in this questioning, which is essentially an inquiry that is 
being ontological; that the clues of the essence of truth may be revealed. He asserts also 
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that Dasein discovers beings but also covers them over – that is to say it is that it is 
nevertheless ‘ensnared ‘ and ‘thrown’ into the world. However truth is that which 
discloses-in-itself, what we may venture has a striking similarity to the Deleuzian 
concept – difference-in-itself. Following this Heidegger makes a spectacular 
proposition, that of a deep and intimate braiding between concealment and 
unconcealment – that to be unconcealed a thing must first be concealed. Moreover, the 
nature of concealment is itself only possible due to the nature of truth or unconcealment. 
And it is for this reason that Heidegger uses the conjoining of two seemingly opposing 
terms – clearing and sheltering.  
 
In Heidegger’s later works, Heidegger uses the verb essencing – that Dasein in 
disclosing beings, ‘essences’ them by gathering this being into a context or ontology of 
meanings. This being an essential task of Phenomenology, this point particularly 
differentiates pure Phenomenology to Heideggerrian phenomenology described here - 
this amounts to the difference between essence and essencing. Both these items infer 
transcendence; the first is to some ideal or conceptual schema, while the second 
(distinctly Heideggerrian) relates to the three temporal ectsases – that is they are 
purposeful. Increasingly Heidegger critiques this view (his own view in Being and 
Time) of transcendence, in favour of what we may call immanence – which essence is 
found in its unconcealment of itself. 
 
In the final reckoning, Heidegger has achieved a fantastic feat  - using the question of 
being (of the authentic Dasein), he affords us a unique view into the nature of Being 
itself, unearthing a fundamental structure. This structure which makes Being possible 
is also that which makes Being impossible or if we were to explain it differently, that 
the essence of truth is the truth of essence.  
 
The essence of truth – what truth really is- is the unconcealment of Being (disclosure); 
that truth is Being’s self-disclosure. It is not that I reveal the world through my presence 
but that Being reveals itself through me.  Therefor Being is a shelter that illuminates - 
that in its disclosure it brings directly the possibility for truth.  
 
Heidegger proposes here that this conceptualisation of Being has been unthought-of in 
philosophy up to now -this means that philosophy up to this point, including his own 
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work, namely Being and Time.  He proposes here that philosophy cannot get away from 
thinking within the Lichtung or clearing that Dasein brings, by seeing that what is being 
revealed is made so by Being itself. In essence Heidegger is here (much like Deleuze 
does later) is inverting the Kantian notion of transcendental idealism; and also the pure 
phenomenology (what we may term transcendental essentialism) of Husserl.  In other 
words, Heidegger here deconstructs phenomenology to a degree that he views his own 
work, Being and Time as very much in the oeuvre of these two philosophies, taking a 
fundamental ‘humanist stance’.  
 
This means (for Heidegger) that the western philosophical tradition has always 
conceived being through the human condition, or Dasein or some aspect of it such as 
experience, concepts or consciousness. For example here we could think of Descartes’ 
‘mental substance’ or Kant’s ‘synthetic a priori.’ Heidegger here is asserting that what 
appears (phenomena) are a result of Being’s self-disclosure – therefor all previous 
schools of philosophy are seen as essentially anthropocentric, and it is this exact 
disposition that he is here refuting. 
 
Heidegger during his discourses on Nietzsche during the 1930’s explores the concept 
of ‘will to power’. He proposes that this concept – that nature (or the conscious) can be 
seen as sheer power - is the realisation of the metaphysics begun by Plato (Cahoone, 
2010). This is a truly revolutionary jump in not only Heidegger’s thinking but within 
the whole Western philosophical tradition itself. In this way Heidegger proposes that 
the essence of the approach of the west to Being has always been centred on ‘power’. 
That is to say that, this tradition always been concerned with the expression of Being 
through humans, it attempts to express control, or exert will over it (Cahoone, 2010).  
This manoeuvre has thus always been obsessively concerned in a theoretical 
understanding of Being, in the ultimate concern to control it through a preponderance 
of calculative and representative thinking. So Heidegger’s great critique of Western 
philosophy, and its approach to being has always been to dominate it and not understand 
it. 
 
This brings us centrally to Heidegger’s Letter on Humanism (1946), which really 
crystalizes Heidegger’s stance in this matter. In this paper, Heidegger   criticizes 
Sartre’s explicit identification of existentialism with humanism (Heidegger, 2011).   
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Sartre proposes that existentialism and humanism are essentially the same thing, 
because for Sartre, there is no natural order, or societal constraints which will guide the 
journey of the individual (Cahoone, 2010). In this way Sartre favours the human 
subject, that it is our very self-determination that gives us the dignity of being human.  
For Sartre, existentialism  (by negating God), leaves us alone in the world, without 
anyone or anything to answer beyond our own machinations. It is this very disposition 
that Heidegger addresses by showing that all humanism accomplished was in the 
formulation of a rationality that warrants man to override and dictate a conceptual 
scheme to Being (Cahoone, 2010). 
 
 In this way, Heidegger reveals, that ultimately humanism is founded on the basic 
metaphysical position. Moreover it follows in lineal succession of idealism and 
subjectivity – this is the notion that the human experience is most valuable and also 
central to not only Being but also the world, and nature.  This places Man in a central 
position, to exploit the natural world and the resources they bestow.  With the 
recognition of the truth of Being, Heidegger says of a ‘true’ humanism,’ that it should 
be founded on an openness-to-be; that we should become the Shepard of Being 
(Heidegger, 2011) and not suppose to be the Lord of Being.  
 
At the end of the essay, Heidegger makes somewhat of a provactive prediction, on the 
evolution of Western philosophical thought: 
 
It is time to break the habit of overestimating philosophy and of thereby asking 
too much of it. What is needed in the present world crisis is less philosophy, but 
more attentiveness in thinking; less literature, but more cultivation of the letter. 
 
The thinking that is to come is no longer philosophy, because it thinks more 
originally than metaphysics – a name identical to philosophy.” (Heidegger, 
2011, p. 181) 
 
This statement once again exhorting us to relook at the tacitly accepted assumptions 
within philosophy, and to disclose a new kind of thinking which is not constrained by 
the metaphysics of presence. Heidegger hopes to show that it is this thinking, which 
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has, lead us to crisis; furthermore to truly address these issues a whole new type of 
thinking is required. 
 
This line of inquiry, comes to a certain maturity in his essay The Question Concerning 
Technology (1953), in which he proposes that technology enframes (Gestell) Being as 
standing-reserve (Bestand).  This term, standing-reserve means that technology treats 
Being as a resource, to be exploited and used. A good metaphor that Heidegger uses is 
that we see Being as inventory that can be accessed and used at anytime. In conjunction 
to this Heidegger says that technology enframes Being such that it conceals it. This 
means technology, along with all the theories and modes of justification that supports 
them, gives us a very particular way of understanding the world and Being.  Therefor 
Heidegger is proposing that due to our obsession with technological purposes, we have 
a very different relationship with Being than was found in other epochs of time. 
Therefor Being discloses itself or reveals itself in different epochs of time, that 
sometimes certain things are disclosed and at other times not.  
 
Specifically in this essay Heidegger aims to show that, science and technology places 
a very particular threat to our understanding of being. Moreover technology itself is the 
completion of the project of metaphysics that began with Plato (Cahoone, 2010). 
Remember as we have discussed earlier, this was not metaphysics in a general way, but 
specifically what we understand as metaphysics of presence.  This enframing of being 
within the present moment that Being is shrunk to fit into a discrete unit of time. 
Thereafter it projects the ‘idea’ or ‘concept’ onto this discrete notion of time; that is, 
Being is shrunk to the present moment and that moment is then made subject to the 
mind’s ideas.  
 
In this way, Heidegger asserts that we have become alienated not only from ourselves, 
but also from Being itself.  He suggests further that the only way for us to overcome 
this error, is for us to return to the notion of aletheia (disclosure/unconcealment) – truth 
as unconcealment.   
 
The notion here is not that we should abandon technology, but abandon the instrumental 
rationality that accompanies it. Then again, the word ‘abandon’ is still too strong a 
recommendation. Rather Heidegger asks us to see it for what it is, that the development 
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of technology is permeated by enframing, and further that this is a type of unconcelaing 
which  (if it is not seen as a way of unconcelaing, but rather as the way of unconcelaing) 
conceals. 
 
If anything, Heidegger’s essay is permeated with a sense awe as much as it is with a 
sense of caution.  A common approach Heidegger takes in this later period of writing 
is to move back historically, to try finding where this enframing began.  In this process 
we uncover a great deal about unconcealment itself. However instead of learning abut 
the creative process, we become enamoured with the creation, in so doing we implant 
a instrumental understanding of things; while simultaneously instituting a blindness to 
Being, or aletheia itself. In this exploration, Heidegger suggests that we go back to the 
original revelation, so to speak and pursue the development of technologies from within 
a stance of disclosure.  
 
Heidegger asserts further that Being must grant enframing. This is another very 
profound and recursive idea, which shows the nested and interdependent nature of 
unconcealment to concealment.  That is to say, that the nature of Being is in concealing, 
but is always unconcelaing this to us.  It is the task of thinking, to recover this. 
 
In thinking technology, Heidegger urges us to return to the ancient Greek notion of 
technē. (practical arts). We see that technē is that place between fine art and creating 
utility. As Heidegger says: 
 
“There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name technē. 
Once the revealing that brings forth truth into the splendour of radiant 
appearance was also called technē. 
 
There was a time when bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called 
technē. The poiēsis of the fine arts was called technē.” (Heidegger, Basic 
Writings, 2011, p. 237) 
 
He exhorts us to reclaim the creation of technology from one centrally concerned with 
instrumentality to one engaged in poiēsis, or bringing-forth. In this way he suggests that 
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we must reunite the now disjointed practices of poetic imagination and utility in 
practical skill.  
 
In a later essay, The End of Philosophy and The Task of Thinking (1966) Heidegger 
proposes that Cybernetics is the final outcome and fulfilment of the metaphysics of 
presence or for that matter philosophy itself. Further that science is now usurping the 
role of what philosophy, in earlier times aimed to achieve – relegating it as unnecessary, 
due to the certitude it once unearthed: 
 
“The sciences are now taking over as their own task what philosophy in the 
course of its history tried to present in certain places, and even there only 
inadequately, that is, the ontologies of the various regions of beings  (nature, 
history, law, art). The interest of the sciences is directed toward the theory of 
the necessary structural concepts of the coordinated areas of investigation, 
“Theory” means now supposition of the categories, which are allowed only a 
cybernetic function, but denied an ontological meaning the operational and 
model-based character of representational-calculative thinking becomes 
dominant.” (Heidegger, Basic Writings, 2011, p. 314) 
 
To truly grasp the meaning here, we must again track back to the great historical 
realisation of first principles or metaphysics.  We see, that because the aim of 
metaphysics and the great philosophical tradition which ensued there is an overriding 
concern with presence  - the notion on now.  This foundational concept, that of a 
discrete notion of time, permeates western philosophical thought from that point on, 
such that eventually the primary conception of Being is one founded on the notion of 
information.  So from this viewpoint Heidegger claims that Cybernetics is the final 
fulfilment of this metaphysics, because it is a supreme example of will to power.  That 
is, it exemplifies an immediate access to knowledge because it understands reality as 
pure information. This is tantamount to saying that reality, in fact all of our experience 
(Being) is merely a product of conception. 
 
In this way, Heidegger strongly claims that this information age is the fulfilment of the 
project of philosophy, which began with Aristotle. This epic manoeuvre completes the 
task of power over Being by assigning a conceptual value to Being and in effect reifying 
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it as an sterile entity. In this way he calls for a renewal in thinking, which will endure 
after ‘end of philosophy’, so to speak. 
 
So for Heidegger what is needed is, an unthought of ability, that thinking be that which 
discloses. There is a deep congruity here, for we understand that this sense of disclosure 
is also the way we may think of Being. In this way he calls for a thinking, which is 
Being itself – that thinking abide in disclosure itself – the opening of aletheia, which is 
the source of both Being and Thinking. 
 
This thinking, opposed to rational and propositional thought, is to capture the moment 
of revelation, in what may be understood as ontological poetry. This moment of 
revelation is problematic due to its revelatory nature – that it requires a re-invention 
within ontology. This may seem somewhat obscure at first but as Heidegger leads us 
we find many of the clues within his critique of metaphysics.  
 
Here he contrasts Husserl and Hegel, in their exploration of the primary matter of 
philosophy – the thinking of thinking.  Saying that although the methods could not be 
more different they arrive at the same area – what Heidegger calls, the “determination 
of the task of thinking at the end of philosophy” (Heidegger, 2011, p. 318) – or the 
matter itself.  Although these moments of revelation emerge through subjectivity, they 
are ‘of the world’ and have the great power to affect it.  As Heidegger says of  ‘the 
matter itself’: 
 
“Questioning in this way, we can become aware that something that is no longer 
the matter of philosophy to think conceals itself precisely where philosophy has 
brought its matter to absolute knowledge and to ultimate evidence.” (Heidegger, 
2011, p. 318) 
 
We find that ‘questioning in this way’ is the fundamental mode of philosophy, 
beginning with –What is the question of Being – what does it mean to question  Being. 
This at the heart of philosophical inquiry, what is the essence of something; what do 
we mean by saying Being?  
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And so here Heidegger asks - is this questioning privileged in philosophy?, asking an 
innately self-reflexive question – the question of the question. He further indicates that 
this line questioning liberates thinking from philosophy – is thinking really questioning?  
Could there not be, before this question a more primal and ancient form of thinking; 
that is not questioning, but an affirmation?  
In this way Heidegger claims that although all philosophy uses the ability of the mind 
to presence (what he calls the clearing), we have not asked what is the clearing itself - 
the presencing of presence itself. Therefore the unconcealment (itself) of the concealed 
(itself) is the true task of thinking. 
“Alētheia, unconcealment, is named here. It is called well rounded because it is 
turned in the pure sphere of the circle in which beginning and end are 
everywhere and the same. In the turning there is no possibility of twisting, 
distortion, and closure. The meditative man is to experience the trembling of the 
untrembling heart of concealment. What does the phrase about the untrembling 
heart of unconcealment mean? It means unconcealment itself in what is most its 
own, means the place of stillness that gathers in itself what first grants 
unconcealment. That is the clearing of what is open. We ask: openness for what? 
We have already reflected upon the fact that the path of thinking, speculative 
and intuitive, needs the traversable clearing. But in that clearing rests possible 
radiance, that is, the possible presencing of presence itself.” (Heidegger, 2011, 
p. 321) 
 
And so it is clear in this passage that what is needed, is openness to possibility, to being 
and to thinking itself. In this way Heidegger is asking for an end to the philosophical 
tradition and a reawakening to vibrant and luminous nature of mind. To in effect 
liberate the potentiality of thinking (as tool of perceptual and social sculpture) as our 
innate right as co-creators of our world. The question of Heidegger’s philosophy then 
becomes not one of the temporal being, but of the modes of thinking and creativity; that 
the oeuvre of his work should be titled, perhaps not be Being and Time but ‘Clearing 
and Presence’ (Heidegger, 2011) 
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As the last lines of this essay leave us, “ the task of thinking would then be a surrender 




The Enactive Approach 
 
The core questions that the enactive tradition aims to resolve or at least engage with are 
how does the mind relate to life? and how does life relate to mind? (Thompson, 2012). 
Moreover what is the place of the body in relation to this; how does it act as an interface 
between life and mind.  
 
Traditional cognitive science holds that life is not necessarily needed for mind; that any 
system with sufficiently developed nervous system can be alive. Also these sciences 
believe that life is not necessarily needed for mind – as we see in basic artificial 
intelligent systems (based on a representational model of the mind). 
 
The enactive thesis conversely holds that any living system is by its very nature is a 
cognitive system (Thompson, 2012). Furthermore what makes this living system a 
cognitive system is autonomy. Therefor to understand cognition we must understand 
biological autonomy,  
 
In this way the enactive thesis has several distinct propositions. The first is that 
autopoiesis and adaptivity are the necessary and sufficient qualities of a system, for life 
(Thompson, 2012). Autopoiesis is self-production, while adaptivity refers to the ability 
of the system to self-regulate with regard to its viability conditions. Thompson (2012) 
further proposes that both autopoiesis and adaptivity are two inextricably linked 
characteristics necessary for autonomy. So according to Maturana and Varela (1980) 
autopoiesis is an internal (with respect to a boundary) metabolic process that produces 
its own components contained within a semi-permeable membrane (which is 
thermodynamically open) that produces itself – that is the metabolic process, the 
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reaction network and the boundaries – such that this self-producing unity emerges in 
the bio-chemical domain. 
 
The second proposition of the enactive tradition is that autopoiesis typifies the notion 
of autonomy, that it is a paradigm case of autonomy. This is to assert that it is the best 
know case in terms of conceptual understanding, modelling and experimentation 
(Thompson, 2012). Therefor the fundamental proposition here is that autopoiesis is the 
best-known and minimal case of autonomy. 
 
So the enactive approach holds that a system is autonomous when it has several basic 
constituent processes. These are firstly that these self-produced components form a 
thermodynamically open network and secondly, that this network has organisational 
closure (Thompson, 2012). Thirdly the identity of the system, which is maintained as a 
relational structure, is maintained under conditions of stress; Lastly this network 
specifies a meaningful environment for the system (Thompson, 2012). 
 
To explore this further we notice that, within this system we find various processes that 
influence each other in a tightly known or recursive manner (Thompson, 2012). This 
means that the basic constituent parts exert conditioning mechanisms amongst one 
another, to create a distinctly relational structure. The autonomous structure as such is 
therefor is set of processes, which creates a broader process in which these constituent 
processes exert forces against one another in a recursive and nested manner. This means 
that in a sense there is a closure amongst these processes in that they are mutually 
dependent or co-arising, 
 
Furthermore these processes are coupled to the external environment (or wider context 
of the system) similarly in relations of mutual influence (Thompson, 2012). Importantly 
the closure that the autonomous system has here is not in isolation or decoupling from 
the wider context; rather we have a very tightly interrelated network of processes within 
a larger comparatively less tightly bound network.  
 
Therefore a system is adaptively autonomous when the constituent processes retain the 
integrity of the system while being thermodynamically open (Thompson, 2012), but 
also have these features or organizational closure. It is this balance, between openness 
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and closure (the fundamental quality here of an autpoietic system), which by 
maintaining this equilibrium, establishes a relational identity. This means that identity 
is found particularly in reference to the wider context it is embedded within, further if 
the constituent parts are removed from this context they tend to atrophy or undergo 
entropy. This means that the identity of the system is challenged in such a way that it 
must maintain its integrity.  
 
The last important feature of this system is that it creates a meaningful environment; 
this means that the basic recursive patterns are such that that system is identifiable. 
Moreover, the recursive patterns that create the system also create a domain of meaning 
– which is specific to that system. Another way of conceiving of this adaptive closure 
is to understand that the system is closed, but also that it is self-regulating, with respect 
to a set of viability conditions (Thompson, 2012).  
 
The third proposition here is that both autonomy and adaptivity are necessary 
characteristics for agency and sense making. In this sense we understand particularly 
that these concepts find their meaning within the meaningful domain setup by the 
system.  
 
So therefore agency has three distinct qualities: Firstly the system has individuality, 
which is self-produced in that it defines its own individuality (Thompson, 2012). 
Secondly it has interactional asymmetry (Thompson, 2012), which means that the 
system itself is a source of interaction with regard to its environment. This means in 
essence that the system self regulates such that it has specific activity with regard to its 
environment –for example the regulation of the wings of a bird to the air around it 
(Thompson, 2012). Thirdly there are certain normative qualities of the system’s self-
regulation in regard to its viability conditions.  
 
Sense making refers to what is significant for the system from the perspective of its 
embodiment.  This means that an autonomous system is embedded in its context such 
that it has a perspective in which its encounters have significance for the system. 
Therefor the environment is a place of significance for the autpoietic system, which is 
in an on-going process of sense-making by establishing significance.  Therefor the 
environment is not merely a physical environment, but a place of significance for the 
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system – it is a niche or milieu; furthermore the viability of the system is dependent on 
the sense the system can make of its context.  
 
Furthering this understanding we can distinguish three dimensions of what it means to 
sense, within the context of autonomy described here (Thompson, 2012). Firstly this 
means sensitivity to conditions, in which the system finds itself; secondly the sensitivity 
of the system facilitates it to uncover significance of environmental conditions in 
relation to its own autonomy. Thirdly, the last way we can think of sense, is in a kind 
of directedness in that it has certain goals, which allow the system to understand 
significance (in the environment) that leads to action – that is to avoid certain things 
and approach other things. So from here, the fourth proposition of an autonomous 
system is that to live is to undergo the process of sense making within precarious 
conditions (Thompson, 2012).  
 
The fifth proposition of the enactive approach is that an autonomous system must have 
cognition. This means principally, ‘being directed towards objects’ which ‘show-up’ 
based upon the perspectival variations of the system (Thompson, 2012). This is what 
we may call, from a phenomenological perspective, that they appear as unities within 
manifolds of appearance. These perspectives can be spatial and or temporal in variation 
– a key proposition of Sensorimotor Contingency Theory (Thompson, 2012). This 
means that the system can understand these phenomena through the unity of these 
spacio-temporal variations. Therefore, fundamentally from an enactive perspective 
cognition is a type of sense-making that arises through the movement of the organism 
and from its nervous system.  
 
So now we can build on to the basic propositions for autonomy - that there is 
organisational closure and that this is regulated (agency). Now we can see that the 
nervous system, complexifies this quite significantly, in that it ‘holds together’ multiple 
cells, tissues and organs by unifying perception through these perceptual variances or 
what we may call the system’s manifold of experience. Therefor from an evolutionary 
perspective the nervous system evolves as due to the need for movement of the 
organism, this typifies animal life (Thompson, 2012).  
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Thompson (2012) says about this, that from this perspective we can see that the nervous 
system offers regulation in terms of movement and emotion, with regard to the 
environment.  
 
Therefore the nervous system generates and maintains neuronal assemblies (transient 
or more permanent structures), which in turn creates a sensorimotor linkage  - that is 
the linkage between sensory components of the body to motor neurons – which effect 
movement (Thompson, 2012). The effected movement in an environment then 
modulates the dynamics of the nervous system, which then in-turn once against triggers 
or creates new neuronal assemblies. Therefor there is an on-going circularity that 
occurs, in which the sensorimotor assembly continues to adjust to meet environmental 
demands in accordance with the systems viability. 
 
So we find that there is an isomorphism between the conditions of autonomy at a 
fundamental level (unicellular organisms or individual cells) and also to that of a more 
complex level, as seen with those having developed nervous systems (Thompson, 
2012).  
 
Now if we begin to try understand the environment around an organism, we can notice 
that sensorimotor coupling, ‘brings forth’ a niche or rather creates affordances within 
the ontogeny or phylogeny of the system, which in turn influences the sensorimotor 
coupling. This then once again modulates the dynamics of the nervous system, and 
thereby engages certain neuronal assemblies that produce specific sensorimotor 
coupling. So we find that a deep interlocking, relational circularity is developed, which 
in together brings about a world. So this is the core and fundamental meaning of 
enaction, that there is an innate a deep circularity between an organism and the niche it 
finds itself – that these two are linked such that they emerge together, interdependently- 
the enaction of a world (umwelt) through structural coupling (Thompson, 2012).  
 
Thompson (2012) explains further that the role of emotion is also of great significance 
in sense making, of equal import as that of cognition itself. So as we covered earlier, 
sense-making is the process which determines significance and valence for the system. 
Thompson (2012) proposes that emotion acts to motivate action tendencies and affect 
regulation – to orient the action of the system. Further he asserts that emotion in this 
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regard cannot be separated from animal sense making and cognition. Therefore from 
the enactive perspective emotion is produced by the complex neuronal structures that 
are responsible for cognition, in this way both cognitive and affective effects emerge in 
the same way. In a cognitive ‘event’ there are cognitive aspects and also affective 
aspects, these two aspects together bring about an ongoing feeling (Thompson, 2012). 
This feeling both motivates the system but also continues to make sense and to 
determine the relevance of the world around it. 
 
Following this understanding, for the enactive tradition of cognition is not abstract 
problem solving, but rather adaptive self-regulation in precarious conditions 
(Thompson, 2012). This is not to say that the mind is not capable of abstract problem 
solving, but that fundamentally this arises from the embodied cognition of the system 
within a niche  - that is the narrow cognition of problem solving, presupposes the 
emotive cognition of sense making. Indeed in this sense we may think that abstract 
problem solving is very narrow cognitive state that at its highest realisation assists the 
organism to act better within a context. In general then, the enactive view believes that 
the body shapes cognition in a very direct and inextricable way, further there is no 
distinguishable difference between cognitive and extracognitive processes. This view 
then is particular against the notion of separating out what is cognitive, from what is 
rational, from what is emotive or bodily sensation. 
 
In this way the enactivist tradition holds that the body is central to all cognition, 
specifically because of the interrelationship between emotion and cognition. A body is 
a self-constituting and sense-making system (Thompson, 2012) such that it is the 
precondition for the disclosing of a meaningful world (cf. Merleau-Ponty,2005).  
 
The central question for the enactive view then is - is life necessary for mind? It would 
seem from the discussion above that, yes indeed that cognition and mind are dependent 
on the metabolic process of autopoiesis. Moreover a meaningful perspective, which is 
a central necessary component of cognition is brought about by systems whose being 
is their own doing – or actually living bodies (Thompson, 2012). 
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Therefore the logical evolution of this view then is that very living system is a cognitive 
system – that life is sufficient for mind. Further that any genuine cognitive system must 
also be a living system (mind is sufficient for life) (Thompson, 2012). 
 
Therefor for the enactivist approach the minimal condition for sentience is not just the 
brain, but the whole living system which is an adaptively autonomous system that is 
constituted by densely coupled and deeply interdependent neuronal and extra-neuronal 




Incompleteness and Analogy 
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem 
 
In 1931, the German mathematician Kurt Gödel published a landmark paper; it was 
called On Formally Undecidable Propositions of Principia Mathematica and Related 
Systems.  The Principia Mathematica mentioned in the title is a monumental treatise 
compiled by Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand Russell, which focused on the 
foundational principles of mathematics and mathematical logic. And it was in this space 
of foundational mathematics that this paper addressed.  
 
From the time of the Ancient Greeks, mathematical logic has been grounded in the 
deductive principle. This meant that propositions could be established as the result of 
an explicit logical proof, this was known as the axiomatic method, because it was based 
on certain a priori truths. The axiomatic method holds that there are certain principles, 
which can be accepted without proof; and further that on the basis of these axioms a set 
of theorems can be derived through the principles of logic. So therefore, any system 
could be explained by first finding their axiomatic foundations. Thereafter using the 
principles of logic, a set of theorems then create the structure  of the mathematical 
system. 
 
The reason for the widespread adoption of this method was basically, that it worked. 
For the development of Euclidean geometry, this method produced a staggering amount 
of theorems and propositions. In this way axiomatic thinking appears in the work of 
many outstanding thinkers of our time, and its weighty contribution to the fields, of 
Science and Mathematics cannot be ignored. Following this, a general mood was 
developed in the scientific and mathematical community, with the central belief that in 
every area of mathematical thought there were a set of axioms, which could provide the 
necessary foundation to build theorems in that field. 
 
Gödel’s theorem (Nagel & Newman, 2005) showed that this was not the case at all, that 
the axiomatic method had some very distinct inherent limitations. He showed that even 
the basic arithmetic of integers could not be ever fully axiomatized. Further he showed 
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that it was almost impossible to establish the internal logical consistency within the 
system of theorems. 
 
In this way Gödel (Nagel & Newman, 2005) showed that many of the great insights of 
mathematics could not have the absolution they claimed; and that many of the great 
branches of mathematics cannot be shown to be completely free from internal 
contradiction. In this way Gödel broke done many of the fundamental conceptions of 
what mathematics was and specifically to its relation to logic and thinking. In this way 
Gödel ushered in a new paradigm of mathematical thought, which had its effects into 




A formal system is a well-defined system of abstract thought within a domain of 
mathematical inquiry (Nagel & Newman, 2005). In this way formal systems have a 
formal language comprised of primitive symbols. These symbols are developed by 
inference on a set of axioms. The system as we have explained earlier then is built 
through the creation of many formulas that are the result of combining these primitive 
symbols, in line with established rules (Nagel & Newman, 2005). 
 
In this way a formal system has the following main constituents: 
 A finite set of primitive symbols 
 A grammar which shows how formulas are created from a set of these basic 
symbols 
 A set of basic axioms, which are grounded in these grammars 
 A set of inference rules 
 
What formal systems aim to do in basic mathematics is to rule out ambiguity and 
uncertainty. In this way, mathematics should be able to: 
 Propose a statement of numbers precisely 
 If it is a true statement, there must be a way of proving that it is true 
 If it is false, there must be a way of proving that it is false 
 There cannot be a way of proving something both true and false 
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This last point is particularly frustrating for mathematicians, especially with regard to 
formal systems. This is because if you have a statement, which is both true and untrue, 
it in effect can invalidate a whole system, due to the interlocking nature of logical 
inference. This dual truth, so to speak is a paradox. 
 
For example if we look at this proposition, “this statement is a lie.” We find that this is 
false (due to its own declaration) and true (because it is asserting something true); 
therefor this statement is both true and untrue or we could say this statement is both not 
true and not untrue. This is a basic example of a paradox, a formally untrue proposition. 
 
For example we could take Russell’s Paradox (Nagel & Newman, 2005), which is a 
paradox he found within naïve set theory. This paradox shows that you cannot have a 
recursive relationship within a set – for example if I have a set of all sets within a 
system, that itself cannot be a set because it contains all other sets and would have to, 
by this definition, also contain itself – which is paradoxical. In this way it is both not a 
set of that set and also cannot be not a set of that set.  
 
Russell’s paradox is also called the ‘barbers paradox’, which is more common way to 
explain it. In this example the barber proposes, “I shave all people who cannot shave 
themselves.” However, when his beard has grown, he will shave himself, at which stage 
the first proposition is invalidated. 
 
 An interesting note, which is particularly relevant for our discussion, is that paradoxes 
are generally formed in relationships between two propositions or set of propositions – 
that is they are relational. Traditionally these statements are placed in hierarchy or 
formal rules, which fundamentally aim to supress the unwanted meaning, or paradox 
inherent within the system. 
 
This point is well ‘illustrated’in the work of M.C. Escher who visually shows how a 
paradox is formed when two seemingly true statements are brought into reference with 
one another. For example, his famous staircases, which show on the one side, them 
moving up and linked in a seeming unity  on the other, so that they are going down, In 
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this ways the stairs are both going up and down simultaneously, which is of course 
paradoxical. 
 
The immediate reaction we have to seeing an Escher staircase is to place it within a set 
of rules for our perception, that it is only a two dimensional drawing and cannot be true 
in three dimensional space. In this way the systematic hierarchy of perception and the 
rules we implant in it mitigates the risk of the paradox to our perception. Similarly if 
we go back to Russell’s Paradox we cannot have a set of all sets because this would 
invalidate the hierarchy of the system.  
 
In this way, sets cannot contain sets of higher order, nor can statements of mathematics 
talk about themselves or things of a higher order (Nagel & Newman, 2005). This 
hierarchy of rules eliminates many valid statements of the system, however it does 
mitigate the chance of there being a tangled hierarchy at any point.  
 
If we apply this type of thinking to our everyday speaking, what we would remain with 
would be completely incomprehensible. For example if I were to write this proposition, 
“I am going to write a sentence, which will explain this paragraph and also be pivotal 
to this whole document.” I would have to exclude firstly, ‘I’ because it is self-
referential, for the same reason, I would have to also remove ‘sentence’. Furthermore I 
would have to remove ‘paragraph’ and ‘whole document’, because they are of a 
higher order. What is left is an utterly incomprehensible mess – “ going to write which 
will explain and also be pivotal.” 
 
The task for mathematicians then would be to create an enormous amount of rules, to 
bypass this in an ever more elaborate manner. The Principia Mathematica was a 
monumental volume of these rules and logics and their relationship to basic axioms of 
a system (Nagel & Newman, 2005).  
 
Gödel skilfully shows in his paper, that he could still create a recursive and self-
referential proposition, using the very language of Principia Mathematica (Nagel & 
Newman, 2005). Further he shows that this is not just the case here but is true of all 
sufficiently powerful formal systems (Nagel & Newman, 2005).  
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To try explain Gödel’s theorem in a rigorous and thorough way is far beyond the scope 
of this work, however to truly grasp the import we should attempt a birds eye view of 
his theory.  
 
So firstly Gödel shows how to construct the formula G, which shows that ‘The formula 
G is not demonstrable.’ That is to say that the formula itself shows that it is, itself not 
demonstrable. Secondly Gödel then shows that G is demonstrable if and only if its 
negation ~G is demonstrable. This in essence is saying that G is demonstrable if it is 
not G. However this is not consistent with arithmetic calculus, because a formula and 
its negation cannot be both formally demonstrable, but if the calculus is consistent then 
neither G nor ~G is formally derivable from the axioms of arithmetic. Therefor if it is 
correct then G is a formally undecidable formula. Then Gödel shows (Nagel & 
Newman, 2005) that even though G is not formally demonstrable, it is still a true 
arithmetical formula, this is because it asserts that every integer possesses a certain 
arithmetical property, which is defined by whatever integer is examined. Then because 
G is both true and formally undecidable the axioms of arithmetic are incomplete (Nagel 
& Newman, 2005). 
 
Gödel then goes on to show that arithmetic in its essence is incomplete and finally that 
the consistency of arithmetic cannot be proved using formal arithmetical calculus.
 
Figure 1. A model for system innovation 
 
Gödel, Escher, Bach 
 
Douglas Hofstadter’s (1979) well-known book Gödel, Escher, Bach (GEB) explores 
principally what sentience means, but specifically how basic operations can become 
identities of selves. In this way Hofstadter’s inquiry is primarily the question of being 
– how do beings emerge from relatively simple and basic interactions? Moreover how 
do these interactions, which are seemingly meaningless, produce meaning at higher 
levels of organization? 
 
For example, when we consider the human body, within the traditional scientific 
paradigm, we have a set of primitive things, such as atoms, molecules, proteins and so 
forth. Yet at the individual level we have a system which represents emergent properties 
far greater that the sum of its parts. Hofstadter believes we can use Gödel’s theorem of 
incompleteness to help us discover this somewhat mystifying relationship. Similarly in 
mathematics, we have at the most basic layers some very primitive symbols and their 
relationships are similarly very simple ones. However, Gödel attempts to describe self-
referentiality and it is this quality that Hofstadter hopes to explore. In this way he claims 
that Gödel’s theorem is isomorphic to the emergence of a self – or self-referent system. 
 
Hofstadter employs several thinking tools, which are crucial to his thesis, these being 
Isomorphism, Recursion, Paradox, Infinity and Formal Systems (Curry, 2007). 
Isomorphism here means that two systems, when mapped have similar features such 
that these features play similar roles in their respective systems (Curry, 2007). 
Moreover there is a relational structure between these features that are also similar. 
Recursion is simply the repeating of a certain property, element, activity or process; 
this could have a definable end or halting point, which would stop the recursion at some 
point. A very well known example of recursion in mathematics is the Fibonacci 
Sequence, which applies a recursive algorithm to an infinite set of integers, producing 
the sequence – 1,1,2,3,5,8,13... The formula can be represented as a recursive 
algorithm, which is a smaller way to represent this indefinite string of numbers. Another 
example of this is in fractal geometry, whose basic operation feeds the identity of the 
last recursion back into itself (very much like the Fibonacci sequence) ad infinitum. 
The amazing thing about fractal forms is that they give the illusion of being solid 
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objects, but at every deconstruction of the object you get a similar form to the whole. 
So we find an object, which is a whole in multiple and recursive manner.  
 
Paradoxes have three different variances, veridical, falsidical and antinomies (Curry, 
2007). A classic example of a paradox is Zeno’s paradox of motion, where he shows 
that motion, as we understand it is impossible. This is because for our bodies to travel 
any discrete length it must first travel half of that distance, but to travel half of that 
distance it must travel half of the half, and this carries on forever. In this way he 
suggests that it is impossible for us to move at all. This is paradoxical because we 
obviously do move. Eventually the advent of differential calculus has helped us 
understand rigorously how motion is possible. 
 
A veridical paradox is paradox that appears to be false, but on closer inspection is seen 
to be true (Curry, 2007). We may classify Zeno’s paradox of motion in this category. 
A falsidical paradox is a paradox, which is established on false assumptions, for 
example the division by zero in mathematics. An antinomy (Curry, 2007) is a paradox 
that is reached through proper reasoning and logic and this is particularly what 
Hofstadter in this book explores. An example of an antinomy for example is the Liar’s 
Paradox, whose main proposition is – this statement is not true. Indeed Gödels theorem 
is a variant of this example, in that what the formula proposes is that it is not provable. 
 
In the Buddhist tradition, we have a further paradox, in which a thing is both true and 
false simultaneously, what is called a dialethia in Western traditions and Catuskoti in 
Indian traditions. This offers an alternative to some paradoxes, an particularly the 
paradoxes that Hofstadter (1979) explores, in that they define them – for example, the 
liar’s paradox is both true and untrue.  
 
Infinity, which is the last thinking tool for Hofstadter, (Curry, 2007)refers to the sense 
that we engage in with infinity all the time. For example the integers are an infinite 
series, so is time and also length. 
 
Using these distinct dimensions of inquiry, we may note that the inquiry is not merely 
into a static structure of the universe but into the generative mechanisms that produce 
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the universe, selves and beings. In this way there is a noticeable theme of inventiveness 
and creativity. 
 
The central theme of the work examines the mathematics of Kurt Gödel, the drawings 
of M.C. Escher and the music of J.S. Bach. What characterises all these great geniuses 
is their ability to begin with very simple building blocks, which are related in a more 
that linear way. That is they are related through rules, rhythms and interlocking 
relationships; in essence they create patterns of relationship (what we could understand 
as a formal system). To add to this these relationships are recursive, isomorphic, 
paradoxical and infinite. These tangled hierarchies are not mere complex and tangled 
messes of meanings but are some of the greatest works of art, music and science ever 
produced. In this way Hofstadter’s main proposition is that these systems are 
isomorphic or analogous to human consciousness and being; however I think what he 
eventually uncovers, much like a Deleuzian Ontology is that this fundamental (meta) 
pattern is our ontology, our world. 
 
Hofstadter skilfully crafts his book, using these three pillars of insight (Gödel, Escher 
and Bach) to understand each other, and also to understand a fundamental isomorphism 
or metapatterning between them. He describes Escher’s drawings in that they show a 
way in which an infinite series can be displayed in a finite way. Similarly Hofstadter 
says of Gödel’s Theorem, “all consistent axiomatic formulations of number theory 
include undecidable propositions.” (Hofstadter, 1979, p. 17) In this way Hofstadter 
proposes that these two propositions are analogous in that they both show how 
seemingly finite systems have infinite, recursive and paradoxical foundations. 
Hofstadter shows that it is impossible to design a formal system, which does not have 
fundamentally recursive, paradoxical and infinite features. In the work of Bach we find 
a very similar approach to his craft and composition. Bach’s fugues are a rich tapestry 
of interwoven recursive musical compositions. For example, Bach would take a pattern 
of notes and recursively re-insert them into a musical composition, at different octaves, 
at different speeds and also backwards. In this way, he would create a musical structure, 
which was fundamentally self-referential, but also different at each recursion – this was 




In her article Stumbling unto Grace (2006), Camelia Elias proposes that what is  not 
seen immediately in Hofstadter’s writing is the creative genius at work - that it is not 
only about how the world is creatively produced (invention) but that it also deconstructs 
the process of invention itself – that GEB is a reinvention of invention itself. Her claim 
here is that Hofstadter in his exegesis gives insight into the nature of inventiveness by 
constructing the book as a series of interrelated dialogues, self referent concepts, 
paradoxical ends and tangled hierarchies.  In this way Hofstadter suggests that the place 
of invention is found in the process of imaginative discovery –  
 
“As he [Hofstadter] puts it: “Quaerendo inveniendis” is my advice to the reader” 
, thus implying that by seeking one will dis- cover the place where invention 
can take place. For Hofstadter the relation between discovery and place is 
essential insofar as the question of invention falls within the category of its 
relation to places.” (Elias, 2006, p. 64) 
 
The term “Quaerendo inveniendis” translates from Latin as “if you look for it, you will 
find it.” This in itself shows a certain recursivity which is the paradox at the heart of all 
invention – how do you find something, that is unknown to you; how do you let the 
idea of an end state guide you to itself? Hofstadter suggests the answer lies in the 
relational position of the inquiry, that it itself both contains the question and the answer.  
In this way the process of discovery is that process which leads to the place of 
discovery. 
 
Elias, in her reading of Hofstadter claims that the process of invention involves a 
“simple process in aesthetic work: coming upon, stumbling over and ultimately writing 
stories out of ones own imagination have a relational function.” (Elias, 2006, p. 64) 
Specifically in GEB, Hofstadter uses, for example, Lewis Carroll to explore and 
investigate Bach’s two-part and three-part inventions and in so doing generates 
connections, analogies and similarities. This integrative and synthetic approach uses 
the context of inquiry as the process of discovery to find the place of invention.  
 
Elias explains further that the etymology of the word invention is the Latin term in 
venire, which means to come upon something (Elias, 2006), suggesting that there is 
something ‘already there’ - that it is in the process of emerging. Later the word became 
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associated with making up a story and by 1531 it come to be associated with the making 
of a device or method (Elias, 2006). These three different meanings of the word – 
finding something, creating a story and inventing a method or device – are all found 
within the work of GEB. In this way the main proposition that Elias makes in her 
reading of GEB is that, “mental and aesthetic representations involve and draw upon a 
poetic embedding into each other, making invention the matrix of imagination.” (Elias, 
2006, p. 64) 
 
This insight into invention is significant because it reveals an underlying epistemic 
mechanic or process in invention. That first there is sense of something that is 
significant, that something shows up as meaningful to the disposition of the inquiry. 
Significance is the sense of a thing, which is novel but also relevant, relational, and of 
interest - to be significant it must stand out within a network of relations, which it shows 
up as different. Thereafter this significance must be woven into a narrative to give it 
relevance, to justify its significance – it is to place it within a world. Lastly once this 
discovery becomes more crystallised, it gains consistency and becomes more reliable 
and regular. There are very clear similarities between this understanding of invention 
and to Deleuzian understanding of individuation ¬– the process in which virtual 
differences when brought into relation create actual events, further there is a striking 
similarity here between the Heideggerrian notion of clearing (sensing emerging 
potentials) and presence (bringing to being). We find this also within much more 
contemporary thinkers like Roger Martin with his ‘knowledge funnel’, which brings 
things from a mystery level, to a more well formed but still semi-structured heuristic to 
finally an algorithmic level.  
 
Elias (2006) further explores this proposition by turning to Derrida, who in his paper,  
(Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, 1989) points to three definitions of invention. 
Firstly it refers to a capacity with an individual to invent, what we could call 
inventiveness. The second aspect is the actual experience of the process of invention or 
the experience of it and thirdly invention can refer to the product itself. This sets up an 
interesting contrast to that which creates and that which is created  - how does the 
processural aspects of inventiveness become the completed form of the invention? 
Derrida (1989) in this explanation, reveals two competing meanings within these three 
understanding of invention: 
 76 
 
“(1) “first time”, the event of a discovery, the invention of what was al- ready 
there and came into view as an existence or as a meaning and truth; 
 (2) the productive invention of a technical apparatus that was not already there 
as such. In this case the inventor gave it a place upon finding it, whereas in the 
former case its place was found there where it was already located. (Derrida, 
Psyche: Inventions of the Other, 1989, p. 49)” 
 
In this way Derrida shows that meaning of invention holds within it two fundamentally 
opposing ideas – that of revealing and that of production. The crucial medium that 
differentiates these two aspects of the word is time. We can see that revealing is 
instantaneous – the moment of revelation; secondly production happens over a period 
of time as it is machined into existence. In the first sense we can see the word as 
something that we stumble over something of significance, in the second sense, 
invention as production, we find that it requires recognition and institutionalisation 
(Elias, 2006). 
 
In this way Derrida proposes that in invention we are finding a truth, which is already 
there, because once found it is something that is apparent to everybody (Elias, 2006). 
Therefor the art of invention is in searching and finding that which is already there; 
however because it is not sufficient from an explanatory perspective so too we must 
create a method of invention – a research program that validates the discovery (Elias, 
2006). In this understanding of Derrida, we see that his proposition of a transcendent 
nature of the invention - that it already exists, however this is distinctly relational way 
– that it is obvious in a set of interrelationships, or what we could name the Deleuzian 
assemblage. In this way it inverts the transcendent, to the immanent. As we see Derrida 
claims that, “the truth that we must find it there where it is found, the truth to be 
invented, is first of all the nature of our relation to the thing itself and not the nature of 
the thing itself.” (Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, 1989, p. 51) This places 
emphasis on the relational truth of the discovery - that the moment of revelation must 
be woven in to set of relational meanings.  
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In this way Derrida’s understanding of our relation to truth, or the relation to the relation 
is of particular relevance here from the perspective of GEB. Hofstadter claims that 
invention is based on a set of propositions, which consist of certain truths (Elias, 2006). 
In describing our relational relation to truth, Hofstadter claims that invention is based 
on the formulation of propositions – that whatever is to be invented must have proof, 
even if that proof is the incompleteness of truth itself – as is the case in Gödel’s Proof. 
So for Hofstadter proof is demonstrations within a fixed system of propositions. So the 
genius in Gödel’s proof is not that he disproved Russell’s Number Theory, but that 
saying the statement of number theory itself did not have any proof – therefore 
challenging the fundamental axioms of the whole of arithmetic. From a deconstructive 
perspective, Gödel found a truth that was already there and in so invented the 
incompleteness of Principia Mathematica (Elias, 2006).  
 
Let us consider this a bit more. Gödel’s manoeuvre was the very subject of the relational 
nature of truth – or the relation itself - in this way he aimed to not merely prove that the 
invention was untrue but to move back to the fork in the road so to speak and uncover 
the very foundations of the invention. This shows that every system, no matter how 
well established, has areas which lapse into ambiguity, uncertainty or the infinite. In 
this way he shows a very crucial insight: that provability is a weaker notion that truth – 
no matter what set of axioms are in place (Hofstadter, 1979). 
 
Hofstadter shows something truly profound in this proposition, for his object of 
explanation here is the relation of provability and truth, moreover that proof itself is not 
truth, rather that truth is a structure of propositions which reveal truth. In this way Gödel 
is an inventor of truth because he reveals a truth that is already there. As Derrida says, 
in his reading Leibniz, 
 
When Leibiniz speaks of the “inventors of truth”, we must recall [...] that he 
means the producers of propositions and not just sources of revelation. The truth 
qualifies the connection of subject and predicate. A person has never invented 
something, that is, a thing. In short, no one has ever invented anything. Nor has 
anyone invented an essence of things in this new universe of discourse, but only 
truth as a proposition. And this logico-discursive mechanism can be called 
technè in the broad sense. Why? For there to be invention, the condition of a 
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certain generality must be met, and the production of a certain objective ideality 
(or ideal objectivity) must occasion recurrent operations, thus a utilizable 
apparatus. (Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, 1989, p. 51) 
 
In this way, Derrida proposes that invention is the revealing of truth, much as Heidegger 
did before him. Moreover that this art of revealing is a matter of practical wisdom 
(phronesis) because it is an embodied skill of knowing what is significant, it is a 
function of sense. Further Derrida explains that for it to be truth there must be some 
ideal met, that is articulated within a network of propositions. Therefor an ideal 
objectivity emerges contextually within a structure of justification. It is at this point that 
we find many similarities with the Deleuzian simulacrum, in that from a Deleuzian 
(1994) perspective, an ideal objectivity is formed through fields of probability, due to 
the assemblage of constituent parts. That is to say the ideal is formed through 
differentiation. To increase this common ground between Derrida and Deleuze we need 
not look further that Derrida’s following assertion: 
 
“If the act of invention can take place only once, the invented artefact must be 
essentially repeatable, transmissible and transposable. The two extreme types 
of invented things, the mechanical apparatus on the one hand, the fictional or 
poetic narrative on the other, imply both a first time and every time, the 
inaugural event and iterability. Once invented, so to speak, invention is invented 
only if repetition, generality, common availability, and thus publicity are 
introduced or promised in the structure of the first time. (Derrida, Psyche: 
Inventions of the Other, 1989, p. 51) 
 
Here we see that Derrida asserts that in the act of invention we have a moment of 
revelation, which begets us a prototype, a possible form of the invention; but this must 
be created within a public space in which the original experience of truth can be justified 
and repeated. The moment of revelation relates very closely to Deleuze’s concept of 
the difference-in-itself, the original point of revelation; whereas the production of this 
truth is in Deleuzian terms repetition or the codification of the immanent into the 
ordered. This process for Derrida then is taking the simple and poetic instance of 
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revelation and creating a consistency in relation to the social world, through repetition, 
transmission and transposition (Elias, 2006).  
 
It is this understanding on invention, that we find within GEB, for although his book 
explores certain well-established themes within art, music, literature and science – the 
assemblage of these things creates an emergent meaning in its entirety; but also 
redefines the constituent parts. Hofstadter not only brings these different themes into a 
comparative proximity but also uses them as epistemological tools on one another. In 
GEB, Hofstadter interprets set theory, through the paradoxical drawings of Escher, 
finding a fundamental isomorphism. Further, taking that insight, he then explores 
Bach’s fugues to produce 21 dialogues, which creates a discursive mechanism around 
the nature of inventiveness, incompleteness and creativity. 
 
The first dialogue is named after a short piece of music by Bach called the “Three Part 
Invention.” This dialogue explores Zeno’s paradoxes of motion in its two parts: 1) 
motion is inherently impossible and 2) motion unexists. In this dialogue he uses the 
characters of Achilles and Tortoise from Lewis Carol (who himself got from Zeno). 
Further in the next dialogue, he uses the same characters, in Caroll’s “Two-Part 
Invention” which rearranges Euclid’s theorem into a paradox. The first dialogue is 
centrally concerned with form (Elias, 2006) as it explores how form arises out of 
incomprehensibility  - the main subject of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion. The second 
dialogue, Two-Part Invention explores process (Elias, 2006) in that  it explores the 
process in which invention occurs as a dialogue between the two protagonists. This first 
dialogue then, posits invention in its syllogistic form, while the second explores in a 
recursive manner  - the question of invention. These two ‘forms’ of invention are key 
themes throughout GEB, and Hofstadter aims to show a braiding between them 
throughout the book.   
 
It is a key conception of invention in Derrida’s reading of Leibniz as well, as he calls 
for a ‘new species of logic’ which, in essence we could say creates a bridge between 
being and becoming. Once again we find an inherent similitude to Heidegger’s clearing 
and presence, which aims to untangle form and then recreate it. Indeed this theme of 
dissolution and then coagulation can similarly be found in Deleuze’s conception of 
territorialisation and de-territorialisation; all of these hark back to a more fundamental 
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alchemic maxim of solve et coagula (dissolve and coagulate). So in this way Derrida 
affirms: 
 
“The game here occupies the place of a psyche that would send back to man’s 
inventiveness the best image of his truth. As through a fable in images, the game 
states or reveals a truth. That does not contradict the principle of programmatic 
rationality or of the ars inveniendi as the enactment of the principle of reason, 
but illustrates its “new species of logic”, the one that integrates the calculation 
of probabilities. 
 
One of the paradoxes of this new ars inveniendi is that it both liberates the 
imagination and liberates from it. It passes beyond the imagination and passes 
through it.” (Derrida, Psyche: Inventions of the Other, 1989, p. 57)  
 
This is very much the sentiment in Heidegger’s essay The End of Philosophy and the 
Task of Thinking (1966), which calls for an end to the philosophy of presence and with 
this a reinvention of thinking itself. However it is not through our reason or rationality 
but to understand the relationship between reason and creativity – which is, we may 
venture, invention.  
 
This relationship between invention as form and also as process is the central poetic of 
GEB, in which Hofstadter (1979) interweaves and contrasts these two notions in a 
tapestry of dialogues, narratives and proofs. In these dialogues there is a focus on 
exploring inventiveness (process) as reasoning, logic and method; and invention as 
abduction and imagination; showing that both of these types of knowing are central to 
the process of invention (Elias, 2006).  
 
Of particular relevance here is the dialogue, which is called “Little Harmonic 
Labyrinth” to explore infinite regress in Lewis Carroll’s paradox (Hofstadter, 1979). 
Further it uncovers how infinite regress both liberates imagination and liberates from 
imagination (Elias, 2006). The story undulates and embeds itself within itself, creating 
a labyrinthine network of referential meanings. Of particular relevance here is the 
notion of teleology or the concept of end state and its relationship in this example to the 
unfolding of the narrative. Hofstadter explores this by explaining recursive and nested 
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structures and their relationship to modulations in music. He proposes that modulations 
setup a temporary goal for the listener without resolution and much of the story weaves 
the reader into such a dialectic without resolution. In this way Hofstadter makes 
invention as the subject of the narrative – by showing invention (form) as a “Typless 
Wish” or what we could call an empty teleology; and inventiveness (process) as an 
open or incomplete system – that is has the ability to accommodate fundamental 
changes to the axiomatic structure of the system. It is in this way that we may venture 
that Hofstadter is offering a meta-pattern of this new type of thinking, or system. The 
Typless Wish reads, “I wish my wish would not be granted.” In this way the only way 
the wish can be granted is by not granting it, but yet to grant it would also be to grant 
it. In this way this paradox shows something, which is both true and false at the same 
time. 
 
If we use Gödel’s theorem as an analogy to explore this Little Harmonic Labyrinth 
(Hofstadter, 1979), we may find some distinct commonalities. In the incompleteness 
theorem, we find purpose and structure – the purpose is revealing itself; its structure is 
incomplete such that it offers itself up, it accommodates and is plastic. In this way it 
reveals an essential nature, which is essenceless. We may say that this is the ideal form 
of tensegrity - the infinite regress; the difference-in-itself (Deleuze) or différance 
(Derrida) – in each case we have a non-affirming negative. In this way we see that The 
Little Harmonic Labyrinth and Gödel’s Theorem have the exact same paradoxical 
nature, which Hofstadter pulls us back into over and over in GEB.  
 
What this means is that is that invention as form is the ability to create (or find) 
recursive definitions and invention as process, and is incompleteness such that the 
imagination can continually create new realities based on productive differences (Elias, 
2006). In this way Hofstadter describes recursive definitions as,  
 
“Such a definition may give the casual viewer the impression that something is 
being defined in terms of itself. That would be circular and lead to infinite 
regress, if not to paradox proper. Actually a recursive definition never defines 
something in terms of itself but always in terms of simpler versions of itself.” 
(Hofstadter, 1979, p. 129) 
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In this way we can grasp invention as a typless fragment (Elias, 2006), in that it is 
produced from difference and also differs to other things in sameness, which is not 
identical. As Gödel shows, this is the unknowability of truth – or as Heidegger would 
say, “The essence of truth is the truth of essence.”. Furthermore as we have understood 
invention as a process of discovery, we can also see that invention is the uncovering of 
a n-dimensional knot – of interlocking analogous fragments. In this way we can say 
invention is fundamentally concerned in the process of unravelling and unfolding and 
then forming and presencing.  
 
The truly astounding accomplishment of GEB, is that much like an Escher drawing or 
a Bach fugue, it conceals the infinite such that it reveals it utterly.  
 
 
Analogy as the Core of Thinking 
 
In their book, Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as the Fuel and Fire of Thinking Douglas 
Hofstadter and Emmanuel Sander (2013) propose that the core mechanism of thinking 
is analogy. “…This thesis is that each concept in our mind owes its existence to a long 
succession of analogies made unconsciously over many years, initially giving birth to 
the concept and continuing to enrich it over the course of a lifetime (Hofstadter and 
Sander, 2013,p.i).”  Moreover the constant analogizing of the mind, creates triggers 
which aim to bridge the known with the fresh experience of the unknown – “at every 
moment of our lives, our concepts are selectively triggered by analogies that our brain 
makes without letup, in an effort to make sense of the unknown in terms of the known 
and old (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013,p.i).” 
 
They begin by making an inquiry into the relationship between thinking and 
categorization. The primary assumptions of traditional Western philosophical thought 
hinges on the relationship between specific and general or categorization. However a 
category in of itself is a very ambiguous notion. If categorization fulfilled its pragmatic 
purpose fully, “ Every entity in the world would fit intrinsically into one specific mental 
“box” or “category” and this would be the mental structure to which all the different 
entities of the same type would be assigned (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013).” However 
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such a vision is naïve in its rendering of the complex richness of reality. Hofstadter and 
Sander (2013) therefore conceive of a category rather paradoxically as an essence of 
thing, which is essence-less or changeable. “For us a category is a mental structure that 
is created over time and that evolves, sometimes slowly and sometimes quickly, and 
that contains information in an organized form, allowing access to it under suitable 
conditions. The act of categorization is the tentative and gradated, gray-shaded linking 
of an entity or a situation to a prior category in one’s mind (Hofstadter and Sander, 
2013,p.19).” 
 
Categorization therefore implies a perfect naming of that which may be unknown, 
allowing for previously invisible or uncertain aspects of objects to be disclosed 
(Hofstadter and Sander, 2013). So a categorization is pragmatically involved in 
allowing us to discover how a situation may evolve and is an indispensible adaptive 
mechanism allowing us to take appropriate action.  Hofstadter and Sanders (2013) then 
propose that if categorization is central to understanding, analogy is the mechanism that 
carries it out (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013). In this way, there is no clear demarcation 
between analogy and categorization, rather they represent two states of an ongoing 
mechanism, “since each of them simply makes a connection between two mental 
entities in order to interpret new situations that we run into by giving us potentially 
useful points of view on them (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013, p.21).” 
 
They propose therefore that at every second of our day we are in a dynamic engagement 
with the uncertain – in a process of analogizing. What we perceive has a determinate 
relationship with our past as we can only formulate categories through analogy. 
Moreover what we perceive determines our actions – the core adaptive capacity of 
thinking.  So it is centrally the analogizing mechanism that is at the heart of invention, 
which liberates the pure force of creativity into the emergence of the novel.  
 
“We claim that cognition takes place thanks to a constant flow of categorizations, and 
that at the base of it all is found, in contrast to classification (which aims to put all 
things into fixed and rigid mental boxes), the phenomenon of categorization through 
analogy-making, which endows human thinking with its remarkable fluidity 
(Hofstadter and Sander, 2013, p.25).” 
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This movement of mind as category-generating analogizing machine allows for rapid 
inferences with relation to the uncertainty of perception. Rather than knowing things in 
a direct manner we engage in a reality of inferential objects.  These objects themselves 
are insubstantial as they a constructed by analogies to other inferences, ad infinitum. 
This is of crucial and primordial importance to the survival of an organism, as 
Hofstadter and Sanders articulate, “if you try to imagine what it would be like to 
‘perceive’ the world in a manner entirely devoid of categories – something like how 
the world must appear to the newborn… Thus if there were two creatures, one of which 
(an adult human being) perceived the world using categorization through analogy while 
the other (a computer) had no such mechanism to help it out, their competition in 
understanding the world around them would be comparable to a race between a person 
and a robot to climb up to a high roof, with the human allowed to use a preexistent 
staircase but the robot required to construct its own staircase from scratch (Hofstadter 
and Sander, 2013,p.35).” 
 
In addition to this, Hofstadter and Sanders (2013) propose that analogizing is 
effectuated in a multiplicity of layers and in a nested and interdependent nature – ‘that 
categorization through analogy drives thinking on all levels’.  They take the example 
of a conversation in which several hierarchical linguistic levels are operating, “ First of 
all the choice of a specific word will of course determine the sounds that make it up; 
similarly, when one is typing at one’s keyboard, each word chosen determines the 
letters composing it, so that they come along automatically rather than being chosen 
one by one. Analogous words are often determined by larger structures of which they 
are but pieces. This happens most clearly whenever one uses a stock phrase (such as 
‘so to speak’ or ‘cut to the chase’ or ‘down to the wire’ or ‘when push comes to shove’ 
or ‘as easy as stealing candy form a baby’), but it also often happens when no such 
expression is involved, because one is always working under the syntactic and semantic 
patterns of the language one is speaking as well as one’s own habitual speech patterns 
(Hofstadter and Sander, 2013,p.36).” 
 
In this way we find a few striking points: firstly that sensory data is handled through 
categorization by analogizing, secondly these analogies are determined within the 
context of past experiences (themselves analogies), thirdly an analogical trope is 
instantiated as the sufficient reason for action and lastly, this analogical tensegrity 
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coordinates action in a hierarchical and nested manner.  This analogical structure then 
determines the first point in an on-going and dynamic apprehension of reality. The 
structural integrity described here is founded on an irreducibility of the interrelating 
parts – that neither part is a part of itself but rather a processural movement of 
becoming.  
 
Hofstadter and Sanders indicate also that this principle of counter-effectuation in the 
production of a linguistic integrity occurs on multiple global, local and recursive levels.  
 “Thus as much as with letters being constrained by  word, the words are in a 
sense constrained by higher-level thoughts. And then moving further upwards, 
we can say that the same holds when one is developing an idea; that is the 
sentences one produces to express the idea are once again constrained by a yet 
higher-level structure, even if there is more freedom at this level than at the 
letter-choice level. And the same holds at the level of the conversation itself, 
because its overall topic, its tone, the particular people involved and so forth all 
constrain the ideas that will be thought of … in summary a conversation 
constrains the ideas in it, the ideas constrain the sentences, the sentences 
constrain the phrases, the phrases constrain the words and finally the words 
constrain the letters (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013,p.43).”  
 
In this insightful inquiry into the nature of linguistic structure, Hofstadter and Sanders 
point not merely to structure of language but to an ontological explanation of the 
production of reality.  
 
In the closing chapters of their book, Hofstadter and Sanders explore that thesis that the 
greatest strokes of genius, insight and innovation come from the cultivated mental 
activity of analogy making.  In particular they explore the genius of Einstein and how 
his particular thinking style, afforded him the ability to revolutionize the scientific 
world and disclose new realities that catapulted human evolution.  
 
The discoveries made by Einstein, suggested that he saw unities, similarities and 
connections where almost no one else in the world saw. The fundamental insight here 
is not only that he made rich and fruitful analogies between previously unrelated 
concepts or principles, but that underlying everything he did there was unifying and 
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guiding belief  - an analogical trope. This was of universal unity – it was this analogy 
of cosmic harmony and unity that drove Einstein creating the creative and cognitive 
dissonance to disclose a reality for its fulfilment (Hofstadter and Sander, 2013).   
 
“My unflagging faith in natures uniformity leads me to conclude that it must be 
possible for an ordinary lump of matter possessing normal mass to be converted 
into a quantity of strange mass or visa versa, even though nothing of the sort 
has ever been seen anywhere. (Einstein in Hofstadter and Sander, 2013).”   
 
So we find that Einstein’s unwavering belief in cosmic unity allowed him to perceive 
or intuit that which others couldn’t. 
Epistemology 
Self-Transcending Knowledge 
Scharmer (2009) in his book Theory U: Learning from the Future as It Emerges asks 
us to consider not how we may change a system, model or organization but rather how 
‘we’ or ‘I’ can change in order to facilitate the change that is asking to emerge. Like 
Martin (and others) he differentiates between learning from the past and what Scharmer 
(2009) calls learning from the future as it emerges.  
 
“Learning from the future is vital to innovation. Learning from the future 
involves intuition. It involves embracing high levels of ambiguity, uncertainty, 
and willingness to fail. It involves opening ourselves to the unthinkable and 
sometimes attempting to do the impossible. But the fears and risks are balanced 
by feeling ourselves part of something important that is emerging that will truly 
make a difference (Scharmer, 2009,p.21).”  
 
This quality of the leader, to presence and sense opportunities and possibilities not yet 
actualized and then bring them into being – is one that is now a necessity.  
 
“Leaders are confronted with this question to face a new challenge. The 
challenge is to develop the capacity for ‘precognition,’ the ability to sense and 
actualize emerging potentials. To do this, leaders must be able to see the 
emerging opportunities before they become manifest in the marketplace. This 
kind of knowledge can be thought of as knowledge prior to its embodiment, or 
‘self-transcending’ knowledge (Scharmer, 2000,p.6).” 
 
Scharmer uses the example of a painter to outline this aspect, “there are three ways to 
look at a painter and her work: one can look 1) at the completed painting; 2) one can 
watch the painter in the process of painting; or 3) one can watch the painter before she 
lifts a brush, as she considers the blank canvas”(2009,p.6)  The painting itself is the 
explicit outcome of the artist activity, while the process of painting will show the artists 
tacit ability in bringing the painting into being; and lastly the artist in front of the blank 
canvas shows how the artist senses the emerging painting (Scharmer, 2009).  This last 
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point, not-yet embodied knowledge or self-transcending knowledge is a central 
capacity of the modern leader – “the capacity to sense and actualize emergent realities 
distinguishes great entrepreneurial leaders from the rest (Jaworski and Scharmer, 2000, 
p.6).” 
 
In his essay, Self-Transcending Knowledge Scharmer (2000) begins by differentiating 
between the knowledge management discussions of the late 1990’s, whose main 
concern was around two forms of knowledge – explicit and tacit (Scharmer referencing 
Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995).  He then proposes a third form of knowledge – self-
transcending knowledge.  
 
 
Figure 2 Scharmer's Knowledge Model 
 
 
Using the analogy of ‘baking’ Scharmer outlines self-transcending knowledge as tacit 
knowledge prior to its embodiment: “Certain kinds of information about bread – like 
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weight, price and ingredients- are examples of explicit knowledge. The activities of 
baking and producing the bread are examples of tacit knowledge and knowledge that 
enables a baker to invent baking in the first place is an example of not-yet embodied 
knowledge”(2000,p.5). 
 
He then couches his investigation into the history of Knowledge Management (KM) 
using these three types of knowledge as a benchmark. The first phase of knowledge 
management arose around information technology and whose focus was primarily on 
explicit structures of knowledge management – ‘Knowledge was conceived of as a 
thing (Scharmer, 2009). This understanding of knowledge as nothing but information 
allowed it to be stored in databases and manipulated by information processing 
methods. 
 
The second phase emphasizes the process of knowledge as the most important aspect 
(Scharmer referencing Nonaka, 2000). “ Knowledge creation evolves in a spiralling 
movement between the explicit and the implicit knowledge held by individuals, teams, 
and the organization (Scharmer, 2000,p.6).” 
 
The question then emerges, what is the force that drives the knowledge spiral itself? 
The third phase of KM then focuses here on the cognitive state that allows tacit 
knowledge to emerge in the first place (Scharmer, 2000;2009). “ Examples of this form 
of knowing are what Nonaka and Konno (1998) call “originating ba”; what von Krogh 
(1998) refers to with his notion of “care”; what Senge (1990) calls “personal mastery”; 
what Kappler (1993) calls “presencing”; and what Scharmer (1999) calls “not-yet-
embodied” knowledge (Scharmer, 2000).” 
 
“All of these refer to a territory of knowledge formation that is upstream from 
both explicit and tacit-embodied knowledge. It is the kind of knowledge Buber 
(1970) meant when he talked about the basic word “I-Thou,” and Heidegger 
(1993) meant when he talked about Being as “coming from absence into 
presence” and truth as coming from “concealment into unconcealment,” and 
what the Japanese philosopher Nishida was referring to when he spoke of “pure 
experience” (1990) and “action intuition” (1987). All of these scholars point at 
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a formative state of knowledge that precedes the separation of subject and 
object, or knower and known, as we will see in the following sections 
(Scharmer, 200,p.7).” 
 
In this way Scharmer (2000, 2009) proposes two forms of tacit knowledge – tacit 
embodied knowledge and not-yet-embodied knowledge. This is significant because of 
the epistemological assumptions that underpin them are distinct and requires different 
types of knowledge infrastructure. Moreover as Scharmer indicates, “ differentiation 
among markets with decreasing, steady and increasing returns suggests in order to 
successfully compete for increasing return markets leaders need a new type of 
knowledge that allows them to “sense and actualize what wants to emerge” (Jaworski 
and Scharmer, 2000).” 
 
Scharmer then maps the landscape of KM, using three epistemological distinctions and 
four ontological distinctions based on corporate action. The epistemological 
distinctions are explicit knowledge (K1), tacit knowledge (K2) and self-transcending 
knowledge (K3). The ontological distinctions he outlines are (Scharmer, 2009): 
 A1: delivering results that create value (performing) 
 A2: improving the process-based context of performing (redesigning)  
 A3: improving the assumption-based context of performing (reframing)  
 A4: improving the intention-based context of performing (regenerating) 
 
A1 or delivering customer focused value creation in the end point of the other three 
underpinning processes, which act primarily to fulfil it. Table 1. Shows how these three 
ontological dimensions interact with the three epistemological dimensions K1, K2, K3 






Figure 3. Twelve Types of Knowledge (Scharmer, 2000,p.8) 
 
 
Plotting the history and development of Knowledge Management, Scharmer elucidates 
three stages of development, Act 1: Knowledge About Things, Act 2: Knowledge About 
Doing Things and Act 3: Knowledge About Thought as the Origin of Doing Things. 
 
The first act understands knowledge as merely the aggregation of data accompanied by 
a set of rules for its translation into meaning full information. “ Examples of this are a 
balance sheet (know what), accounting rules (know-how), reports based on activity-
based costing (know-why), and the purpose statement of the company (know-who) 
(Scharmer, 2009). Knowledge here is an objective and explicit piece of information 
about the reality that it denotes. The main concern here is “ how do these explicit types 
of knowledge relate and contribute to the capacity to innovate and create value 
(Scharmer, 200,p.9).” 
 
The second act is concerned with the interplay between explicit knowledge and tacit 
embodied knowledge.  Scharmer (2009) attributes much of the progress in this area to 
the work of Nonaka and Takecuchi (1995): “What I found was that the existing theory 
of information processing is not enough. The process of innovation is not simply 
information processing; it’s a process to capture, create, leverage, and retain knowledge 
(Scharmer quoting Nonaka, 2000, p.9).” The knowledge creating organization then is 
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one that acknowledges both stages of knowledge creation – explicit and tacit-embodied 
knowledge - and works on refining the interplay between these two aspects, in what 
Scharmer (2009) terms ‘an ever evolving ‘knowledge spiral.’ This stage is concerned 
with how knowledge is situated (Orlikowski, 1996), embodied and tacit – not only with 
the external reality but about enacting that reality. Following this Scharmer (2000) 
skilfully unites the themes of this period into four aspects (a) knowledge in use (Lave 
and Wenger, 1991); (b) theories in use (Argyris and Schön, 1996); (c) culture and 
metaphysics in use (Schein, 1992; v. Krogh and Roos, 1995); and (d) aesthetics in use 
(Monthoux, 1993; Scharmer, 1991).” 
 
The last act as proposed by Scharmer focuses on the question, “what drives the 
knowledge spiral itself?” This act points to that state beyond traditional notions of self 
and object and between reality and imagination.  
 
“On this stage knowledge is situated in an incipient not-yet-acted reality that is 
brought into existence through an act of action-intuition (Nishida) or presencing 
(Heidegger). The terms “action-intuition” and “presencing” signify a state of 
mind that transcends the distinctions between “inside” and “outside,” between 
“I” and “thou,” and between knowing and acting (Scharmer, 2000). This stage 
is concerned with how the three stages of knowing are enacted simultaneously 
(Scharmer, 2000,p.10).” 
 
These three acts have three different underpinning epistemological assumptions – 
different relationships between knower and known (Scharmer, 2000). These are 
outlines in Table 2 below. 
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Figure 4 Three Epistemological Stances (Scharmer,2000,p.12) 
 
Explicit knowledge is knowledge about things and its data point is observed reality, its 
experience type is based on observation and its conceptualization is based on reflection 
without action. It’s criterion for truth is ‘Can you observe it?” Tacit embodied 
knowledge is knowledge about things we do and its data point is situated and enacted 
reality, its experience is type is based on action. Capturing this type of Knowledge 
requires reflection on ones actions or reflection-on-action and its criterion for truth is, 
‘Can you create it?’ The last type of knowledge – not-yet-embodied knowledge is 
concerned with that place “where thought and action come into being’ (Scharmer, 
2000,p.12).” Scharmer explains (2000) that the experience type is based on aesthetic or 
pure experience (Nishida 1990). In order to capture this most upstream level of social 
action, we have to engage in what Schön (1983) calls “reflection-in-action,” in what 
Csikszentmihalyi (1991) calls “flow,” or in what Rosch calls primary knowing (1999).” 
 
These three acts, as we can see have three distinct epistemological notions, meaning 
three different notions between knower and known. With explicit knowledge, “ the 
knower produces a statement about the outside (reality) but cannot bring it into 
existence, the known. From this point of view knowledge represents a thing (Scharmer, 
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2000). The second act is related to knowledge within about a living process and its 
enactment. Self-transcending knowledge is relates to reality from both within and from 
outside. As Scharmer (2000) indicates the locus of the denoted reality is both outside 
and inside; or as Nishida states (in Scharmer, 2000) neither outside nor inside the 
knower. 
 
The Cultural Innovator  
 
The above-discussed ontological stances (which we may call distinctly Postmodern) 
describe or articulate certain groundlessness to as-lived-reality. They have emerged 
largely as a critical discussion and dissatisfaction around the master narratives of the 
Modernist era (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008). These philosophies such as “ Marxism, 
laeissez-faire capitalism, positivistic science, Lockean liberalism, and the systemic and 
totalitarian philosophies of Hegelian and post-Hegelian philosophies have given rise to 
multiple ways of thinking and patterns of behavior (Martin & Moldovenau, 
2008,p.26).”  Each structured on a set of ideals or posited beliefs that have created a 
lens in which to act-in-the-world. These ontological stances each create a realm of 
possibilities and it if is for this reason that they are invaluable mechanisms in the 
generation of reality (or realities). However it should be also acknowledged that no one 
stance (unless it is one that is ungrounded in a set of inherent truisms) is able to deal 
with the complexity of the modern organizations or market place.  
 
We see in our societies, organizations and business practices as a multitude of layered 
ontological narratives that are woven inextricably, each “equally legitimate or 
illegitimate, depending on their context and purpose (Martin & Moldovenau, 
2008,p.26).” This is the hallmark of the postmodern era – “many value systems, many 
ways of knowing, many ways of acting and relating – many ways of managing – and 
many ways of choosing among them (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008,p.26).” It is the role 
of the innovator, entrepreneur and high value-decision-maker is to be a point of 
synthesis in the generation of shared (and even transcendental) meaning or ultimately 
Shared Praxis (Scharmer, 2000). This arena of shared meaning or consensual reality 
unifies worldviews. We may also note that, that the interaction between many 
worldviews may often bring breakdown, especially in synergistically engaged and 
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coupled systems such as in organizations and societies. This is because, “In the 
postmodern era, self evidence is dead: no single way is evidently valid to everyone in 
virtue of its claims. Monoparadigmaticity is a cultural relic (Martin & Moldovenau, 
2008,p.27).” 
 
This breakdown offers an opportunity for cultural innovation, technology development 
and synthesis of new meanings. It is therefore the role of the cultural innovator to 
facilitate this purpose (Martin & Moldovenau, 2008). He or she must be able to 
internalize the clash among multiple, incommensurable views of the world and resolve 
this clash productively.  
 
In recognizing this fundamental quality, we simultaneously see the need for a new way 
thinking and acting, an embodied and integrative approach. So where do we start? The 
first place is addressing the ontological and epistemic foundations under which 
entrepreneurship, innovation and strategic management occur.  We see that currently 
these practices operate embedded in a set of worldviews that dictate the potentiality of 
the action. For example; entrepreneurship traditionally operates under means of 
creating some new value proposition and thereby creating a new market or providing 
value in a novel way to an existing market. However these conceptions of value, market 
and novelty are treated as absolute – as if they could be applied acontextually.  The 
blindness of this objective stance disempowers the entrepreneur fundamentally to 
understand the problem space – there is no self-evident value to provide to some 
uniform and objectively understood customer.  
 
So how does it come to be that the entrepreneur acts within this worldview? It is with 
unawareness that these modes of operating are accepted  - as a process of Being; of 
living in language We see then, the innovator, inept and disillusioned (Martin 
Moldovenau, 2008, Johannison,2011) and with it we see failure of such an astounding 
amount of new ventures that we have come to take for granted the high risk nature of  
these new ventures. It is this breakdown, this area that holds the key to a reformation 
of the innovative practice. If alternatively the entrepreneur or innovator understands the 
situated-ness of his venture or invention s/he may begin a dialogue with the 
environment, the customer or user and also himself – what Johannisson (2011) has 
called existential venturing. This may be thought of as the realization that cultural 
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innovation is a process of identity crafting, in order to meet the context of the venture.  
Moreover a deep sense of responsibility for your existence in that situation and at that 
time is needed -understanding the creation of meaning as one that emerges from this 
reflective act.  - The fundamental existential stance.  The primary quality of The 
Cultural Innovator then is the ability to reflect and act in the face of dissonance and 
opposing worldviews. The primary ontological basis for this is the realization of the 
groundlessness of reality and the construction of meaning as situated. The 
epistemological function then is one that is iterative, emergent and both historically and 
socially contingent. 
 
As Martin and Moldovenau indicate, “The postmodern condition of management may 
be understood as the percolation into organizational reality and managerial practice of 
dilemmas and conundrums that have inhabited the core of epistemology and analytical 
philosophy” (2008, p.28). We may extend this insight to many aspects of cultural and 
technological innovation as well as entrepreneurship as an encompassing practice. In 
this way we can appropriate many post modern philosophical stances as starting point 
in the reforming of theory and practice of innovation and entrepreneurship (Martin and 
Moldovenau, 2008).  
 
This multiplicity of meanings and representations can only be held together – integrated 
and synthesized – by an ontological stance of radical interdeterminacy (Martin and 
Moldovenau, 2008 referencing Quine, 1951). This is a very interesting and central point 
in describing the as-lived experience of the cultural innovator because it means that on 
a fundamental ontological level there must be an acceptance of a world of many 
meanings and interpretations and that these worldviews are made due to its groundless 
nature. 
 
Radical interdeterminacy then suggests “these different representations – which come 
alive through managerial action and make themselves into separate realities- cannot be 
guaranteed to connect to each other…(Martin and Moldovenau, 2008, p.55).” 
Therefore decisions cannot be made on a sound logical argument alone, rather the most 
plausible or most valid choice must be made. It is this cognitive capacity; to choose 
without the possibility of objectively reducing to axiomatic premises, that is a 
profoundly creative act. The integrative thinker then must act when there are no 
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incontrovertible premises from which to motivate. Rather plausibility and meaning 
must be made through that action. 
 
Consequently this indicates that the integrative thinker must have a high plastic 
cognitive ability while having a good theoretical and philosophical understanding of 
these concepts. Granted, these are innate and tacit abilities, yet all tacit ability comes 
through reflexive understanding (hermeneutics). As Martin Moldovenau  state, “the 
very problem of ontological choice must be understood and accepted before it can be 
cultivated as a core managerial ability” (2008, p.63) 
 
The Hermeneutic Circle, which may be described as - theory, method, observation, 
interpretation and new theory - indicates the circularity of generating new meaning. It 
also highlights the interdependent and synthetic nature of interpretation. 
 
This process is the basis of how we make decisions to act – by observing and 
interpreting and then theorizing we make a choice. Heidegger (1927, Being and Time) 
explains (with regard to the Hermeneutic Circle) that this process is determined largely 
by the “forestructures’ that apprehend it. This means that the only way a thing may be 
known is through a background of interlocking meanings and representations (cf. 
Maturana, 1974). It points to a coupling between they way we represent things and how 
we investigate them – “What you know, how you know it, what you take to be real, and 
what you take the import of reality to be in the constitution of knowledge are 
intertwined (Martin and Moldovenau, 2008, p.63).” 
 
 Theories for understanding or interpreting the world emerge as dependent on the 
methods that give rise to them and are consequently bound to the epistemological 
rationality that founded the inquiry.  Moreover there is no trans-paradigmatic metric 
that may measure the quality of a theory acontextually (Martin and Moldovenau, 2008), 
rather theories must be verified or refuted within its own standards of epistemic 
rationality.   
 
It is the quality of the integrative thinker then to design a course of action that unifies 
not only competing paradigms and worldviews, but also the meaning generating 
apparatus that support them – their epistemic rationality (Martin and Moldovenau, 
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2008). What is required for the cultural innovator and integrative thinker is an 
engagement in these circular hermeneutic worlds not only at a logical and pragmatic 
level but also simultaneously on ontological and epistemic level. 
 
Investigating how choices of theories and models are made further, Martin and 
Moldovenau (2008) indicate that it is only partially based on data and the articulation 
of data... “ But also on choice based on unconscious theories. They cite Pierre Duheim’s 
data undetermine theory, which states ‘that even if a datum refutes a theory, it is still 
possible to salvage that theory by making changes to its assumptions, to the theories 
which the measurement apparatus that has produced the datum is based (Martin and 
Moldovenau, 2008).’  All these factors point to a complex and nondeterministic 
relationship between theory, evidence and data; that there is a underlying and persistent 
subjectivity to reality.  
 
As Martin and Moldovenau (2008) explain, “what you say you see does not depend 
only on what you see and the structure of English; rather, there are, once again, choices 
to be made when you put your experiences in words, even though these choices of 
which we may not always be conscious” (p.65). 
 
It is an important role of the integrative thinker then as articulator (Johannisson; 
Spinosa et al. 1997; Martin and Moldovenau, 2008). This is the process of making sense 
of a complex social world and mediating that meaning – sensgiving (Johannisson, 2011; 
Martin and Moldovenau, 2008). 
 
This indicates how central the act of thinking is in this area; indeed it is ultimately the 
process of thinking about thinking structures themselves that is what is required  
(Martin and Moldovenau, 2008). It is this way that the integrative thinker must 
constructively bridge multiple hermeneutic circles, making sense of numerous theories 
and methodologies existing in varying worldviews.  
 
The integrative capacity then is the ability to think reflexively and act responsibly “in 
the face of multiple, incommensurable, and possibly conflicting models of oneself, the 
world and others (Martin and Moldovenau, 2008,p.8). Moreover we may understand 
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these models to not be only theoretical or representational but also embodied aspects 
such as, ”modes of argumentation, justification and personal technologies for 
understanding oneself and others (Martin and Moldovenau, 2008,p.8).” 
 
We recognize here how this is an innate and tacit ability, one that cannot be reduced to 
the algorithmic level and one that may not be fully explicitly represented (Martin and 
Moldovenau, 2008). In this way Martin and Moldovenau suggest that fostering ‘
productive stances and modes of being,’ rather than a dissemination of instrumental 
methods and techniques may inculcate these tacit abilities. Knowing that when thrown 
into the world it is impossible to be consciously aware of ones action, rather it is 
suggested that this capacity must be embodied, it must become a way of being. This 
understanding outlines the importance of an ethics and values based approach to the 
management of innovation. 
 
In building a tacit ability we notice that it is a way of being, that is to say it is building 
a disposition – an embodied stance. If we reflect on the meaning implied here, we may 
say that this is an autpoietic function. That the integrative thinker will organize and 
reorganize to meet environmental demands is very appropriate in describing a tacit and 
embodied ability; and although this ability will undoubtedly employ algorithmic and 
technical skills they will be used contextually and relevantly.  
 
We may further infer that this embodiment, due to its nature must be fostered through 
a deep reflexive act into the nature of being itself. As we have seen the foundational 
aspect of the integrative thinker is in an ontological stance of groundlessness. This is 
quite significant. To truly embody such a stance requires a deep dedication to validating 
this belief both experientially and logically.  
 
Once this understanding has become established, s/he must engage in what may be best 
described as the practice-theory (Johannisson, 2011) of the experiential epistemologist 
(Martin and Moldovenau, 2008). To elaborate, there is a need for a serious and 
dedicated reflexive practice, in which one engages progressively in a complex world. 
A reflexive practice that not only formulates theories, models and practices but engages 
in discourses about the nature of theorizing itself (thinking about thinking). This is 
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coupled with a deep sense of empathy, lateral thinking and big-mindedness (Martin and 
Moldovenau, 2008), allowing the ability to act as a bridge across multiple hermeneutic 
circles.  
 
What we are interested in here as researchers is in understanding the as-lived experience 
of this - how does this come about? What is the relationship between theory, its practice 
and how it may this become embodied?  These concepts have much similarity with 
Johannisson’s (2011) discussion of phronesis - “Entrepreneuring as a practice is 
ontologically/epistemologically qualified by presenting phronesis as the relevant 
guiding intellectual virtue in knowledge-creating (Johannisson, 2011, p.23). “He is 
suggesting here that only by looking at the knowledge creating process itself may we 
begin to uncover the entrepreneuring, innovation and the integrative capacity. 
Johannisson (referencing Flyvberg, 2001) describes the three Aristotelian virtues of 
phronesis, episteme and techne as having new relevance to entrepreneurial research 
(Johannisson, 2011). Techne refers to artisan skill and craft whereas episteme refers to 
the nature or grounds of knowledge, which in traditional science is embedded (with its 
normative functions and structures). Phronesis then is practical wisdom and that ‘‘[t]he 
person possessing practical wisdom (phronimos) has knowledge of how to behave in 
each particular circumstance that can never be equated to knowledge of general truths 
(Johannisson, 2011 referencing Flyvberg, 2001).” 
It is this quality of practical wisdom, of knowing when to act and how to act and to 
what degree, that we may link to the integrative capacity of the high value decision 
maker of the future (Martin and Moldovenau, 2011).  Therefore phronesis becomes an 
appropriate paradigmatic standpoint for our investigation because 1) it allows the 
ability to engage with as-lived experience of the innovator as one that is preoccupied 
the knowledge creating apparatus itself, 2) that it allows the integrative capacity and 
the course of the innovator and entrepreneur at once to emerge from a purely 
organizational or economic function and evolve to one of identity crafting and 
existential venturing and 3) innovation, invention and the integrative  capacity are 
innate and tacit abilities (it is  impossible to apply a set of universal truths or 
instrumental and algorithmic functions to them). 
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In this way we may posit that phronesis is pragmatically reliant on a relationship with 
knowledge before its embodiment (self-transcending knowledge). This notion of 
practical wisdom is very close to the disclosive capacity that Spinosa et al. (2007) 
describe in the entrepreneur. They define six qualities that show this relationship: 1) 
The entrepreneur finds an anomaly or a point of significance and holds onto it, thereby 
innovating; 2) He brings this anomaly to his everyday life and allows it to generate and 
disclose opportunities; 3) He makes this anomaly to his world, undergoing a process of 
sense-making and in the process embodying it; 4) he then moves further, having built 
a prototype, he begins to test this in the world; 5) in this way he must then integrate this 
moment of realisation with the world around him, creating the machinery of 
justification and sense behind them and 6) he must now move this embodiment, through 
his activity to the organisation which attempts to enact it; so that it become the central 
organising principle of that venture. 
 
This description shows how the central capacity of the cultural innovator is a disclosive 
capacity: 
 
“Entrepreneurs are in tune with the disclosive nature of human activity, in that 
they establish disclosive spaces held together in particular styles. By being in 
tune in hi sway – by holding onto an anomaly and instituting the practices by 
which an anomaly comes into focus – entrepreneurs contribute to reconfiguring 
the practices of their society. Thus successful entrepreneurs bring about social 
change by modifying the style of particular sub worlds or the style of society in 
general.” (Spinosa et al, 2006 p.68) 
 
This understanding of entrepreneurial activity places the entrepreneur at a critical 
juncture in the evolutionary path of businesses, organisations and societies. Further 
because this activity is fundamentally disclosive, that is it enacts new worlds of being, 
it is and always has been a crucial component of society. However we must reclaim the 
notion of business, enterprise and industry from one that is principally concerned with 
the manipulation of resources to create new value propositions; to one that is vested in 
the overall benefit society. Most importantly however, technē the fundamental quality 
of the entrepreneur as discloser is what can rescue this world, which lies on the brink 
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of many global and local systemic disconnects. The ethics of business then is 




The Opposable Mind 
 
Roger Martin (2009), in his book The Opposable Mind outlines the qualities of the 
integrative thinker: someone who skilfully applies the integrative thinking discipline as 
an indispensible antidote to complexity and uncertainty . “They have the predisposition 
and the capacity to hold two (or more) diametrically opposing ideas in their heads. And 
then, without panicking or simply settling for one alternative or the other, they’re able 
to produce a synthesis that is superior to either opposing idea. Integrative Thinking is 
term for this process – or more precisely this discipline of consideration and synthesis 
– that is the hallmark of exceptional businesses and the people who run them (Martin, 
2009,p.6)” 
 
He goes further to describe the workings of decision making, outlining four steps to 
resolution.  The first stage understands or decides what is relevant to the inquiry, ‘What 
is salient?’  The next stage involves modeling the causal relationships between these 
salient features. “How are they related?’ Next, by keeping this causal map in our minds 
we gain an understanding of the architecture of the decision – ‘What are the processes 
or steps of the decision?’ Often this process happens as a mental exercise, as an organic 
organizing process.  Lastly we determine what the criterion for resolution is - ‘How do 
I know when I am done?’  
 
As Martin (2009) elucidates  “ Whatever we decide, we’ll arrive at our choice by 
considering a set of features we deem salient; creating a mental model of the causal 
relationships among those features; arranging those causal relationships into an 
architecture intended to produce a specific outcome; thereby reaching a resolution of 
the problem at hand. (p.29)”  Importantly he goes on to emphasize the ‘situatedness’ of 
the decision making process,  “With different salience, causality and architecture, we 
would almost certainly arrive at a different outcome (2009,p.29).” 
 103 
 
This last point is a critical insight into what differentiates what he calls The Integrative 
Thinker and his/her capacity to create new ways of Being and Doing.   Martin then 
outlines four qualities of The Integrative Thinker, which increase their capacity to 
harness creative tensions. “The first difference between integrative thinkers and 
conventional thinkers is that integrative thinkers take a broader view of what is salient. 
(2009, p.29)” This indicates that this unique disposition is the opposite to the natural 
process of decision-making – when facing complex decisions; we instinctively strive 
to simplify the problem statement. Indeed much of the technical-rational and scientific 
paradigms are concerned with how to apply experimentation (in ideal states) to complex 
everyday realities.  
 
The second difference is that, “integrative thinkers don’t flinch from considering 
multidirectional and nonlinear causal relationships”(Martin, 2009, p.30).  Traditional 
decision making methodologies strive primarily to reduce complexity and non-linear 
causality througho linear and atomistic relationships. This is a significant because many 
complex phenomena are emergent – that is not reducible to basic interactions or parts.  
 
“The third difference between integrative and conventional thinkers is in the 
architecture of their decisions. Integrative thinkers don’t break a problem into 
dependent pieces and work on each piece separately. They keep the entire problem 
firmly in mind while working on its individual parts  (Martin, 2009,p.30).”  This focus 
on holism and systems creates an expanded scope of application for the intervention, 
allowing a solution to emerge that is more relevant, valid and robust. As Martin 
describes, “The complexity presents a cognitive challenge that integrative thinkers 
welcome. Because they know that complexity brings along in its train an opportunity 
for a breakthrough resolution” – an unprecedented solution, the disclosing of a new 
world” (2009, p.31). 
 
The fourth quality is that “the integrative thinker will always search for creative 
resolution of tensions, rather than accept unpleasant tradeoffs (Martin, 2009,p.31).”  
This concept of creative resolution is the heart of innovation, implying two principles, 
that of 1) striving for resolution between opposing or dissonant forces, models or 
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concepts and 2) the creation or generation of a novel concept, model or entity that 
bridges that divide. 
 
Martin outlines three aspects that are needed to develop the capacity of The Integrative 
Thinker namely, Stances, Tools and Experiences. The first aspect, Stance describes 
both on the world you find yourself in and your disposition towards it. “It is your most 
broad-based knowledge domain in which you define who you are in the world and what 
you are trying to accomplish in it. Stance is how you see the world around you, but it’s 
also how you see yourself in that world (Martin, 2009).” 
 
The stance taken is the most fundamental point of addressing a problem. Often we take 
this aspect for granted, believing that ‘we are who we are, in a world that is what it is.’ 
This worldview determines the scope of our ability to act with skill, as Martin indicates, 
“it guides us in making sense of the world around us and taking action on the basis of 
sense-making. In fact, because we are so often unconscious of our stance and the 
assumptions about the world that flow from it, its guidance is all the more powerful and 
all the more difficult to resist (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Concurrently, the tools used in a situation are largely determined by the stance taken. 
“Tools range from theories to established processes to rules of thumb (Martin, 2009),” 
which “ make it possible to recognize and categorize problems, and apply tools to them 
in the past proved effective on similar circumstances (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Experience then stems from the practical knowledge of the application of tools within 
the chosen domains of action. “Experiences enable us to hone our sensitivities and 
skills. Sensitivity is the capacity to make distinctions between conditions that are similar 
but not exactly the same … Skill is the capacity to carry out an activity so as to 
consistently produce the desired result (Martin, 2009).”  
 
Experience supports and enhances these tacit abilities, allowing an experienced 
practitioner to improve his abilities to fine tune his capability in the chosen practice.  
Moreover these skills and sensitivities are mutually supporting activities:  “ Skills and 
sensitivities tend to grow and deepen in concert. As you repeat a task, you are inclined 
to build what you learned from previous repetition into the next (Martin, 2009).”  
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Through experience you are able to differentiate between finer and finer detail of that 
task or ability. In contrast a new practitioner is concerned with the new features of the 
activity, and your activity in that task. “ When we learn something new, we’re acute 
aware of features that more experienced practitioners take for granted…This 
hyperawareness of yourself and the skill you’re learning does not last long. Over time, 
practice transforms conscious acts into the automatic habits characteristic of mastery  
(Martin, 2009).” 
 
In so doing, a practitioner becomes an adept and eventually a master in the chosen field, 
using a set of tools from a certain disposition.  Martin calls this dynamic relationship, 
your Personal Knowledge System, “ Stance guides tool acquisition, which in turn, 
guides experience accumulation.” Furthermore this relationship is unidirectional, “ 
Experiences inform the acquisition of more tools (Martin, 2009),” which in turn may 
influence your stance or disposition.  
 
Hilary Austen (2013) in the article Artistry: The Territory, The Map and a Compass 
gives some insight into the concept of mastery. She has developed a knowledge system 
that aims to support the goal of artistry, which she articulates as the balance between 
qualitative and quantitative modes of knowledge (acquisition), “ the enduring conflict 
between structure and openness (Austen, 2013).”   
 
“Quantitative thinking – the application of numerical values to enhance understanding  
(Austen, 2013)” is the use of abstractions of reality in order to manipulate knowledge, 
with a focus on allowing us to repeat our work predictably and reliably.  “Quantitative 
thinking allows us to be precise and to share understanding; we use it to define fairness, 
rationality and effectiveness and it is this utility factor that has led so many people to 
equate quantitative thinking with intelligence (Austen, 2013).”  
 
Qualitative thinking is involved in the subjective experience of reality, “Qualities are 
physical and tangible rather than abstract: we perceive and feel them: tones, textures, 
movements, flavours, interactions, relationships and materials all have qualities.” 
Moreover these qualities are inextricably with the cognizer, as they are not generalities 
or abstractions.  
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“ Whenever you reason with sensory experience rather than with abstract 
symbols; whenever you act without hesitation upon what you know, while 
courting the possibilities of surprise; whenever you use a combination of 
immediate and remembered experience to predict and then revise immediate 
action – these are times when you are exercising qualitative intelligence 
(Austen, 2013).”  
 
Her main proposal is that these two modes of knowledge are the two sides of the same 
coin and furthermore that Artistry is the “dynamic interaction between these two sides 
of the coin (Austen, 2013).”  To enable this ‘dynamic interaction’ she proposes a 
personal knowledge system around three kinds of knowledge: “Directional, Conceptual 
and Experiential. The links among them, whether working upstream or downstream, 
suggest fundamental differences in how we approach our practice. To work 
downstream is to exploit past knowledge (‘Mastery’) and to work upstream is to seek 
new knowledge (‘Originality’). True artistry depends on both. (Austen, 2013).” 
 
Experiential knowledge speaks to the qualitative or situated aspect of knowledge 
acquisition, the direct interaction of the practitioner with the medium and all of its 
qualities.  Conceptual Knowledge is the “map of that (experiential) territory; it is the 
sum of all theories, equations and models you use to find your way through the thickets 
of first-hand experience and pass your knowledge to others (Austen, 2013).”  Lastly 
Directional Knowledge are a set of ideals, values or principles “that guide your practice 
– even your identity (Austen, 2013).” 
 
Similarly Martin (2009) in articulating the stance of the integrative thinker highlights 
six key features.  Firstly they see models as representations of reality and not reality 
itself, ‘the map is not the territory.” Rather it is a useful representation of an experiential 
reality, with the main aim of guiding purposeful activity. “ Whatever models exist at 
the present moment do not represent reality; they are simply the best or only 
constructions yet made (Martin, 2009).   
 
Secondly, to the integrative thinker differences and dissonance in these representations 
are opportunities for the development of novelty. “…they believe that conflicting 
models, styles and approaches to problems are to be leveraged not feared (Martin, 
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2009).” Importantly at this point it is also interesting to note that the emergence of 
dissonance that is the perception of disharmony between models is the actual indication 
that change is possible and needed.  This leads to the third point that they believe better 
models are possible even when others don’t.  
 
The fourth point indicates a full cycle from experiential knowledge to conceptual 
knowledge and back to experiential knowledge – the belief that this new model is 
enactable.  “ They believe that not only does a better model exist but that they are 
capable of bringing that better model from abstract hypothesis to concrete reality 
(Martin, 2009).” 
 
“Fifth they are comfortable wading into complexity to ferret out a new and better 
model, confident they will emerge on the other side with the resolution they seek … 
And sixth they give themselves the time to create a better model (Martin, 2009).”  
 
Martin’s six aspects and Austen’s three-part knowledge system point to a deep 
relationship with many complimentary yet opposite modes – that of analysis and 
synthesis, divergence and convergence, dissolution and concretion, qualitative and 
quantitative. Underpinning these modes is an optimism and faith that sustain this 
practice of enactment. As Martin says, “ This is an inherently optimistic stance. 
Integrative thinkers understand that the world imposes constraints on them, but they 
share the belief that with hard thinking and patience, they can find a better outcome 
than the unsatisfying ones they are presented with (Martin, 2009).” Most fundamentally 
it discloses a positive and reinforcing relationship between imagination and reality and 
provides pragmatic insights as to how new worlds may be enacted.  
 
Through this we can understand that this practical wisdom or Phronesis is ‘mastery of 
mastery itself’ or as Austen calls it Artistry.  
 
 Designing Business 
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In his book The Design of Business (2009), Roger Martin calls for a reconciliation of 
existing value generating mechanisms in business today.  He sees these two 
mechanisms as based on analytical and intuitive thinking respectively.  
 
On the one side we have a model “ that holds that the path to value creation lies in 
driving out the old-fashioned practice of gut feelings and instincts, replacing it with 
strategy on rigorous quantitative analysis (Martin, 2009).” This model of value 
generation, centred on analytical thinking, “harnesses two familiar forms of logic – 
deductive reasoning and inductive reasoning – to declare truths and certainties about 
the world. The goal of this model is mastery through rigorous, continuously repeated 
analytical processes (Martin, 2009).”  The aim here is to eliminate judgment bias 
through systematic abstraction and strive for consistent reproduction of results. The 
other model focuses on intuitive thinking – “the art of knowing without reasoning. This 
is the world of originality and invention (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Both these modes of operation have their strength and weaknesses yet neither is 
satisfying to meet the demands of modern organizations.  Organizations cantered on 
analytical thinking hone their ability around a core range of activities improving their 
operational capacity to replicate the original moment of their success in a reliable and 
consistent manner. In so doing these organizations cripple their ability to adapt to the 
changing nature of the markets they are embedded in. Concomitantly those 
organizations that focus the intuitive insights operate at the mercy of those seemingly 
random breakthroughs without any hope of developing the innate innovative capacity, 
to meet a changing market landscape. “Neither analysis or intuition alone is enough... 
The most successful businesses in years to come will balance analytical mastery and 
intuitive originality in a dynamic interplay that I call design thinking (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Martin (2009) goes on to describe what he calls the knowledge funnel or the movement 
from mystery to heuristic to algorithm. Design thinking is that organizational 
disposition that allows the movement along this knowledge funnel (Martin, 2009) and 
more importantly this allows the ability to develop long-term advantage and resilience.  
 
These three levels represent the three stages in which some unknown value may be 
‘unearthed,’ then better understood and finally mastered. The first stage - the mystery 
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level, refers to the deep and wide area of the initial inquiry. The next stage in the funnel, 
the heuristic refers to a narrowing of the field of inquiry to a more ‘manageable size.’ 
It is a way of thinking about the mystery that provides a simplified understanding of it 
and allows those with access to the heuristic to focus their efforts. Over time the 
organization that places much effort and focus on a heuristic, may take it to the 
algorithmic level or a fixed formula. 
 
Moldovenau (2009) equates the mystery level to a hunch or a prelinguistic intuition. 
This is quite significant as it honours intuitive knowledge in its most raw form, as 
feeling or sensing that will remain beyond words or explanations. Indeed we may be 
able to explain much about that moment in retrospect but at that time this breakdown 
will cause a creative engagement with the unknown – a dynamic coping with 
environmental stress.  
 
Keen observation of this through experience and time, will show the emergence of a 
heuristic or rule of thumb.”…heuristics are open-ended prompts think or act in a 
particular way… Heuristics offer no guarantee that using them produces certain results. 
Rather they contain the vague promise that, all things being equal, using that heuristic 
in the context it is meant for may, or on average will be better for you than not using it. 
Heuristics are different from hunches in that they are explicit: they bring intuitions into 
language (Moldovenau, 2009).” Lastly algorithms guarantee a uniform result in the 
absence of any catastrophe or unusual anomaly, they certified production processes 
(Moldovenau, 2009).” 
 
Heuristics lie at a critical juncture between the known and the unknown – it provides a 
path of organized exploration of what could be. For example, when trying to get to a 
new destination we may use a map, or the sun or some other landmarks to guide our 
exploration. Over time we may explore several routes in dependence on the markers 
we have available to us. While some might value efficiency and try to limit travel time, 
others might enjoy the view of a particular route. To add to this, our preferred choice 
might change due to the time of day taking into account traffic or a beautiful sunset.  
Heuristics allow us to gather many messy and uncoordinated variables into a salient 
and cohesive exploration of possibilities.  
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Algorithms thereafter, “take the loose, unregimented heuristics – which take 
considerable thought and nuance to employ – and simplify, structuralize and codify 
them to the degree that anyone with access to the algorithm can deploy it with more or 
less efficiency (Martin, 2009).” If we expand on the above analogy, we would use an 
algorithm as a set of specific directions to communicate (to a group of people) how to 
get to an event. In this instance many of the variables and possibilities of the original 
process will be omitted for the explicit purpose of sharing this specific route to a place 
at a specific time.  We see then that as the purpose is made more specific, the way to 
fulfill that purpose becomes more prescriptive. Concomitantly the applicability of this 
algorithm will be quite limited:  the set of prescribed directions will be quite reliable 
and also very valid for the situation – to communicate clear directions to a specific place 
at as specific time, however they become far less valid when applied to other similar 
situations.  The goal of reliability then is to produce repeatable results that are 
predictable while the goal of validity is to produce results that meet the desired 
outcome.  
 
“As understanding moves from mystery to heuristic to algorithm, extraneous 
information is pared away; the complexities of the world are mastered through 
simplification (Martin, 2009).”   
 
In this way we can see that the knowledge funnel may be see on appropriated in two 
broad functions: 1) to explore new possibilities and knowledge, what Martin (2009) 
calls exploration and 2) to capitalize on exiting knowledge or what he calls exploitation. 
“Devotion to exploration is the invention of business, a risky proposition and the reason 
that nine of ten entrepreneurial start-ups expire in less than two years. Exploration alone 
is unstable business (Martic, 2009).”  The exploitation of knowledge within a given 
stage – that is, running an existing heuristic, gently honing and refining it but not 
seeking to move knowledge to an algorithm or running and existing algorithm and not 
seeking to explore the next mystery – is the administration of business (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Most organizations take the common path, whereby some great insight has generated a 
new value proposition. It then proceeds to experiment and hone their ability deliver that 
value proposition with greater efficiency and accuracy. Over time a competitor will 
 111 
emerge and drive a new value proposition from mystery to heuristic to algorithm and 
in effect taking over the market.  
 
So what is the reason so many businesses, organizations and companies fall into the 
trap of taking a disposition that is either exploitation or exploration. Martin (2009) 
indicates that this is mainly because they adopt analytical thinking as their main 
organizing principle. Furthermore as time ensues this causes an ever-increasing reliance 
on these forms of thinking making them rigid and fragile.  Moreover in an 
organizational culture steeped in analytical thinking, that is one that is based on proof 
emanating from the past, the alternative of intuitive thinking seems like complete self-
sabotage.  
 
Martin (2009) suggests that the answer lies in what he calls the Design of Business or 
the balance between these two modes: exploitation and exploration; a focus on 
reliability and a focus on validity; analytical thinking and intuitive thinking – “that 
helps a company both hone and refine within the existing knowledge stage and generate 
the leap from stage to stage. (Martin, 2009).” 
 
The Design of Businesses then is a meta-organizing intelligence that knows when and 
how to apply these two opposing modes of thinking. The main thinking discipline in 
this regard is abductive logic – or the logic of what might be. 
 
Pragmatically this means that the Design of Business can be broken into three essential 
components “1) deep and holistic user understanding; 2) visualization of new 
possibilities, prototyping and refining; and 3) the creation of a new activity system to 





The design thinker helps the organization “balance between exploration and 
exploitation, invention of business and originality and mastery (Martin, 2009).”  The 
main process in this is the use of abductive logic – a concept first developed by Charles 
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Sanders Peirce.  His major insight into the field of innovation was that new ideas cannot 
be proved in advance, rather they can only be validated in time.  
 
“ To advance knowledge, we must turn away from our standard definition of proof – 
and from the false certainty of the past – and instead stare into a mystery to ask what 
could be (Martin, 2009,p. 25).”  In this way the abductive thinking discipline sits middle 
way between the past-data driven world and the knowing-without-reason world.  Most 
organizations are dominated by forms of inductive, deductive and declarative 
reasoning, which emphasize understanding what is and what is operative. New ways of 
being and new knowledge however can only emerge from asking about what could be. 
 
Therefore the design thinker is constantly striving for the most valid solution, knowing 
that all past driven data are hypotheses and not fact. This belief stems from the lucid 
insight that if it has worked in the past it does not necessarily mean it will still work , 
hence “the real empiricist is a ‘first-rate noticer’ of precisely the anomalies that would 
cause him or her to throw out the all things equal assumption (Martin, 2009).” 
 
In this way, Martin (2009) describes a Design Thinker as someone who is “constantly 
seeking a fruitful balance between reliability and validity, between art and science, 
between intuition and analytics and between exploration and exploitation.” 
Furthermore in achieving this the design thinker and the design thinking organization 
applies the most crucial tool of abductive reasoning to the problems of business. 
 
To understand the true import of this mode of thinking we must first examine the modes 
of thinking on which the scientific paradigm -which has monopolized modern thought 
– is built. These are deductive and deductive reasoning, whose main goal is “ to allow 
the speaker to declare at the end of the reasoning process that a statement is true or false 
(Martin, 2009).” 
 
Deductive logic is moving from the general to the specific - because all crows are black, 
if I see a black bird I can deduce it is a crow. Inductive logic is moving from the specific 
to the general – because all the children I have observed enjoy playing with Lego, all 
children like playing with Lego. However these two forms of logic are not the full 
picture, it is apparent that the acquisition of knowledge is not an abstract and purely 
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conceptual exercise but that that one is necessarily bound to the environment of action 
and also to experience (Martin, 2009).  
 
The early pragmatists argued in fact that new knowledge could only come about 
through the synthetic process of dealing with uncertainty in one’s experience (Martin, 
2009). One of those pragmatists, Charles Sanders Peirce, “ in fact argued that no new 
idea could be proved deductively or inductively using past data. Moreover, if new ideas 
were not the product of these two forms of accepted logic, he reasoned, there must be 
a third fundamental logic mode (Martin, 2009).  Peirce argued that knew knowledge 
occurred through ‘logical leaps of mind’… “ New ideas arose when a thinker observed 
data (or even a single data point) that didn’t fit in with the existing model or models 
(Martin referencing Charles Sanders Peirce, 2009).”  
 
 
Figure 5 Modelling Abduction 
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This ‘ inference to the best explanation’ started with the observer trying to make sense 
of what was observed, he called this third type of reasoning abductive reason. This was 
not concerned with declaring what is true (declarative reasoning) but what could 
possibly true (modal reasoning). 
 
We notice in this description a few significant points: firstly the seeking out of 
breakdowns, disharmonies and dissonance as the true seeds what is asking to emerge, 
secondly the use of correct or valid imagination to simulate new possibilities and 
thirdly using direct experiential knowledge to navigate and inform the becoming 
emerging reality. 
 
The Integrative Thinker’s Toolbox 
 
Martin (2009) outlines three main tools to be used by the integrative thinker, in his 
book, The Opposable Mind: 1) Generative reasoning; 2) Causal modeling; and 3) 
Assertive Inquiry. 
 
Generative reasoning is the use of modal reasoning and specifically abductive logic (as 
explained above) to think about possibilities and generate new concepts of what may 
be. As Martin explains, “ In essence, abductive logic seeks the best explanation that is, 
it attempts to create the best model – in response to novel or interesting data that doesn’t 
fit an extant model. Deductive or Inductive logic might prove such a modal true or 
untrue over time, but in the interim, abductive logic generates the best explanation of 
the data. That’s why I call this process of using abductive logic ‘generative reasoning.’ 
(Martin, 2009).” 
 
This type of thinking facilitates the trial and error that is needed to find creative 
resolution. Through multiple prototypes, iterations and evolutions, integrative thinkers 
use generative reasoning to work through this messy and unknown terrain of what does 
not yet exist  - working back from resolution to architecture to causality to salience 
(Martin, 2009).  Starting with the unknown, they navigate using the tool of generative 
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reasoning progressively shedding light on the emerging reality, through organized 
exploration and deliberate experimentation. 
 
The next tool at the disposal of the integrative thinker is causal modeling, “ 
sophisticated causal modeling is a crucial underpinning for causality and architecture, 
the middle two steps of the integrative thinking process (Martin, 2009).”  Martin goes 
further to highlight two types of causation relevant to the causal mapping: material 
causation and teleological causation. “Material causation, which says that under a 
certain set of conditions, x causes y to happen (Martin, 2009).” Teleological causation 
asks “ what is the purpose of y, or why do we want y to happen? (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Systems dynamics mapping is a process of mapping complex systems that helps clearly 
visualize complex and non-linear causal relationships. Of specific import here are 
feedback loops that general accelerate relationships between variables (Martin, 2009). 
 
“Systems dynamics tools help integrative thinkers consider complex causal loops in 
creating their models and help them build models in which the whole is viewed together 
rather than split into discrete components. In fact, in systems dynamics, the whole must 
be held in mind to capture and understand all the relevant causal feedback loops 
(Martin, 2009).” 
 
These two tools, generative reasoning and causal modeling are very potent tools at the 
disposal of the integrative thinker. They work together to create novel models that take 
into account phenomena, data and ideas previously not accounted for. Moreover they 
give the modeler the tools to ‘recover the memory of the whole’  - or keep in mind all 
the complex dynamics of the whole. To this Martin, (2009) add radial metaphors to act 
as a trope for the exploration and investigation. “The radial metaphor helps the 
integrative thinker in two ways. First it helps thinkers conceive of the situation at hand 
in a way that is conducive to creating a new model. The radial metaphor also helps with 
the cognitive heavy lifting of keeping a coherent whole in mind while honing the 
individual parts (Martin, 2009).” 
 
The third important tool Martin outlines is assertive inquiry, whose main aim is to foster 
a deeper relationship between modeling and reality. The processes of modeling aspects 
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od reality, is inherently bound to the subjective experience of the modeler. In order to 
ground the generative aspect of innovation, these models must be based on foundation 
collaboration and consent. “ When you use assertive inquiry to investigate someone 
else’s mental model, you find saliences that wouldn’t have occurred to you and causal 
relationships you didn’t perceive (Martin, 2009).” 
 
Assertive inquiry is a “ sincere search for another’s views … and tries to find gaps in 
understanding…it seeks common ground and tries to fill gaps in understanding (Martin, 








In their book Understanding Computers and Cognition (1986), Winograd and Flores 
propose a new foundation for design. This is not the design of artefacts, but in the design 
of new way of being.  This new design imperative  emphasises innovating within the 
preunderstandings of a social context. Therefore fundamentally this is the design of 
synthetic and integrative structures that facilitate new ontologies, these new ontologies 
in turn allow for the emergence of technologies, which enact these emerging potential 
realities into being.  
 
“The most important designing is ontological. It constitutes an intervention in 
the background of our own heritage, growing out of an already-existing ways 
of being in the world, and deeply affecting the kinds of beings we are. In 
creating a new artifacts, equipment, buildings and organizational structures, it 
attempts to specify in advance how and where breakdowns will show up in our 
everyday practices and in the tools we use, opening up new spaces in which we 
can work and play. Ontologically orientated design is therefore necessarily both 
reflective and political, looking back to the tradition that formed us but also 
forward to as-yet-uncreated transformations of our lives together. Through the 
emergence of new tools, we come to a changing awareness of human nature and 
human action, which in turn leads to new technological development. The 
designing process is part of this dance in which our structure of possibilities is 
generated.” (Winograd & Flores, 2006, p. 163) 
 
As we see have seen from our discussion above, the Postmodern world is an interwoven 
tapestry of ontological narratives. Each which their own means of knowing, being and 
doing, so in turn there is a need for a rethinking of design, from a art preoccupied with 
the design of instruments or as a purely aesthetic endeavour. This rethinking, asks for 
a practical wisdom, that has the ability to be present to these often-incommensurable 
narratives and create new ways of generating meaning that unite these differing 
worldhoods. Furthermore, ontological design is founded with the understanding that 
systems are open, incomplete and in evolution; therefor a major concern of this new 
design is in the development of mechanisms, which allow for dealing with the processes 
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of on-going breakdown. These mechanisms deal with the breakdown, by creating 
means of what we may term teleological design – or the ability to dynamically generate 
system goals, through dialogue, learning, consolidation and generating new 
dispositions. 
 
Therefor what is apparent from this discussion is that we need to move design from a 
thing to a process of designing, an activity. This is a pivotal insight for design – that 
design is not a detached activity that happens periodically but is one that is a necessary 
function of any social and technological structure. We have inherited a legacy of design 
philosophy, which privileges an objective view – we see this in the design practices, 
which are based on the manipulation of raw materials into objects. For example within 
a typically modernist view, we have the emergence of modernist architecture, which 
privileges abstract and ideal forms. The result of the modernist regime on architecture 
is the monolithic, sterile and machine like buildings that litter our cities; that privileged 
efficiency, and reduction of cost above human need. The results were buildings, which 
after few decades broke down and became uninhabitable. 
 
Following this we see that ontological design as the design of systems, which self-
regulate and are evolvable. To this we have to acknowledge that to enable this, human 
cognition must be placed centrally in an on-going process of designing.  
 
In this milieu of design as an activity, Winograd and Flores (2006) present the first real 
explanation of technological ontological design.  This approach draws from a typically 
Heideggerrian tradition, exploring in much greater depth some of the thoughts 
Heidegger around technology and its role in society.  
 
They begin by exploring a central concept to in Heidegger’s ontology, readiness-to-
hand. As we have explored earlier Heidegger compares ready-to-hand and present-at-
hand; these two phenomena relating to two distinct aspects of being-in-the-world. 
Present-at-hand refers to what Heidegger describes the metaphysics of presence, which 
is concerned with the ontic status of a thing – it is looking at objects which are 
immediately apparent or eternally present in an ideal way. This phenomenon is an 
object of thinking – of what Scharmer terms reflection-on-action. Ready-to-hand refers 
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to a prereflexive state, or state before thinking – a background of preunderstandings 
from which we operate.  
 
When we engage in the world, we have a shared background of history in which we all 
share. For example, we have a set of cultural norms, language and ways of speaking 
which make communication and engagement in the world possible.  In this way our 
backgrounds give us the affordance to be able to communicate easily and effectively. 
Winograd and Flores (1986) call this transparency of interaction, in that it allows 
interactions between people and within social context to happen ‘naturally’. 
Furthermore they propose that this is central in the design of technologies, because 
technologies, which have transparency of interaction, are easier to use and thus enable 
human activity. To do this, design must be ontologically clean, which means it presents 
an experience, which is consistent with the domain of understanding, it is within. In 
this way the user is driving and not commanding, there is an assemblage with the system 
that is intuitive and natural. 
 
Following this Winograd and Flores (1986) emphasise another Heideggerrian concept, 
breakdown. This also relates to the concepts of ready-to-hand and present-to-hand in 
that breakdown occurs when we stop acting in the world and step back and reflect on 
it. The classic example of this is when a pen stops writing, at that point we stop writing 
and we become aware of the object, pen. In this way we become aware of the world in 
a particular way, which allows us to examine it. In this breakdown worldhood appears, 
a set of interrelated equipment, purposes and identities. In this way breakdown is a 
design opportunity, a necessary process which is indicative of the evolutionary 
development of the system. Design then must facilitate processes, which dynamically 
deal with breakdown, not as system failure but as means of evolution. 
 
The third characteristic of technological design is an understanding of blindness, this 
emphasises that any system that is developed within a set of basic axioms will always 
have certain blindness. This like breakdown cannot be avoided, but must be embraced, 
as a means of system development. However if blindness is not accepted, that is if we 
believe a system may solve a problem indefinitely we run the risk of designing systems, 
which are irrelevant and fragile. Therefore a key aspect of ontological design is in being 
aware of the possibilities, which are being eliminated in its construction. 
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Another key concept that Winograd and Flores (1986) explore is that of systematic 
domains. This is a domain, in which a recurrent pattern of breakdown occurs (Winograd 
& Flores, 2006), that leads to the development of a set of rules and laws to deal with 
these breakdowns. In many ways this is similar to a formal system within mathematics, 
that it is a systematic approach to a recurrent pattern of breakdown. Technology offers 
a distinct mechanism for human activity within these systematic domains, particularly 
as a mechanism of extended human cognition. Through leveraging the huge processing 
power of technological systems, we are able to identify much larger insight into the 
world around us, but also allow greater abstraction of it. In this way technology affords 
us domain specific ‘enhanced cognition.” 
 
In the essay The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger expresses that the advent 
of cybernetics represents the completion of the project that began with Aristotle. In this 
epoch, being is treated as a resource that can be manipulated; it is the attempt of man 
to finally exercise complete dominance over being. In this way, we are left with a 
technical rationality, that limits the possibilities of our existence. As we see from the 
enactive traditions, which are similarly based on autpoietic theory, as we change a 
domain of interactions, the system that interacts with it is also changed. In this way this 
this paradigm of presence limits the evolutionary means of humanity. “There is a 
fundamental circularity here: the world determines what we can do and what we do 
determines the world.” (Winograd & Flores, 2006, p. 177) 
 
Technology is a particularly powerful because are “machines for acting in language” 
(Winograd & Flores, 2006, p. 178), by using them we engage in a discourse that is set 
down by their designers. In this way we act in a domain of interactions that are brought-
forth from a very specific background of understanding (Winograd & Flores, 2006). In 
most cases the design background is based on a rationalistic tradition that is at its very 
core antithical to the nature of being, or to us (Winograd & Flores, 2006).  
 
From a design perspective technologies built in this way will necessarily create many 
breakdowns, in their use. Moreover, systems built from this technical rational 
paradigm, engender a certain hard wiring of cognitive processes. As we see from the 
enactive tradition, the viability of any system is based on its plasticity in creating new 
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ways to adapt in precarious conditions. By interacting in a technical rational paradigm, 
we cut ourselves off from our innate right as creators and inventors, because we 
reinforces our role as merely ‘decision making things in the manipulation of 
representations. 
More profoundly, as we engage with these systems, we are ultimately imposing a 
technical rationality – a cognitive perspective, a way of being –in-the –world – which 
effects the way we see ourselves, others and the world we live in. This has huge 
ramifications for us as a species, for if we see the world as merely a resource to be 
exploited, we will see ever increasing amount of macro and mundo systemic 
disconnects. The effect of this is already very apparent.   
 
However Winograd and Flores (2006) claim that for this very reason we can turn the 
tables, so to speak, That we may, as Heidegger suggested use technology as tool of 
human evolution and transformation. The reason for this is because technology is a way 
of acting in language, this is important because language makes distinctions in being. 
In this way technology has the potential to bring forth worlds that connect us back to 
our humanness, back to our role as ‘shepherds of being’as Heidegger would say. As 
Winograd and Flores (2006) say at the closing of their book: 
 
“In ontological designing, we are doing more than asking what can be built. We 
are engaging in a philosophical discourse about the self – about what we can do 
and what we can be. Tools are fundamental to action, and though our actions 
we generate the world. The transformation we are concerned with is not a 
technical one, but a continuing evolution of how we understand our 
surroundings and ourselves – of how we continue becoming the beings that we 






Disclosing New Worlds 
 
Spinosa, Flores and Dreyfus (1997) in their book Disclosing New Worlds describe all 
pragmatic activity as being organized by a style. This is a very appropriate framework 
for our exploration of business models. 
 
The description of the style of each of the interacting business models will be a central 
concern of the investigation. The style is a concept akin in meaning to the notion of 
Worldview (described in Soft Systems Methodology) and Heidegger’s concept of 
Worldhood. According to Heidegger a Worldhood is comprised of three interrelated 
parts – equipment, purpose and identities.  That is, a Worldhood is a “totality of 
interrelated pieces of equipment, each used to carry out a specific task… these activities 
are undertaken to achieve certain purposes … (and) finally this activity enables those 
performing it to have identities (Spinosa et al., 1997).” 
 
They further distinguish between style and disclosive spaces, “We have already 
specified that a disclosive space is organized as an interrelated set of equipment 
relations, plus roles that give a point to the activity of using that equipment. But in order 
for things, people and selves to show up as meaningful (as opposed to merely effective), 
this organized activity needs a further level of organization, which we call 
coordination… That all of our disclosive spaces are organized in a more-than-
equipmental way becomes apparent if we consider the everyday phenomenon of 
familiarity (Spinosa et al. 2007).” This refers to the experiential truth we all share – that 
things seem familiar even when we haven’t experienced them before – a fundamental 
continuum of experience. 
 
Therefore style is “ the ground of meaning in a human activity system (Spinosa et al., 
2007)” and it this exact area that the ethnographic study hopes to address and 
interrogate.  
 
A style of organizing pattern “or the coordination of actions, opens a disclosive space 
and does so in a threefold manner: 1) by coordinating actions, 2) by determining how 
things and people matter and 3) by being what is transferred from situation to situation. 
 123 
These three functions of style determine the way anything shows up and makes sense 
for us (Spinosa et al., 2007).”  
 
Through the fieldwork it will be precisely the style of organizing that is to be elicited. 
Spinosa et al., go further to describe a method of ‘involved experimentation’ in which 
reflective practitioners may engage with disharmony in a deep, deliberate manner to 
bring about evolutionary and purposeful change within the system. This involves three 
processes namely – articulation, reconfiguration and cross-appropriation – which may 
through involved engagement may cause the style to change. 
 
Articulation is when a style is defined and described in greater detail, that is the process 
of being aware of the style itself. “All articulating makes what is implicit explicit. If 
what is implicit is vague or confused, then we speak of gathering from dispersion. If it 
was once important and has been lost, then we have the special kind of articulation we 
call retrieval (Spinosa et al., 2007)” 
 
Reconfiguration then represents a larger shift in the style, what may most closely be 
described as a form of recombination of parts of a systemic whole. Although it 
represents a fundamental change in the workings of the style it does not include a 
departure from its intrinsic meaning. “ In the case of reconfiguration, a great sense of 
integrity (experienced in articulation) is generally not experienced. Rather, one has a 
sense of gaining wider horizons (Spinosa et al., 2007).” 
 
Cross-Appropriation can be seen as changes occurring between two disclosive spaces 
or Worldhoods, specifically the adoption of a practice or set of practices “that it could 
not generate on its own but that it finds useful (Spinosa et al., 2007).” Cross-
appropriation is often associated with large-scale change, representing a significant 
change in the coordination of the style. 
 
These three skills are different ways in which disclosure may occur and bring about 
historical change. This concept of historical change is fundamental to a reckoning of 
the evolutionary mechanism. Historical change refers to a constructivist view, that 
people sense them as continuous with the past and therefore as meaningful. This is 
contrasted with discontinuous change that is an imposed order. Therefore these skills 
 124 
of disclosure are involved in the discovery of what might be called an implicate order 





The Lived Experience 
 
This section of the thesis is called ‘The Lived Experience’ because it aims principally 
to describe the phenomena encountered, in its making – which took about one year to 
complete. During this time period, I was involved in numerous business model projects, 
however only one of these interventions are documented here – the business model 
innovation work for a new model for online learning. This project was embedded within 
a much larger ecosystem design, whose overall strategic goal was to improve job 
opportunities through skill development, within the Western Cape. 
 
The rest of the section has been dedicated to an investigation into the general 
phenomena of the business model innovation process – spanning several projects 
during this year. In line with the phenomenological methodology, these phenomena aim 
to attempt a description of the essential nature of the process. This part has six chapters 
which each aim to disclose a key dimension of the journey. These chapters were 
constituted from notes and journal entries during the yearlong period; and so is a 
synthesis of an on-going process of self-disclosure within numerous fields of 
intervention. 
 
 The first one, A Triangulation of Space looks specifically at the existential phenomena 
present during the period, while the last five focus on the process of innovation within 
business specifically. 
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A New Paradigm for Learning 
 
Education is one of the most fundamental needs facing Africa and indeed the world 
today. In Africa, many challenges exist in the education arena, with many citing the 
quality of education offered in the continent as being low. There are many challenges 
faced within the African context regarding the provision of learning. These include 
access to early childhood education, primary and post primary education, including 
vocational education and training; shortages of basic facilities, infrastructure, 
equipment and teaching and learning materials; a shortage of qualified teachers within 
the continent and an inadequacy of investment in education have all assisted in 
impeding access, quality and achievement of international targets for education. Within 
the South African context, the challenges of education and the provisioning of learning 
have received much focus, with the introduction of a number of initiatives to address 
such challenges. This initiative seeks to help by enabling self-direct learning in order 
to help meet the skills and education demands of the country. It focuses on creating a 
holistic model of learning, which ensures the ability to understand and interpret content 
and create relevant solutions based on individual learning. 
 
Situation of Concern 
There are currently many ways of accessing content about a area of knowledge over the 
Internet; however, most of the current models of online learning systems/platforms seek 
to ensure knowledge transfer, and focus on the transference of explicit knowledge. 
Focus on only this form/type of learning is concerning as it only provides knowledge 
about things (as opposed to knowledge about doing or knowledge about new ways of 
doing things). It further places focus on data related to the external reality (as opposed 
to the enacted reality or not-yet enacted reality) and only allows for learning in 
abstraction or reflection without action. In essence, it does not provide the learner with 
the ability to understand, experience, and make contextual sense of knowledge. 
Therefor application of the knowledge in a practical and pragmatic way is often 
difficult. The predominant existence of such platforms compounds the challenge of 
ensuring a quality education in the South African context, and highlights the need for 
an online learning platform that creates a holistic learning experience providing 
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knowledge about things, knowledge about doing things and knowing about thought-
origins for doing things.  
 
Approach 
In order to conceptualize and design a Learning Management System that seeks to 
ensure holistic learning, we have used a particular lens for the intervention. This lens 
comprised of the ontology, which enabled the team to gather an understanding of the 
philosophical underpinnings of the current education system; the epistemology, which 
outlines the methodological processes we engaged in, while a creating a new model for 
learning within the context of the broader job economy and ecosystem and; the business 
models, which included a presentation of varying learning models based on different 
philosophies of learning.  
 
 




Pedagogy of the Oppressed 
 
Paulo Freire wrote the Pedagogy of the Oppressed in 1970. It seeks to describe the 
contradiction between the oppressors and the oppressed, and how this dichotomy may 
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be overcome. The main proposition here is that liberation is not a gift or a self-
achievement, but a mutual process. Freire presents the “banking” concept as a means 
to describe the current education system, highlighting this concept of education as a 
means of oppression because it treats the student as an empty vessel to be filled with 
knowledge, like a piggy bank. This presupposes that the student is absent of knowledge 
and experience and presents an objective view of knowledge.  
 
The learning process teaches the individual important societal norms needed for them 
to become successful; moreover creativity of the individual is discouraged for 
uniformity. The Pedagogy of the Oppressed (Friere, 2000) asserts that learning should 
rather be seen as a mutual process that is world-mediated; views people as uncompleted 
beings that are conscious of their incompletion (both learner and teacher). These 
assertions point towards a learning model that embraces co-creation, interpretation (a 
subjective view of knowledge) and dreaming (individual and societal). In this sense, 
the relationship between the teacher and learner differs in that generative themes of 
learning are created rather than the pure transference of knowledge (teacher transferring 
“objective” knowledge about particular subject matter to a learner) and the essence of 
education then becomes the practice of freedom. Through this process of dialogue and 
the creation of generative themes the individual then has the ability to look critically at 
their world and slowly develop the skills to perceive their personal and social reality. 
As this process occurs, the person is then transformed from being a passive receiver of 
information to one that can deal critically and creatively with reality and discover ways 
to transform their world. 
 
The educator constantly re-forms his reflections in the reflections of the students 
[who] are now critical co-investigators in dialogue with the teacher…Problem-
posing education involves a constant unveiling of reality, the emergence of 
consciousness, and critical intervention in reality. This is education as the 
practice of freedom rather than the practice of domination. It de-mythologizes 
and takes character of our present historical society and culture as a starting 







Figure 7 The Worldhood as business model 
 
Evaluated learning Models 
 
Four different models for educating people were utilized, with the goal being to 
understand the way in which the model creates learning and the style through which it 
is done. This was conducted in this manner in order to be able to create a holistic model 
of education that links the various methods of ensuring learning that exist in the 
evaluated models. 
A: Formal Schools 
This model represents the traditional form of ensuring learning.  
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The basic philosophy of the formal school learning model is that education is objective 
and that learners need to be socialized in a paradigm of scarcity industrialization. 
Purposes:  
The formal school-learning model seeks to serve a number of purposes.  
 Socialize in: 
 Corporatization 
 Capitalistic principles  
 Commodification 
 Scarcity  
This purpose seeks to ensure that learners are socialized into the key concepts operating 
within their society. This speaks to the provision of knowledge about things and 
highlights the systemic structure of education presented by Freire in the Pedagogy of 
the Oppressed. 
 
 Industrialization of Education: This refers to ensuring reliability in the 
education system and consistency with regard to the quality of teaching and 
learning activities.  
 Standardization: Standardization means the development of a coherent 
standard that may be applied in a large number of contexts. 
 Educational policies: This refers to the creation of policies, which propagate a 
certain pedagogical agenda. 
 Clear standards of education: The formal school-learning model also seeks to 
create clear standards of education. The value of this is ensuring economies of 
scale in the propagation of education amongst a variegated population. 
 Create passive learner: A purpose of this pedagogical theory is that it creates 
learners that are passive and receptive to the knowledge that is being transferred 
to them. This is complementary and necessary with the high level of 
standardisation in this pedagogical agenda. 
 Fulfil needs of industry and economy: Finally, this learning model seeks to 
provide learning that speaks to the demands of job roles that have been 
identified and seeks to provide learning that may be transferred to application 




This refers to the stakeholders who participate in providing learning in the formal 
school learning model. The identities that function within this learning  model are: 
 Students: This refers to the person seeking to learn within this process. 
 Teachers/Principles: This refers to individuals that function to provide the 
knowledge about things/concepts. 
 Government: This refers to the government in which the learner and 
teachers/principals are citizens and the government has a social contract to 
provide learning to its citizens. 
 Parents: This refers to the parents of the learners. 
 Informal leaders: This refers to leaders within the community who do not 
necessarily hold formal positions within the community. 
 WC District: This refers to the community/regional area under which the 




This refers to the things that are used to provide learning within this model. 
 Classrooms: This learning model is usually provided through a classroom 
setting. 
 Curriculum: This refers to the sets of concepts that are intended to be 
transferred to students within a course. 
 Schools: This refers to the institution of learning responsible for ensuring the 
provisioning of learning. 
 Policy development: This function guides the governance and implementation 




 Objectification of knowledge and belief that knowledge is transferred: The 
central belief in this system is that knowledge may be viewed objectively and 
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that the primary function of education is in the transfer of this object between 
teacher and student. 
 Education “only” happens this way: There is a certain rigidly held belief that 
knowledge is only gained through knowledge transfer. 
 Knowledge acquisition and transfer: This refers to the basis that learners are 
passive participants and that the teacher transfers knowledge (about 
things/concepts) to them and once this is done, the knowledge has then been 
transferred to the students and they then have an understanding of the concepts. 
 
We find the best critique of this model in Friere’s Pedagogy of the Oppressed. The data 
utilized in this model is based on external reality with ‘observation experience’ 
operating as the primary experience type. The learning model does not place much 
focus on learner reflection, opting for a stance of reflection without action and the truth 
criterion being whether one can observe the (relayed) properties of an object. In this 
sense, the perspective of this model is external, with a view on objective reality. 
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The current era shows that we are approaching more networked connections between 
people, content and tools. Due to this, new pedagogical methods of learning online have 
been proposed based on the principles of connectivism. In this new model, learning is 
seen to reside in the connections between people and digital artefacts within the 
network. This pedagogy is known as the connectivist pedagogy. One way in, which this 
pedagogy has been actioned, is in the form of massive open online content (MOOC). 
The MOOC format was pioneered by George Siemens and Stephen Downes and the 
key difference with MOOCS is that they focused on knowledge generation and creation 
as opposed to knowledge duplication. In MOOCs, the learners take a greater role in 
shaping their learning experiences than in traditional online courses, while facilitators 
focus on fostering a space for learning connections to occur. There are key concepts 
within the connectivist pedagogy that seek to make this learning model successful in 
creating learning connections, these are 
 Aggregation: Enable content to be produced in different places and aggregated 
as a newsletter or a web page accessible to participants. 
 Remixing associates materials created within the course with each other and 
with other materials. 
 Re-purposing of aggregated and remixed materials to suit the goals of each 
participant. 
 Feeding forward: sharing of re-purposed ideas and content with other 
participants and the rest of the world. 
 
There are several key principles that form the basis for the connectivist pedagogy and 
allow it to achieve its purposes, these key principles are 
 Learning and knowledge rest in diversity of opinions. 
  Learning is a process of connecting specialized nodes or information sources. 
  Learning may reside in non-human appliances. 
  Capacity to learn is more critical than what is currently known. 
  Nurturing and maintaining connections is needed to facilitate learning. 
  Ability to see connections between fields, ideas and concepts is a core skill. 
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  Accurate, up-to-date knowledge is the intent of all connectivist learning 
activities. 
  Decision making is a learning process. Choosing what to learn and the meaning 
of incoming information is seen through the lens of a shifting reality. While 
there is a right answer now, it may be wrong tomorrow due to alterations in the 
information climate affecting the decision 
 
These principles inform much of the MOOCS learning model and may be seen through 
its purposes, identities, equipment and co-ordination style. 
 
The basic philosophy of MOOCs is that education is an open resource and explicit 
knowledge is a utility and human right. 
 
Purposes: 
 The purposes that being sought to be fulfilled by the MOOCs learning  model are to 
 Disrupt the commodification of education: a founding principle of the 
connectivist pedagogy is in the disruption of education as a scare resource, 
while creating the channels to promote knowledge as open resource or social 
utility. 
 Facilitate self-organization through collaboration: A further proposition of 
the connectivist pedagogy is that learning may be significantly facilitated 
through collaboration between learners. 
 Provide quality free online learning content 
 Facilitate self-guided learning: A key concept here is to nurture the ability 
within learners to find knowledge and learn through self-guided efforts. 
Identities 
 
The identities that exist within this learning business model are and pursue its purposes 
are 
 Students:  
 Academia/Thought leaders 
 Private learning institutes 
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 Learning groups 
 Practitioners  
 
Equipment: 
The equipment that is utilized to pursue the purposes of this learning  model are  
 Collaborative learning mechanisms 
 Web platforms 
 Online curriculum 
 Personal computers 
Co-ordination Style 
The co-ordination style that is portrayed by this learning model is articulated as follows: 
We need an open-education economy to fulfil the skills needs of our time. 
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Figure 9 MOOC business model 
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C: Disruptive Approaches:  
Kepler School: Instilling tacit-embodied knowledge through the pragmatic pedagogy 
 
The third learning model is based on a disruptive new approach to solving the crisis of 
higher education in the developing world. This model has been introduced in Kigali, 
Rwanda in the form of the Kepler School and seeks to provide the benefits of both the 
formal school learning model and the MOOCs learning model. Launching in 2013, the 
pilot campus in Kigali, Rwanda will be the first university to bring together three major 
innovations in education and technology for the first time: 
1. Online courses from leading international universities, e.g. Harvard, UPenn; 
2. Intensive, in-person instruction using proven techniques from high-performing 
schools, e.g. no-excuses charter schools 




Within this disruptive model, learners stream lecture and complete online assignments, 
problem sets, and exams developed by professors at leading universities around the 
world. Kepler’s Teaching Fellows then lead seminars to discuss difficult material, build 
critical thinking skills, and contextualize topics for Rwandan undergraduates. This is a 
time when learners can analyze, debate, and question their own preconceptions. A 
condition of this model is that learners live and work together in wired group housing, 
fostering an atmosphere of friendship, collaboration, and academic competition. These 
are all seen as key drivers in achieving long-term intellectual outcomes. Finally, Kepler 
connects its learners with employers for internships and careers. The school trains their 
learners to stand out professionally from the start by partnering with local and 
international organizations to determine the skills they need from new hires. 
 
As this model is guided by a basic philosophy that true learning generates tacit ability; 
the purposes, identities, equipment and co-ordination style are geared towards this 
philosophy. 
Purposes: 
The purposes being pursued by the Kepler School learning model are to 
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 Leverage online content 
 Provide space for learning 
 Provide tutors and mentors 
 Focus on competency-based learning 
 
Identities: 
The identities that function to pursue the purposes of this learning model include 
 A community of tutors 
 Learners/students 




The equipment utilized to pursue the purposes of the Kepler School learning  model are  
 Classrooms/School 
 Internet Access 
 Web platform 




The co-ordination style that blends the purposes, identities and equipment of this 
learning model is a basis on competency/outcomes based learning. 
 
This learning model focuses on ensuring tacit-embodied knowledge and illustrates the 
pragmatic pedagogy in action. This highlights a move away from the formal school 
pedagogy and seeks to ensure greater co-creation and ensure a tacit-embodied 
knowledge with the focus on the type of knowledge being knowledge about doing 
things. The data focus of this learning  model is enacted reality, with action experience 
being the primary experience type. As opposed to the formal school model, the Kepler 
School learning model does focus on reflection, highlighting reflection on action as a 
key learner activity. This model has a generative epistemology; hence, a true test for a 
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learner is this model is producing new knowledge and hence new realities, with this 




Figure 10 Kepler School business model 
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MPhil. in Inclusive Innovation   
 
Another disruptive model that seeks to blend varying pedagogies of learning to enhance 
the learning experience is the Mphil. in Inclusive Innovation. This learning model was 
introduced in South Africa at the University of Cape Town Graduate School of 
Business (GSB) in 2013. The focus of this learning is making sense of the world/reality 
in which one lives in order to pursue and create meaningful change within that context. 
It places a strong focus on self-transcendental learning, experiencing breakdowns (as 
an epistemological process) and utilizing these in order to create (re)solutions in order 
to make a meaningful change. The model includes a rigorous academic curriculum and 
practical prototyping of new business models, processes, services and products that 
help create a more inclusive economy and society at large. 
 
The model seeks to move learners away from set (organizational) cultures and 
organizations (traditional ways of organizing) and ensures that learners work together 
for one year in a “living lab” environment, where expertise, life experiences, passion 
and innovation all converge to support new possibilities and ideas. This learning model 
has a strong philosophical basis and seeks to equip learners with skills that enable them 
to analyse (work) systems towards creating new solutions. 
 
The basic philosophy underpinning the Mphil.(in Inclusive Innovation) learning  model 
is that existential crises are the means to discover new job markets and self-
transcending knowledge allows for the exploration of emerging potentials. 
 
Purposes: 
The purposes being pursued by this learning model are to 
 Create social enterprises through engaged scholarship: A fundamental goal 
of this model is to facilitate the advent of social enterprises by exposing the 
learner/entrepreneur to relevant discourses in contemporary philosophy and 
science. 
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 Focus on self-mastery as means to knowledge acquisition: A further 
proposition here that true learning occurs a deep engagement with purpose and 
identity. 
 Leverage existential and transcendental crises to create purposeful systems 
(existential venturing): Another key concept in this model is that of 
entrepeneuring - that enterprises are born out of the existential crises of the 
entrepreneurs pursuing them. 
 Articulate existential processes with entrepreneurs 
 
Identities: 
The identities that function to pursue the purposes of this learning  model are 
 Students/Entrepreneurs: 
 Academia/Thought leaders 
 Private Enterprise 
 University of Cape Town 
 
Equipment: 
The equipment utilized to pursue the purposes of this learning model are  
 A Curriculum around the philosophy of learning 
 Incubator- Solution space 
 Practical problems based on industry need 
 
Co-ordination Style: 
The co-ordination style that enables the interrelationship between the purposes, 
identities and equipment is an emphasis on engaged scholarship. 
 
The disruptive learning models place a strong focus on self-transcending knowledge 
(MPhil Inc. Innovation) and tacit-embodied knowledge (Kepler Model), highlighting a 
learning need to know about the thought-origins of things. The data focus of these 
models is a reality that is not yet enacted and it utilizes aesthetic experience as the 
primary means to learning. This model places much emphasis on reflection-in-action, 
highlighting the key truth criterion as the ability for learners to presence an emerging 
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reality. The model embraces both an internal and external perspective, focusing on a 
view of a not-yet-enacted reality.  
 145 
Figure 11 MPhil business model 
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Problematizing the current system 
 
The interrelationship between the explicit (As represented by the formal school and 
MOOCs learning models), tacit (as represented by the Kepler School learning model) 
and self-transcendent (as presented by the MPhil. in Inclusive Innovation learning 
model) models of learning reveals the current chasm between education and pragmatic 
skill. The model below highlights the key systemic interrelations between these models 
and the current issues presented by the perpetuation of a system that only focuses on 
the production and transference of explicit knowledge. 
 
The objectification of knowledge intensifies (has intensified) the practice of education 
as knowledge transfer. This intensified practice of education as knowledge transfer as 
not only reinforced the objectification of knowledge, but it has also increased the 
commodification of education. The intensified commodification of education has 
subsequently intensified the standardization and validation of knowledge, further 
intensifying the reliability of education to fulfil need for particular/specific expertise. 
This has intensified the objectification of knowledge and subsequently intensified the 
autocracy of the knowledge economy and the Pedagogy of the Oppressed, this learning 
model focus has intensified passive learning, which has negatively impacted on the 
learners’ ability to think critically and abductively and be aware of social and existential 
realities. The reduced ability to think critically and abductively has decreased the 
mindfulness (cognitive plasticity) of learners, reducing their ability to adapt thinking to 
context and subsequently intensifying the inability to deal with dynamic complexity. 
This inability has increased the dissatisfaction with educational outcomes. 
 
The reduced ability to be aware of social and existential realities has slowed down 
purpose-driven learning and venturing, reducing the ability to sense emerging market 
potentials and subsequently intensifying the inability to innovate and create new job 
markets. This inability to innovate and create new job markets, coupled with the 
inability to deal with dynamic complexity has led to further dissatisfaction with (formal 
school learning model) educational outcomes. 
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This highlights the inadequacies of the predominant model of learning and calls for a 
model of learning that blends explicit, tacit and self-transcendent learning models in 
order to enhance the ability to think critically and abductively, be aware of social and 
existential realities, innovate and create new job markets and, deal with dynamic 
complexity, in order to narrow the chasm between education and pragmatic skill and 
ensure satisfaction with educational outcomes. 
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Learning for dream advancement is an intellectual and practical space where 
individuals articulate, develop, innovate, and pursue their dream. Dream advancement 
encourages creativity by all those in educational space. Educators within the educative 
environment promote self-examination, dialogue, and co-creation amongst all learners 
to prepare them to build the world they want their dreams to exist. Learning provides 
people the skills and experiences needed to adapt or transform the world as citizens. 
The proposed model brings together the various evaluated models in a way that ensures 
holistic learning.  
 
 
Figure 13 Integrative knowledge model 
This new model of learning seeks to achieve the transference of knowledge, utilizing 
the principles of the connectivist pedagogy through online learning (merging the formal 
school and MOOCs learning models), provide tacit ability to learners via experiential 
learning pursued using the pragmatic pedagogy (merging the Kepler School and MPhil. 
in Inclusive Innovation learning models) and ensure the instilling of self-transcending 
 150 
knowledge through existential venturing utilizing an existential pedagogy (expanding 
on the MPhil. in Inclusive Innovation learning model). 
 
In order to fulfil this purpose, it is envisaged that the learning model needs to exist 
within an interdependent ecosystem. The diagram below highlights the components of 
this ecosystem. 
 
The ecosystem aims to provide a mutually reinforcing multiplatform system that’s net 
effect aims to ensure holistic learning and address the supply and demand of skills 
within The Western Cape. The four platforms involved are: 
 
1. The Skills Intelligence Platform 
2. The Career Awareness Platform 
3. The Learning Awareness Platform 
4. The Learning Market 
 
The Skills Intelligence Platform (SIP) 
 
This platform’s overall aim is the facilitation of the development of new skills 
programs. To achieve this the platform must assist in assessing skills gaps within the 
Western Cape, allow for the aggregation of these skills gaps into categories and tags, 
enable the creation of challenges to meet these skills gaps and enable the creation of 
initiatives that plot the course of an implemented solution to a skills gap. 
 
The net output of this platform is to supply information regarding skill development to 
those who post their “skills gaps”  (as a result of the development programs), to allow 
a platform on which skills development practitioners to collaborate to create skills and, 
to generate skills development programs which are most directed to fulfilling the 
biggest skills demands in The Western Cape. 
 
The Career Awareness Platform (CAP) 
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The CAP’s main objective is to address the need of the citizens of The Western Cape 
to find fulfilling work aligned to their skill ability. To achieve this goal, this platform 
must assist in graphing social and skill ability for each user, assist in the creation of 
career wizard to match users to skills development programs, online learning content 
and mentors. Further, this platform should provide coaching and guidance regarding 
career awareness and match users to job opportunities. 
 
The Learning Awareness System (LAS) 
 
The LAS is fundamentally a system to facilitating learning via an online learning 
platform. To achieve this goal, the platform needs to aggregate online learning content, 
provide practical cases to support online learning, provide validation for skills learnt 
and connect leaners to real work situations. 
 
The Learning Market 
 
The Learning Market is an online marketplace for online learning content generated by 
private businesses to create a skills development economy. This system will be 
interoperable with the Learning Awareness System. 
 
Engagement dynamics of the learning model 
 
The learning model is conceptualized to function within this ecosystem in a manner 
that maximizes holistic learning and links explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge and self-
transcendent knowledge. 
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Within the model, academia, industry, the Premier Skills Office (Western Cape) and 
small-medium enterprises would collaborate to provide information related to  
 skills demand and practical problems. The content related to skills demand would feed 
into the skills intelligence platform resulting in programs being created to address skills 
gaps. The created programs would be viewable online via the learning management 
system, these would be supplemented by the practical problems raised, MOOCs and 
online content. Learners, unskilled and unemployed citizens would also collaborate to 
create content regarding the knowledge demand, this content would feed into both the 
Career awareness platform as well as the learning management system. The 
culmination of the content arising from the skills intelligence platform, learning 
management system and career awareness platform would function to create practice 
based courseware which would inform practical solutions, assist in meeting the skills 
demand and assist in meeting the knowledge demand. This would ensure that learners 
gain explicit knowledge, tacit knowledge, and self-transcendent knowledge that not 
only enhances their learning and individual skill base, but that is also directed towards 
creating (or participating) in solutions aimed at making a positive impact in their 
context. In this sense, it may be seen that the learning management system is geared to 




The total lifecycle of this project (The Design of a New Learning System) alone was 
10 months. The process articulated above, constituted the first two months of work on 
the project. Following this we took this high-level conceptual model and created a 
detailed specification for development, including a functional, specification, user 
experience analysis and design, a fully functional prototype and visual guidelines 
documentation. Much of this work has not been included here due to intellectual 
property restrictions. 
 
At the time of hand-in of this thesis, the project was in the first phase of development, 
and the final design was received with great commendation.  
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  Phenomena of the Interventions 
 
This research has been grounded within the experience of the everyday reality of 
business model innovation. In the previous section we explored the intervention. This 
section will explore, the phenomena, which were encountered during these 
interventions. 
 
All the phenomena detailed below occurred during the engaged process of business 
model innovation. In this way they arose firstly as experiences, which were at once 
deeply moving, but also inexplicable and uncertain. The journey of this thesis then was 
taking these experiences of significance and finding a way to firstly understand them 
better, secondly interrogate them and thirdly being able to explain them clearly and 
lucidly. 
 
Sections two and three then are a result of my deep interrogation of current 
philosophies, theories, narratives and methodologies; in an attempt to recover the 
essence of the phenomena I experienced. In this way this research is distinctly 
empirical, in that it is based centrally on the as-lived experience of this process. What 
is attempted here is to draw these experiences (a posterori) into their essential natures 
(a priori). This is with an important distinction however. Unlike Husserl’s project, 
which aimed to reveal essential and eternally existing natures, we are here interested in 
the inverse – the creation of essences from experience. This is with the central 




Following this, these descriptions of the phenomena of the intervention are not lengthy 
explanations of theoretical or philosophical systems but rather succinct descriptions of 




A Triangulation of Space 
 
The journey of this thesis began in early 2013 when I realized I had received a 
scholarship to complete my masters’ degree at The Graduate School of Business. I had 
been living in Durban for the last year, working at a venture capital firm in the capacity 
of a product designer, digital and business strategist. The year had been a cumbersome 
one, full of obligatory handshakes and meaningless nods. I had become somewhat 
disillusioned with many aspects of the world I was engaging with and was sincerely 
seeking a way out.  
 
I felt the noose of the modernist regime firmly around my neck – I worked all day and 
well into the night  (I was managing a local team of designers and developers in South 
Africa and also team of developers in San Francisco) running after what seemed like 
an utterly futile goal – the creation of a product who’s primary’s purpose was to extract 
as much money from would-be consumers as possible; without any real benefit I may 
add. 
 
So after a year of this my life was a complete mess – my relationship of three years was 
systematically falling apart in front of me; my relationships in general with people had 
become painful and stressed. At the end I realized I had embodied all those things I had 
fought so hard exclude from my life, I had become so self-obsessed, habituated into the 
style of always ‘looking out for number one’.  In the final reckoning the decision to 
leave my life in Durban, my family and my girlfriend was my attempt to directly face 
myself, to question fundamentally the nature of my existence and my purpose.  
 
This is an important point of departure because it articulates well the place from which 
all my research came– highlighting the intentionality of this work. Emerging from this 
crisis, I realized my journey was dedicated to resolving two broad questions – 1) Where 
do I find myself in this world and how do I make my engagement in this world 
meaningful? 2) How do we transform businesses, organizations and societies, so that 




The first and probably most profound phenomenon I wish to describe in this narrative 
is that of self-transcendence (cf. Scharmer, Self Transcending Knowledge). This is the 
realization that the self is not the source of knowledge but the vehicle of it. Furthermore 
it is the fluidity of the self that determines its ability to recognize, assemble and make-
sense of the noise of reality. When describing this fluidity, I suggest that it is traditional 
notion of linear causality, which is the fundamental stricture on this. The great leap of 
thought then, is that the world emerges, not to ’billiard ball’ determinism but through 
an innate and fundamental circularity – that world gives us narratives, which occupy 
the imagination, from which we give the world our narrative. 
 
To articulate this, I will begin at the beginning - to a month before I left for Cape Town. 
In the period after I resigned from my job and before leaving (to Cape Town), I had a 
month of time to try and determine my bearings in this journey. It was a time of 
meditation and reflection.  Reflecting on this now I realize this was my first 
experimentation with the notion of being present to the problematic.  What occurred 
through this period of deep mindful engagement to the mess of my life, was that quite 
magically three narratives appeared. These three texts were – 1) The Myth of Sisyphus 
by Albert Camus, 2) Dune by Frank Herbert and 3) Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius by Jorge 
Luis Borges (part of Borges’s compilation of short stories called Labyrinths) 
 
These narratives are significant because their appearance were an answer from the 
world to my internal condition – that by mindfully holding the breakdown before me, 
the world swiftly answered. Moreover each of the texts, which emerged, was to become 
three dimensions I would explore over the next year and become the major themes of 
my journey. 
 
Lets begin in the beginning, with Camus’ absurdity. The myth of Sisyphus is a classic 
essay of existential philosophy, inquiring into the nature of purpose and meaning of 
existence. The book is a retelling of the Greek myth and introduces Camus’ philosophy 
of the absurd.  It is important to note here that Camus’ work was published in 1942 in 
the age of industrialization and in a world at war.  
 
The gods condemned Sisyphus to a truly pointless and meaningless task – he had to roll 
a rock to the top of a mountain and then due to its own weight it would roll back down 
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again. Then he had to do it again and again, for eternity. It is in Camus’ retelling of this 
myth that he articulates what he calls the absurd – a lifetime of futile labor. Here Camus 
is not referring to the many small absurdities we encounter in our everyday life but to 
the overall obsession of the modernist culture to enforce a life of servitude to irrelevant 
and indeed non-existent ideals – and is therefor a philosophical and metaphysical thesis.  
It is a confrontation, a confrontation between sturdily held notions of justification and 
rationality that the world itself is comprehensible.  One might say it is part of our human 
nature, that we are born with certain sense, which is integral and inherent to our being 
human. It is this common sense, which is confronted.  Camus maintains here that we 
project this sense onto the world – which we expect the world to confirm to. 
 
We think for example that evil should be punished and that goodness should be 
rewarded – however this is not always the case.  Goodness is not always rewarded and 
evil is not always punished.  The absurd is this recognition  - that we have this demand 
of the world and that the world is indifferent to it completely.  
 
There is much subtlety in this text for it is an inquiry into the notion of the world and 
into the notion of Self. In my reading of The Myth of Sisyphus and of The Stranger 
(1942) it seems that Camus is describing not a confrontation between this rationality 
and an indifferent world necessarily, but between the actual notions of a real world 
itself. This needs some clarification. An object of Camus’ thesis is the scientific 
paradigm, what Thomas Nagel (1989) calls  ‘the view from nowhere’. This objective 
view of the world holds that the world exists ‘out there.’ This scientific worldview with 
its grand notions of the universe and objective rendition of history leaves the individual 
with an indubitable recognition of their insignificance and indeed the futility of their 
existence. 
 
Camus’ proposes then that the real meaning then is life itself – life is the meaning of 
life. The value of life is in making it’s meaning, the only thing that is meaningful is the 
meaning you make of your experience.  
 
The central point here is that our rationality has dominated our way of thinking in a 
blind and uncontrolled manner – to such an extant that most people would argue that 
thinking is rationality. If we look deeply into what rationality is, we notice that it is the 
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function of the mind, which attempts to explain, why? It is a chain of justification or 
explanation to deal with the incomprehensibility of experience. 
 
The problem is that we don’t follow this chain to its conclusion, we are always happy 
to resign ourselves to a middling explanation, which truly explains nothing. For 
example children are always full to the brim with questions, whose exhaustive 
questioning always exceeds the knowledge of the parent. A child may ask about a 
person who died in a car crash: 
 
Child: Why did she die in the car crash? 
Parent: Because she wasn’t wearing a seatbelt? 
Child: But why did she die and the other person who also wasn’t wearing a seatbelt not 
die? 
Parent: That’s just because it was her time 
 
You see, our rationality does not explain anything, however it does highlight the 
coordination of our own thoughts, our sense of things. 
 
Similarly if you ask yourself why you do a thing, what is your motivation for doing a 
certain thing. If you do this, then you get that and then when you get that, you will do 
this…and finally you will be happy. But what is happiness and what is pleasure and 
why is it so important that we find it? And why should happiness be a final end? In this 
way justification, explanation runs out. Similarly in a scientific paradigm understanding 
runs out – we find amusingly that theoretical physicists are always attempting to explain 
the next edge of the known world. This edge is indefinable because of the dependent 
nature of all things – things emerge together, not from origins. This understanding of a 
world of origin, Heidegger calls the metaphysics of presence, which he explains has 
been the predominant mode of thinking in our time. 
 
As David Bohm (1980) lucidly describes, “ …older theories become more and more 
unclear when one tries to use them to obtain insight into new domains. Careful attention 
to how this happens is then generally the main clue toward new theories that constitute 
further new forms of insight.” As we observe the world, we have implicitly agreed to 
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certain attributes and qualities of it through our disposition. These theoretical lenses 
provide the main source of organisations of factual knowledge (Bohm, 1980). 
  
Returning to Camus’ retelling of the myth of Sisyphus, we find ourselves upon what 
we may argue is some of Camus’ finest writing. He explores Sisyphus as the archetypal 
absurd hero – that he is an archetype for us.  Fated to live an eternity in meaningless 
toil. 
 
Using this archetype as mode of exploration he inquires into the state of mind of 
Sisyphus. In this he further explores two possible states of mind. Firstly he begins to 
examine Sisyphus’ intentionality toward his task. If he were completely engaged in his 
work, if he was truly coupled with it, and not reflecting on the task itself, this problem 
would not arise. In so doing he problematizes thinking and reasoning – that if in the 
end we ask, “what does this amount to?”, the answer will always be deeply unsatisfying. 
Conversely if we ignore the urge to question and remain in the experience itself we 
avert the weight of reflection. 
 
The second answer that he proposes is that Sisyphus’ mind is one of resentment against 
the gods, and is in in a state of revolt. However this is not revolt in the mundane sense 
but in a metaphysical sense. That is, a rejection of the basic premise of things, selves 
and worlds. It is a reactive gesture a way of giving meaning to your life but in defiance 
and revolt.  There is some ambiguity here in what this actually means and indeed it was 
this ambiguity, which much of this discourse aims to unravel. What does it mean to 
defy the traditional common-sense? 
 
So in this rendition Camus proposes, in line with a tradition including Kierkegaard and 
Dostoyevsky before him, that rationality and self-consciousness is the problem. Camus 
is indicating that if the story of Sisyphus is tragic it is because he is conscious but 
specifically that he was self-conscious, reflective and self-aware. Moreover that 
consciousness is not necessarily a blessing, but rather the problem of existence. 
  
To elaborate on this further, we may take the example of a machine, which is also fated 
to do the same repetitive task until it breaks down or becomes redundant. This activity 
is only absurd in the view of self-agency or self-awareness. We may venture that 
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Camus’ proposition here is that this concept of Self is in fact the root cause of the 
despair of the existential crises.  
 
We could argue further that consciousness itself is not the problem but the quality of 
consciousness, or in other words what we are conscious of. In a mundane sense our 
consciousness is always directed to a sense of individuation - that our consciousness is 
aware of our selves and then the world in which we act.  
 
As discussed earlier Camus proposes two alternatives to this – 1) that we remain 
focused in the experience itself or 2) that we revolt against the fateful determinations 
of our existence.  It is at this point that I found many correlations to Tibetan Buddhism.  
The fundamental proposition here is that the self is not an inherently existing thing, 
meaning that it is does not exist independently. Furthermore, and this is the fundamental 
link with Camus specifically and with the existential philosophers in general, the notion 
of the self as an inherently existing thing sullies the quality of consciousness, such that 
it is suffering. 
 
This is a truly profound pattern, that is unravelled here – that the conception of what a 
self is determines the quality of experience. The Buddhist notion of self then is that 
which holds the activity of a self as one coherent entity – through conceptual 
imputation.  I would like to emphasize the last point, that of conceptual imputation. 
This is the insight that the self is a function of concepts, naming and the structure of 
language and that it is merely that. However language makes distinctions in a field of 
intensities, this is significant because these distinctions once made propagate 
themselves. If this crucial generative mechanism in not revealed, we would believe that 
the words we live in, is life.  As Camus explains, ‘the absurd is lucid reason that sees 
its limits.’ This means as we delve into the machinery of thinking we find its 
paradoxical and labyrinthine beginnings, which is life in its most gracious unknowable 
form.  
 
However this does not mean that we may merely think away the world, but rather that 
we find our responsibility to take creative action. To be present and to dream those 
dreams, which are being asked to be dreamt.  What does this mean? This means that, 
as Deleuze indicates, the role of the philosopher is not to reflect, but in the creation of 
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new concepts, for the world is dynamic flux which is eternally becoming.  The true act 
of philosophy then is not to acquiesce to what is but to abide in possibility itself.  
 
This leads onto the next fundamental phase of my investigation, that of 
intersubjectivity. This was a driving question that I found myself seeking answers to, 
how do we resolve the internal world with that of the material world?  It is this question, 
which we find really at the centre of contemporary philosophical debate, global 
economic and political discourse and most importantly at the centre of every human 
being, in their everyday life.   
 
There is much evidence that this question lies at the heart of human experience; in fact 
we may say that it is that which defines the human experience. In Western Philosophy, 
as we have shown earlier this has been a central question defining the trajectory of 
philosophical thought from Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and then Deleuze. The 
early phenomenologists were concerned with uncovering an essential nature of things.  
 
We find in fact that the lineage of western thinkers followed a very specific line of 
inquiry.  We find firstly, that there is a complete dissatisfaction at the ontic level with 
an objective reality or world ‘out there’.  What is acknowledged is a plurality of 
subjectivities; there are many people who are experiencing the world from their own 
perspectives – however there are enough shared experiences for us to act with in it. To 
facilitate communication, language emerges as means of finding shared experience. 
With this language-ing of reality we find a metapatterning of this language to structures 
of justification, explaining and understanding - what we may term rationality or 
common sense.  These metastructures of language infer a certain hierarchy, that things 
are only things when placed in some association with an ideal.  
 
This concept may be understood between the relationship of general and specific – 
which ground inductive and deductive forms of logic. Using an example of a table, 
when we an encounter a table we immediately recognise it as a table, but is this Table. 
That is to ask does this represent the essence of table-ness, does it represent all tables 
and more profoundly where does Table exist. Fundamentally this is an ideal sense of 
Table, yet it is only through this idea, this virtuality that we can comprehend it as a 
table. This led first to movements of Transcendental Idealism and this notion of 
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thinking also lends itself to finding an essential nature of things, which we find in 
Phenomenology. Finally in the neo-phenomenological movements and later with the 
philosophy of Gilles Deleuze, the proposition of an essential essence is abandoned. 
 
Interestingly there is a striking resemblance between this lineage of thinkers and that of 
middle way school(s) of Buddhist philosophy. Nagarjuna the great Buddhist 
philosopher founded this tradition. He expounded the doctrine that things are devoid of 
substance or essence because they are mutually dependent and co-arising, called The 
Middle Way. 
 
There were three major schools of the Madhyamaka tradition, each founded upon a 
critique of the former, with a final exposition held by the Prasangika School, which is 
widely acknowledged as the most accurate understanding of Nagarjuna’s doctrine. This 
is interesting here because the two earlier schools, the Sautantrika School and the 
Yogacara School both hold views, which have similarity with the phenomenologist and 
the idealist positions.  
 
The Sautantrika School firstly held the notion of an essential conventional nature, that 
things have an essential nature when they appear in an interdependent manner. This can 
be likened to the phenomenologist’s thesis, which holds that things appear as a 
derivation of some essential nature or organisation. The fundamental argument posed 
to this proposition, specifically in Chandrakirtis commentary to the 
Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, is that a thing cannot fundamentally have a different nature 
from its essential nature.  This argument is in essence the same argument as that 
proposed by Deleuze against an essentialist view (Deleuze G. , 1994). 
 
The Yogacara or the mind-only school, was concerned centrally with phenomenology 
and ontology. Specifically they were interested in understanding the difference between 
what may be considered to be real and what is illusion or false apprehension.  The 
Yogacara School and the Prasangika School were engaged in a very central dialectic to 
the emptiness doctrine. This dialectic was really around the Prasangika’s claim that an 
assertion of any thing’s existence or non-existence was incorrect, while The Yogacara’s 




Simply put, these two schools uphold two views, which the Prasangika School 
countered. In all philosophical traditions, this is the question, the question of being so 
to speak. Is the world we experience real, are our minds only real or is the world only 
real?  These fundamental questions in philosophy, science and religion have lead to 
many stances. In particular we can contrast two dominant stances that of nihilism on 
the one hand and essentialism on the other. Obviously there a numerous gradations of 
these positions, with ever greater subtlety.  
 
Particularly from the point of the Madhyamaka school, the essentialist (or eternalist) 
view holds that things inherently exist. This view is very close in explanation to the 
Aristotelian metaphysics of presence, which understands the world as either 
immediately present or eternally existing. With this in the West is a long tradition is 
‘essentialists’. This understanding breeds a way of being which aims to pursue those 
desirable objects we crave and push away those object we are averse to. Even more 
fundamentally than this we see that this view in the West has led to an overriding 
preoccupation with dominance over Being.  
 
This is worth exploring further. If we take the essential and idealist stance – which 
holds that there is an essential nature to things, which exist eternally. We would have 
no ethical problems exploiting the world, because we do not see the resources of the 
world as immanent to history, but from a plane of ideal essences. However if we 
understood the world, its resources and our lives as historical entities, we are 
immediately called to act with responsibility and indeed awe. 
 
The second view, which the Prasangikas refute, is that of nihilism. This is the belief 
that life is meaningless, that all equates to nil. Particularly they address this as an ethical 
standing - that because meaning is made, that there are no eternal truths that the 
meaning of life is similarly devoid. This belief lies in a schism between our inner world 
and the world out there – in this way our actions, our thoughts and our beliefs are our 
own and have no real meaning. This amounts very closely to Descartes solipsist view--, 
which implants the great schism between self and others.  
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The middle way school, in this way proposes a middle way, that things do not not exist, 
neither do they exist. A common explanation of this is in the doctrine of the two truths, 
which says that there is an absolute and relative truth. This doctrine claims that things 
do not exist absolutely, however in a relative sense things appear as objective reality.  
 
This in turn relates to two fundamental characteristics that of emptiness and dependent 
origination.  Things are empty in the sense that they do not have an essential nature – 
that is when you search for an inherently existing object, it is unfindable.  Things arise 
dependently, this means all objects are relational, all things are historical entities.  
 
The lack of inherent existence means that objects do not have any finite points – in of 
themselves; rather objects are products of distinctions in language or conceptual 
imputation.  Language in turn is based on a way of reasoning, but particularly in rules 
of thinking, which are related to inductive and deductive forms of logic. Specifically it 
is the function of language to make inferences from general to specific; which in turn 
must hold an essential nature.  
 
The Madhyamaka School aims to show fundamentally the irrationality of an existing 
thing. For this Nagarjuna proposes the tetra lemma, in which describes the eight limits 
of propositional logic. For a proposition P we have eight possible limits: 
Positive Configuration Negative Configuration 
  
P Not (P) 
Not-P Not (Not-P) 
Both P and Not-P Not (Both P and Not P) 
Neither P nor Not-P Not (Neither P nor Not-P) 
 
The view of emptiness that Nagarjuna expounds is the viewless view, which is all of 
these in a dialectic without synthesis.  We can understand this logical machine as 
working against the tools of logic itself, to engender a state, which is the viewless view. 
If we take any proposition (P), we must also acknowledge that it emerges from a 
background of understanding (Not-P). Similarly we may see that Not-P is a proposition 
in itself, and similarly emerges from a background Not (Not-P) – this is a paradox of 
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infinite regress, remaining incomplete and without resolution. Further if we take both 
P and Not-P to be true, this is similarly a proposition within a background and so on.  
 
We may say then to assert a thing to be real we must suppress an inordinate, in fact 
infinite number of possibilities for its truth – that perceiving the real requires a 
fundamental lack of awareness. And so the spell of reality is cast. As Heidegger urges 
us to see it is unconcealment that also conceals; for it is the clearing that shelters. 
 
So back to our narrative, as I have said at the beginning of our story, one of the nodes 
of this journey lay in discovering Borges’ Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius.  This book was 
a fragment of an incomplete totality, which I stumbled upon. The short story is a 
beautifully crafted, journey into the reality of the imagination. Borges is a part of an 
oeuvre of South American writers that explored magical realism. This was a style of 
writing, which explored the borders of the real, in attempting to understand reality itself. 
At the heart of his writing is a paradox so profound, it asks a fundamental ontological 
question. This became known as the Borgesian Conundrum, “whether the writer writes 
the story, or if it writes him.” Rather than resolving this, the works of Borges imply that 
there is a mutual inscription, further that the creative act of being is one that alters the 
totality of being- it alters the past and restructures the future. 
 
The story of Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, starts with Borges, who finds an article in an 
encyclopaedia about a mysterious country called Uqbar. He uncovers a massive 
conspiracy of a group of elite intellectuals to imagine and thereby create a world, called 
Tlön.  This world has its own set of metaphysical and physical laws, in which the 
mythology of Uqbar is set. 
 
In the beginning of the book, Uqbar is thought to have existed somewhere on Earth 
around the Middle East.  As he investigates further, he finds more fragments and clues 
about the existence of this world. He is lead through a labyrinthine maze of texts and 
books in his attempt to verify the existence of this place. What is most interesting in 
this journey is that he discovers a passage, which says that in the literature of Uqbar, 
there is never mention of reality but rather imaginary worlds. He finds evidence of two 
imaginary worlds Mlejnas and Tlön. 
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Eventually the discussion around Tlön moves beyond Borges, and further to a broader 
group of academics and intellectuals. This leads to an extended discussion around the 
languages and philosophy of this lost world. In particularly Borges’ explores the 
epistemology of Tlön, whose inhabitants hold an extreme form of idealism, that they 
emphasise the world before inference to things. In explaining this further Borges 
discovers that one of the languages of Tlön lack nouns, its central mode is in the use of 
impersonal verbs qualified by monosyllabic prefixes and suffixes, which in effect act 
as adverbs. In another language, the basic unit of language is not the verb but the 
adjective, which when in conjunction with other adjectives infer what we would call a 
noun. 
 
There is a common reading of Borges that he is proposing that the world of Tlön holds 
an extreme form of Berkeleyan Idealism – denying the reality of the world. Indeed 
Borges does undergo an extensive discussion of Berkley in the short story: 
 
Hume noted for all time that Berkeley's arguments did not admit the slightest 
refutation nor did they cause the slightest conviction. This dictum is entirely 
correct in its application to the earth, but entirely false in Tlön. The nations of 
this planet are congenitally idealist. Their language and the derivations of their 
language - religion, letters, metaphysics - all presuppose idealism. The world 
for them is not a concourse of objects in space; it is a heterogeneous series of 
independent acts. It is successive and temporal, not spatial. There are no nouns 
in Tlön's conjectural Ursprache, from which the "present" languages and the 
dialects are derived: there are impersonal verbs, modified by monosyllabic 
suffixes (or prefixes) with an adverbial value. For example: there is no word 
corresponding to the word "moon,” but there is a verb, which in English would 
be "to moon" or "to moonate." "The moon rose above the river" is hlor u fang 
axaxaxas mlo, or literally: "upward behind the onstreaming it mooned." 
(Borges,1998, p.73) 
 
However if we examine this a bit closer we find a thread, which tugs at the very notion 
of ideal. For there to be an ideal there has to be the notion of the non-ideal or specific 
– in this way the notion of ideal is inherently fixed to an object, thing or noun. For me 
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the true thrust of this imagining is conceived of a world of pure intensities. It is this 
world of intensities, which Deleuze’s whole ontology embraces  - in fact for Deleuze 
reality is a unified field of intensities, which is territorialized through differences 
(Deleuze G. , 1994). It is this act of difference, which produces things – though these 
things are emergent properties of intensive differences.  
 
There is a further understanding commonly held about the story, that the members of 
Tlön deny reality. However they obviously do take things to be real, for they act in 
language, however it is based on a completely different metaphysics. This alternate 
metaphysics does not privilege presence but possibility and becoming. This unreality 
liberates being from the ontic status to that of the ontological status – that of Being as 
possibility. Further it shows that the possibility of being is also the impossibility of it.  
 
As the story continues, Borges’ inquiry unravels Tlön to the world; slowly the rest of 
the world gradually hears more about Tlön, its people and their ways. In this way they 
slowly adopt the ideas of Tlön and begin affecting reality in the same way. At the end 
of the story, these ideas take over completely eradicating the cultures of the real world. 
 
When I first read the story, I was about to set off on my journey to Cape Town and like 
Borges, within his own story – this story was the first fragment of the investigation. It 
was a puzzle so intriguing it occupied my thoughts week after week – stuck in my mind 
like a grain of sand within a clam.  I read and reread this story many times – mainly 
because I felt it was significant in some way. I couldn’t exactly understand why it was; 
yet I was drawn to it again and again.  
 
What I eventually found was that this journey, the journey of Borges was isomorphic 
to my journey, similarly it transcribed a route that was common to philosophical, 
innovative and entrepreneurial activity.  As we recall the story, there are a few stages. 
Firstly the discovery of some anomaly, which just doesn’t quite sit right – in this case 
Borges stumbling over the article about the lost world. We may call this our Gödel 
statement, which is a statement, which is true for the system but inexplicable by the 
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theory of the system1. Secondly, the inquirer unfolds the investigation by being present 
to the anomaly; slowly more and more fragments appear. These fragments are part of a 
whole picture, which seems to remain whole, but also incomplete.  
 
As more and more pieces fit together, there is a fundamental breakdown in the 
epistemic machinery, things do not make sense. In this breakdown the intervener asks 
– what may be true? In this certain axioms of a new system emerge in dependence of 
each other – this is the basic scaffolding of a new truth. 
 
In generating basic axioms of a new system, we articulate its coordination, rules and 
laws. In the process of Borges, the evidence within the encyclopaedia pushes him to 
question his own epistemological machinery and in so doing the ontological status of 
things.  So thirdly there is a prototype of a new sense – an innovation in the 
epistemological machinery of the situation (what Spinosa et al. call reconfiguration). 
This is not as instrumental innovation would have it; as a development of a new concept 
or thing, but an innovation around how new concepts are made and what is called to 
‘be plausible’ – innovating within a background of understanding or ontological design. 
 
Next having found this radiant gem, the intrepid explorer uses it as tool within a social 
context. This new prototype disrupts the predominate sense, using the basic anomaly(s) 
it has found.  This new assemblage is defined in its relationship to a context of 
intervention- by its ability to affect and be affected. It is this dialogue of counter 
effectuation that weaves in a new sense. It is important to note here that this process of 
validation is not an imposition, but a dialogue of mutual becoming. In the story Borges 
finds that his discovery leads to this being a discovery of a wider socio-cultural context.  
 
In the next stage there is larger and larger adoption of this new sense, which becomes 
an unavoidable truth. Over time this takes hold until the old sense is forgotten, and a 
new world has emerged. This last stage is such a profound ontological transformation 
that both histories and futures are altered. In this way the a posterori creates a new a 
priori; a transcendental empiricism. 
                                                 
1 It is important to note here that this is a posteriori that it is a found empirical piece 
within a system 
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This may seem all rather esoteric and abstract, but this form of ontological design is a 
pervasive mechanism within society to day.  Spinosa et al. (2007) in their research of 
entrepreneurs detail six qualities, which they think are most important: 
 
“(1) The entrepreneur innovates by holding some anomaly ;(2) he brings the 
anomaly to bear on his tasks;(3) he is clear about the relation of the anomaly to 
the rest of what he does, and once he has a sense of a world in which the anomaly 
is central, such as the world of work, he embodies, produces, and markets his 
new understanding; (4) to do this he preserves and tests his new 
understanding...to see how it fits in a wider experience (5) as we have claimed 
but have yet to argue, he must take this new conception and embody it in a way 
that preserves its sensibleness and the strangeness it produces, seeing to it that 
his new understanding retains for others the authority it had for him and 
reconfiguring the way things happen in a particular domain; (6) finally he 
focuses all dimensions of entrepreneurial activity into a styled coordination with 
each other and brings them in tune with his embodied conception, so the critical 
distinctions involved in appreciating the product become manifest in the 
company’s way of life.” (Spinosa et al, 2007 p.50) 
 
This pattern is not only found in business though, it found in physics, biology, 
mathematics and philosophy. Moreover, since this process begins with an individual 
experience of significance, this is also our main way we approach the world and the 
uncertainty inherent within it.  
 
The work of Einstein is a great example here. His work in general relativity began with 
empirical observation, which led to a reformulation of basic laws of physics. It is 
important to note however that his intervention did not disqualify the formal system of 
physics entirely but explained it in a fundamental different way, namely general 
relativity. In this way he addressed the epistemic machinery within the milieu of 
physics. Today his work has completely changed the ontology in which we live.  
 
Borges’ strategy in Tlön, Uqbar, Orbis Tertius, is profoundly fitting to the current 
investigation because it aims at envisaging a world freed from the shackles of a 
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metaphysics of presence. If Heidegger aimed to outline the mechanisms of presence, 
Borges helps us imagine a world made, not inherited: 
 
“How could the world not fall under the sway of Tlön, how could it not yield to 
the vast and minutely detail of an ordered planet? It would be futile to reply that 
reality is also ordered. Perhaps it is, but orderly in accordance with divine laws 
(read:” inhuman laws”) that we can never quite manage to penetrate. Tlön may 
well be a labyrinth, but it is a labyrinth forged by men, a labyrinth destined to 
be deciphered by men.” (Borges, 1998 p.81) 
 
It is with this grand vision of the work of the imagination, that we find the last 'night 
star’ is the sky of my journey. This is Frank Herbert’s Dune. (1990) Like the other 
two narratives, I stumbled upon this one too; I started listening (on audiobook) to it on 
my drive down to Cape Town. The exquisitely crafted novel is one of the great Science 
Fiction classics and became one of the first insights into a genre of ecological thought. 
 
It traces the life path, of Paul Atreides who is born in the midst of an interplanetary 
political saga. Paul is propelled across the universe when his family is given 
stewardship of a new home, the desert planet Arakis. Paul and his family are usurped 
and have to flee into the desert wild.  
 
The planet, Arakis is a source of the most valuable substance in the universe, the spice. 
The spice has truly supernatural powers that allow it to ‘fold space’ and carry 
interstellar ships across great distances in a blink of an eye. It also has several 
entheogenic and psychotropic properties when ingested, allowing for supernatural 
abilities such as precognition and telekinesis. 
 
The main antagonist in the story is Baron Harkonen of the House Harkonen, who spins 
an elaborate plot to gain control over the planet and in effect, dominate the spice route, 
which rules the known universe.  Further Arakis is a desert planet, in which all the 
natural resources have dried up, on the brink of ecological collapse.  
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The story drew many parallels for me to the world we live in, with wide macro and 
mundo system failure, entangled beneath a complex political agenda. Moreover it 
represented the overburden of the overriding paradigm of exploitation in which most 
of our industries operate under. Most centrally it was the reason I had travelled across 
the country, to try find a way to renew business, organisations and societies – to liberate 
them from a paradigm of scarcity, instrumentality and dominance. 
 
I found the richest understanding of Dune, in reading Heidegger side by side, the spice 
seemed analogous to the Heideggerrian concept of Being. Specifically I was drawn to 
make connections between Heidegger’s articulations of the metaphysics of presence, 
(which established an epoch of dominance over being) to the obsession of the 
interstellar community’s obsession with spice. Further the spice is used as fuel to power 
great intergalactic ships; it is manipulated and subjugated to will of man.  
 
In contrast, in exile Paul Atreides learns to use the spice to unlock inner wisdom and 
potential within him. Instead of using the spice in a machine, Paul ingests the spice and 
lets it transform him; rather than impose his will on it. This is what Heidegger suggests, 
when he proposes that the role of man is as ‘Shepard to being.’ Arakis, the Desert planet 
was analogous to language, the house of being, because like language Arakis is the 
home of being. In the hand of the house Harkonen the planet is dry wasteland, in my 
interpretation this is the same state of language, which is used as a stricture on being. 
 
At the end of the novel, Paul retakes the control of the planet and in effect the power of 
the entire inter planetary society. In this he initiates systems, which territorialise the 
arid planet in attempt to make it a rich and fertile paradise once again. The message 
then (from my extended metaphor/interpretation) is that in the reinstating man as the 
‘Shepard of being’, that is to be guided by and through it, we may stand at a new age 
of human evolution. An age where we may truly unlock our potential - which I suspect 
if far greater than our wildest dreams. 
 
The key point in the telling of this narrative, is not only in detailing these guiding stars 
of my journey, but also in trying to describe the unravelling of the process of discovery 
and innovation. This is not innovation in the way that is commonly understood but an 
innovation within the background of my being, an innovation of self.  In following these 
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clues and fragments, which at first seemed nothing more than mere interest, unravelled 




As we have seen from the narrative (A Triangulation of Space), in the last section the 
first portion of my journey was concerned centrally with identity and purpose. In 
particular, Albert Camus’ writing had resonated deeply with the deep anxiety I had been 
experiencing. In fact I found the whole movement of existentialist philosophy was 
grounded in the understanding that we are pulled to see the world as mundane, 
meaningless and unfulfilling, if we merely become accepting inhabitants of it. 
Heidegger calls this conscience; this is the part of Dasein, which calls us back to 
discover our authenticity. It is that part of us which shakes out of complacency, into a 
state of being ontological. This is to ask the question of being, to ask the question of 
our own true potential. 
 
To set the scene briefly, I had begun my journey as an entrepreneur with a group of 
fellow students, who had been friends for a few years. We had started a company, which 
we called Ownpower, which focussed on offering a set of business and organisational 
design services. In these early stages of the business we were all struggling to find our 
identity by ourselves and together, bound together by deep passion to find meaning in 
our own lives and in the work we were committed to doing. 
 
It was interesting that during the first period of this journey I immersed myself in the 
early work of Heidegger, especially Being and Time that is one the great and sentinel 
works of existential philosophy. In particular this piece of writing with its deep 
profundity, struck a chord with my experiences at the beginning of this project. In this 
work Heidegger articulates his conception of authenticity – which in his explanation is 
to be one’s own person or to belong to oneself.  
 
This is a conception, which is not to isolate oneself from the world around you, but 
emerges from a deep affirmation of your own historicity, while acknowledging the 
impermanence of life, or what he called being-unto-death.  
 
Placing yourself firmly within this temporality, you are affronted with the creative act 
of being- what should I do with my life, what is meaningful to do?  Heidegger believes 
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firmly that we must not detach ourselves from the place where we find ourselves, and 
to the people, places societies we belong. It is in this situatedness, in or dependence of 
others that we find our purpose, identity and authenticity.  Furthermore realising that 
death is a real possibility, that we could die at any moment, we must act in accordance 
– swiftly and with commitment. 
 
In my case, I   realised profoundly that a meaningful life would necessarily mean a 
dedication to designing systems that create the conditions that help people to empower 
themselves. Indeed this is the very meaning of the word, Ownpower. So as a group we 
found a deeply shared common purpose, a dedication to creating purposeful systems. 
My work in particular explored the way we could leverage technology to create virtual 
platforms that could improve the lives of South Africans.   
 
The feeling of finding your voice within the sea of noise of the modern world brings 
about unbelievable joy. It is a state of true awe and is difficult to describe. Overall this 
comes from an overwhelming feeling that you were born do this, that all the pieces in 
your life finally make sense. All the little jobs you had, all the experiences and paths 
you took, which never really seemed to make sense, suddenly do. To find that thing is 
to find your authenticity, and with this is a deep sense of purpose and the meaning of 
your existence. 
 
Most importantly, I believe that this is the first step in which every entrepreneur or any 
inventor, philosopher or great scientist must pass through. This feeling of purpose is 
the only thing that can provide the passion and fuel to pursue the great ideas and 
enterprises of our time. 
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The Inferential Object 
 
This area is concerned with exploring that thing which is unknown. Probably one of the 
most pervasive phenomena I experienced in all the projects was a relationship with a 
field of possibilities – which I call here the inferential object. 
. 
 
Figure 14 Mapping the inferential object 
 
 
It is the work of all entrepreneurs, innovators, scientists, and philosophers to articulate 
this relationship with a possible future. This idea became more and more clear to me as 
the journey progressed. It really hit home after being on a course to study Scharmer’s 
methodology, Theory U. During the course of the program Otto Scharmer gave a talk 
to the whole group, describing how he came across the concept of Leading from the 
Future as it Emerges. He explained that as a young man, within a divided Germany 
there was an unquestioned sense of a better future. It was taken for granted, he said that 
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people everywhere had a common vision of what a better world would be, this sense of 
a better future, he explained, created the conditions for that new world to be born.  
 
It was the role of the leader, to be perceptive enough to sense this future, and to facilitate 
the dialogue, engagement and interaction that makes this conception clearer and clearer. 
As he said, “the role of a leader is to immerse himself in the context of the situation, to 
understand the systemic causality of the system, in so doing, find the points of leverage- 
those points in which he could affect change and then create the shared praxis to change 
them.” This shared praxis is centrally dependent of teleological design or designing a 
future end state. Indeed the process has six different stages: 1) Downloading or 
understanding the context of the situation, its history and peculiarities; 2) Seeing or 
suspending judgment to see the situation with new eyes; 3) Sensing which is looking 
for aspects of significance 4) Presencing, which is finding what the system is asking to 
become and also finding what your place is, what is the action you need to take to 
actualise it;) Crystallizing, this is the process of bringing this discovered emerging 
potential into greater clarity, bringing vision and intention; 6)Prototyping, in this stage 
the emerging potential is tested within the context of intervention, a process of 
validation and iterative development; and finally 7) Performing refers to the 
implementation of practices and infrastructure that weaves the potential state into an 
actuality. 
 
In my research I have tried to explore the process of innovation in many differing 
contexts and studying many heterogeneous methodologies. In so doing I believe there 
is a deep isomorphism between all these practices, which I think Scharmer’s Theory U 
typifies. Furthermore in my study of philosophical and social theories as well as in 
cognitive and evolutionary theories, I have found this creative process repeated over 
and over again. I will attempt here to make the connections to outline this isomorphic 
trait of creativity, which is also the basis for life – the ontological claim that Being is 
Becoming. 
 
If we begin in the proximity of Scharmer’s Theory U, which attempts to understand 
evolutionary mechanisms within dynamic systems, we find in business literature, the 
work of Roger Martin. In particular Martin’s ‘Knowledge Funnel’ tracks the process of 
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an innovation from the level of mystery, to the level of heuristic and then finally to the 
level of algorithm. This very much like Scharmer’s model begins with an anomaly, a 
mystery that has no real explanation with in the system. Following this the innovator 
finds a set of heuristics to better deal with this uncertainty, creating models and 
prototypes. Over time this heuristic becomes and algorithm, as it gains consistency, 
legitimacy and plausibility. With this comes the formulation of practice, methods and 
infrastructure that exploit this new found potential – in the case of a business this would 
mean a new model, practice or innovation.  
 
Martin further goes on to explain that businesses in general can have modes of operating 
and can have blends of the two in their operating. This is of exploration and 
exploitation: exploration is process of finding that anomaly, that Gödel statement, if 
you will, and then bringing it into an organisational or business practice; exploitation 
on the other hand is the exploitation of an already established algorithm, invention or 
practice. Businesses need both to survive but generally have a predisposition for one of 
the other. This is the basic evolutionary dynamics of business, as a business disposition 
becomes more based on exploitation it becomes more fragile and less adaptive. It must 
then engage in a process of innovation, a state of dissolution and re- creating – the 
genetic algorithm, so to speak. This is what Deleuze would call a process of de-
territorialisation and re-territorialisation and so this conception of a business is very 
much in line with the Deleuzian conception of social systems as the development of 
assemblages and strata, through a process of stratification. Over time a business 
undergoes greater and greater territorialisation and codification, which gives it a certain 
structural disposition. However all organisms must undergo change, grow and adapt or 
breakdown. In this case the social organism, it must find generative mechanisms to 
adapt to new environmental and internal stresses. 
 
Martin proposes one such genetic algorithm for business in his methodology of 
Integrative Thinking.  This is the process of taking two opposing, distinct and differing 
business models and integrating them. Once again for Deleuze the morphogenetic 
process is that of intensive differences, this is the conception of productive difference. 
In the process of Integrative Thinking, we are holding to opposing models and not only 
finding how they are different but also how they could be the same, we are looking for 
common ground, or more appropriately a common future.  
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If we turn back to Deleuze, an assemblage has an actual state, which is the basis for a 
virtual field of possibilities. In this way, when two actual objects interact it is the 
differences between their virtual fields which define the event, of their interaction. In 
this way the differences between the fields of virtualities creates novelty, action or the 
case of an organism - cognition itself. 
 
If we take the enactive approach, the very act of cognition is sensing within the 
environment for points of significance – points of difference. For example a bacterium 
will notice a sugar gradient in its extracellular environment, this intensive difference 
causes the organism to travel upstream of the gradient finding food. So even in the most 
fundamental aspect of mind and mind in life, we have this basic creative process.  This 
is the exact same process – an organism understands points of significance, has a sense 
of directedness and acts. In the same way the innovator senses significance, brings forth 
the intensive differences, explores and discovers meaning and creates action which 
birth new worlds. 
 
Similarly in the Heideggerrian schools of Ontological Design and in Disclosing New 
Worlds, we find the same basic phenomena. First we have a background of 
understanding, things breakdown and in the breakdown points of significance emerge. 
This leads to a process of articulation, reconfiguration and cross-appropriation which 
due to it acting within a ‘background of understanding’ leads to a reengineering of the 
prereflexive state. In this way new forms of justification and plausibility are created, 
leading to new businesses, new innovations and new social practices. 
 
Similarly as Spinosa et al. (2007) describe the path of the entrepreneur, they describe 
an almost identical process (explained earlier, the six qualities of the entrepreneur).  
Indeed we find this thinking well inscribed in the later work of Heidegger, who calls 
for a return to technē – the union between the poetic imagination with that of practical 
skill. what he calls poesis, - to bring-forth. 
 
In Heidegger’s unrelenting determination to describe the essential nature of being, he 
stumbles upon a paradoxical and unequivocal truth. That in our unconcealment (in 
finding truth), we conceal - hence he claims that being is the clearing that shelters. From 
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here he proposes that our true role discloses new possibilities and then brings them into 
being, that is to say our work is in clearing (unconcelaing) and presencing (bring that 




This term, analogical tensegrity combines two concepts analogy and tensegrity. These 
two terms have been centrally important to my understanding of what the as-lived 
experience of innovation is.  
 
The word tensegrity is a word that has been mainly used in architecture and itself is a 
synthesis of two words – tension and integrity. In its common usage in architecture it 
represents an ability of a structure to withstand exterior conditions, while maintaining 
its form, it refers then specifically to a dynamic stability. In this way it is a very similar 
concept to autopoiesis in evolutionary biology, in that it refers to a condition in which 
a cell self-produces to maintain its identity in precarious environmental conditions.  
 
Within the Enactive Tradition, we find a further exploration of embodiment to propose 
that cognition arises from autonomy. Further autopoiesis and adaptivity are the 
necessary conditions for mind. This is due to the recognition that as an organism deals 
with a changing environment it undergoes a process of sense making which carves out 
a niche within its environment. This is a key point, so it is worth exploring in a bit more 
depth here. What this means is that by understanding intensive differences within the 
environment the organism coordinates itself such that it takes action, based on a basic 
directedness and self-production.  Therefore the enactivists propose the body is a self-
constituting and sense-making system such that it is the precondition to disclosing a 
meaningful world.  
 
A meaningful world then is a way of interpreting the raw sensory data, which is a field 
of intensities in the environment. At a biological level of a bacterium or single cellular 
organism, much of this meaning is determined by phenotype and genotype of the 
organism, that is the biological history of the organism – therefor cognition is 
structurally determined. Furthermore this determinism creates the capacity to exist in a 
particular milieu.  
 
However the future state of the organism is determined centrally on another aspect of 
the organism, adaption. The first thing to consider when understanding this capacity 
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for adaptivity - is to adaptive to what end? In this way we can note that adaptivity is 
always to some goal or teleology. So in the enactive tradition, this is the capacity of the 
organism to make sense of its environment towards some goal or set of goals – what 
they call directedness. To elaborate on this, in every actual situation, there are set of 
possible futures, which are inherent within the organism and its relation to its 
environment. Furthermore there is an innate disposition to a best future state, what we  
could call an attractor.  
 
In this way the world shows up from this being towards objects, that things are 
meaningful within a field of possible futures. This idea is common throughout the 
phenomenological tradition from Husserl to Heidegger; and is very apparent in the 
work of Deleuze in his explication of the structured space of possibilities of a system.   
 
To take a slightly different perspective on this same concept, I’d like to talk a bit about 
my experiences with tensegrity – or dynamic stability. The great revelation for me with 
regard to tensegrity came through my practice of Kung Fu. I have trained in Kung Fu 
and particular the internal art of Chi Kung and the style of Hung Gar (Tiger Kung Fu) 
from the age of 16. In tiger training, there is an emphasis on exercises that mimic the 
movement of the tiger, changing the basic movements of the body. By exposing the 
body to new rhythms, new sensations and new experiences, the capacities of the body 
changes. However this is only the mundane aspect of this practice, surprisingly what I 
noticed through my practice were significant changes in my consciousness.  
 
The practice specifically involves breathing practices combined with visualisation, of 
you as a tiger. When deeply engaged in the practice, there are moments of deep clarity 
when the world shows up in a fundamentally different matter, particularly as a field of 
intensities and not as realm of objects. Over time (I practiced for about 6 years) I noticed 
significant changes in my consciousness and became deeply interested in that world 
before reflective thinking. The basic understanding from this experience is exactly what 
the enactivist articulate, that 1) cognition is determined structurally (through 
experience) and 2) that by noticing things of significance produces action and furthers 
an evolutionary trajectory.  
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As I researched these phenomena more, I discovered a few interesting concepts that are 
relevant to our discussion here. Firstly different states of consciousness are distinctly 
related to a different inner biology, specifically different states of consciousness depend 
on the occurrence of very particular neurotransmitters within the body.  
 
Deleuze speaks about this in third chapter of Difference and Repetition (1994) where 
he describes our appearance of our world as determined by the territorialisation of the 
ego – or the structure of the space of possibilities of the self.  In this chapter he writes 
about delirium as a temporary de-territorialisation of the self – not the biological self 
but the self, which is a structuring of possibility, which in turn has its basis in the 
biological body.  
 
In delirium, much like the states I experienced through martial practice we have a 
deterriorialisation of the mind such that we are open to a much broader sense of things. 
To reiterate our points above, taking from the enactive approach, things show up as 
meaningful dependent of the teleological architecture  - things make sense against a 
structure of possibilities. In these states, whether they be meditative, delirium or fugue 
states, there is dissolution of this structure of virtualities. In this way the world appears 
as field of pure intensities, what Deleuze called the field of immanence. 
 
There is an extra step in the process of kung fu and in also within practices of tantric 
yoga, where dissolution is just the first step. The second step is a restructuring of this 
field to a particular new disposition. In the case of tiger kung fu, you (re)perceive 
yourself as a tiger – the main aim of this practice then is to create a temporary 
singularity of tiger.  In this way things show up in a fundamentally different way – that 
is to say, things are significant in a fundamentally different way. In so much that action 
is directed in different avenue altogether and creates a different growth trajectory. 
 
It is important to note that these states are never produced in a purely solipsist way – 
that is it not purely a result of subjective fantasy. In this process we are not denying that 
there is a reality that exists, what we are saying is that the machinery of sense of that 
reality that can change. Furthermore as this changes so does the possible trajectory of 
that subject – that by restructuring the virtual space we change the future actuality of 
that subject (in its environment). Lets try and explore this a bit further. Kung Fu for 
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example is rooted in the physical body; there are extensive exercises, routines and sets 
of movements. In this process a new reality – that is a new type of engagement with the 
word – is enacted.  This means that there is an innovation in the sense generating 
apparatus, while being-in-the-world.  
 
The fundamental learning for me in this process is that things show up dependent on 
the base of a structure of meanings, which in turn are structured around a teleological 
architecture of directedness. To change this structure (in a fundamental way) one must 
undergo a process of dissolution and then re-structuring. This requires a level of 
biological and cognitive plasticity, which in turn requires a state of mindfulness.  
Within the phenomenological tradition, we note with Husserl, Heidegger and also with 
Merleau-Ponty there is an emphasis on the philosophy of perception, cognition and 
being. However we could argue that there is very little written about the pragmatic and 
practical aspects of this. It is of no doubt that these philosophers were consummate 
meditators but little of their works explains the practical dimension of this – how do we 
achieve these plastic states of consciousness?   
 
In is this way we can use mindfulness as an appropriate mechanism. Mindfulness is 
now en vogue so to speak; every aspect of modern life is permeated by it, but the 
question that is not so easily answered is – mindful of what? If the mind is mindful of 
its own nature (essenceless essence) the world emerges as field of pure intensities. This 
is similar to paradoxes in logic, when you turn the machinery of logic on itself you are 
left with an infinite regress; however this is the essential nature of the logic itself. 
However if you use logic to create structures of thought which are fundamentally 
relational we get formal systems. The mistake we have made in science and in life in 
general is that we take these systems to be complete, true and or eternal; rather they are 
always incomplete, relational and contextual – and it is for this reason they can evolve.  
 
Further if we are mindful of ourselves within a certain teleological architecture the 
world appears accordingly. Therefor in disclosing new worlds, the innovator must use 
his mind in two ways: 1) to hold the breakdown or point of significance in his life and 
2) when seeing a possible future teleology (which resolves this) must hold on to it with 
his mind. Both these processes alter cognition, in that things show up in terms of this. 
In a typically Heideggerrian way, we see that a worldhood is constituted by equipment, 
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purposes and identities which are coordinated in a more that equipmental manner. In 
this way changing the basis of understanding of being-in-the-world we transform the 
purposes, equipment and identities. 
 
Therefor mindfulness is the fundamental pragmatic method of the phenomenological 
tradition and the actual path of the entrepreneur and innovator. Moreover it is the role 
of passionate commitment, purpose and desire that allow for the sufficient energy to 
create both the plasticity  (to think of new ways) and the structured thinking creating 
new ways of being. Hillary Austen explains the combination as artistry, or the ability 
to exploit past knowledge (mastery) and also be concerned with new types of 
knowledge (originality). In addition she claims that artistry is the ability to balance 
between qualitative and quantitative thinking, in a purposeful and directed way. In this 
way she proposes an assemblage of three different types of knowledge: experiential, 
conceptual and directional. This relates very well to the view we have been building up 
to this point – that we have experiences, which become meaningful within a set of goals 
or ideals we conceive. It is important to note however that experience is first in the 
order of things, that it is the experience itself which brings about a set of virtual 
possibilities, and that with every actuality the field of possibilities is altered.  
 
In this way we have two sides of the coin so to speak, which are both integral to the 
work of the entrepreneur and innovator. Firstly there is the ability to conceive of things 
in a different way and then secondly to find the axioms that make it a plausible or 
justifiable system.  
 
In Hofstadter’s book Surfaces and Essences, he explores the genius of Einstein in his 
ability to make analogies, where others could not see any. In particular we see that 
Einstein had a very particular structure to his being  - that he believed in a deep unity 
between all things. Hofstadter explores all the great discoveries Einstein made as found 
through analogies between different aspects of theoretical physics; but places an 
emphasis on what we could call an overarching analogy – that of unity. In this way he 
shows that these generative analogies were made possible because of deep faith and 
belief in the unity of physics. Moreover this belief is the analogy of analogy  - that is it 




What is extremely significant here to our investigation is that through his cognitive 
structures certain things became significant to Einstein, where no one else could see 
them. Then by taking these moments of lucid insight, he found the rigorous thinking 
required to validate them in an intersubjective world of shared experience. Over time 
these insights became the basis of a whole new era of theoretical physics and not to 
mention a whole new way of understanding our world. 
 
In my experience in the projects described earlier, this was so close to the actual 
experience of what innovation is, for me. The first necessary step however is a deep 
commitment to the project; this commitment is always to some ideal. This ideal or 
teleology is vague and insubstative at the outset, no more than a hunch or intuition. 
However as this intuition is held firmly through deep emotional commitment, the world 
offers up itself in many meaningful ways. I would see analogies to almost everything 
that was going on in my life, what I could only call a deep synchronicity between the 
design of the project and my everyday experience of life.  
 
It is the work of the innovator and entrepreneur to create this analogical tensegrity that 
allows things to be significant in relation to a set of goals – what we could call 
teleological design. 
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The Essence of Innovation 
 
In many ways the central theme of this research has been to engage in a discourse about 
what innovation is, specifically within the context of business models. From this initial 
point of departure, our journey has led us deeper and further than this initial point – 
exploring cognitive science, complexity, dynamical systems and philosophy. In the 
practical dimension, I explored the as-lived experience of business, system and 
technology design in varying contexts in an attempt to enrich my own understanding 
of what innovation means. This somewhat broad investigation aimed to reveal an 
essence, a common ground or isomorphism - by asking what are the basic phenomena 
of business model innovation?  
 
As I started this research project, one of the most significant things that I felt was that 
the process of innovation was a fundamental and even basic form of life – that we have 
no choice but to be creative, to dream and to become. However we forfeit this right, to 
merely be consumers of mass engineered ideas, thoughts and media. We are truly living 
in time where we have forgotten the meaning of authenticity  - to be true to oneself and 
to get a hold of oneself in such a way that we live a true meaningful life. This is a 
creative act, an act of innovation within the self.  It is this act of authenticity, which 
opens the way, so to speak, for a true understanding of our role in life as disclosers. 
This point of authenticity is the fulcrum from which the act of innovation occurs. In 
finding oneself being-in-the-world you are able to orientate yourself such that you can 
make meaning with the world around you and your work.  
 
The work of the innovator then, is the expression of being; in that it is being ontological 
– it is asking those questions which are centrally concerned with the self, purpose and 
identity. In this process we find a world of meaning, which is necessary for the work of 
the innovator. In this way the first disclosure is the disclosure of oneself in the world; 
with this found purpose, the disclosure of the innovation itself is found without 
coercion. This is the art of not-doing, or being present to a field of possibilities from 
the perspective of your basic stance.  
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The second disclosure is within the context of the intervention, but is one fundamentally 
dependent on the inner state of the intervener (the first disclosure). In this way things 
show up as meaningful, in relation to a system of interlocking meanings and to oneself. 
In this process points of significance emerge which lead to a disclosure of what could 
possibly be. The articulation of the structured field of possibilities. 
Following this, the innovator searches for the basic building blocks, the basic axioms 
of a truth – in so doing a prototype is formulated. As we have seen in our examples, 
this could take many forms – a theory, a practice, a model or primitive product. In this 
creation he shares his discovery with the world, creating a shared commitment and 
understanding. In this way he restructures the field of possibility within a group of 
people – the third disclosure.  
Following this an on-going discourse is established between, the context of the 
intervention, the intervention itself and the innovator. This dynamic assemblage is 
directed by empirical understanding within the structured space of possibilities. With 
time the intervention establishes consistency, becomes structured and has greater 
codification. With this a new sense is implanted and with it a new truth.  This is the 
fourth disclosure, which is in truth, concealment into the pre-reflexive background of 
the intervention. 
This process requires a level of thinking, which is not merely rational or technical; 
rather it is one found on the possibility of the empirically found. In this thinking 
discipline, there is a need to transcend both conceptions inherent within the traditional 
metaphysics of presence- that is of the now and the eternal.  Underlying this 
metaphysical revolt is an understanding of the world as things as historical, contingent 
and interdependent-, which insists on a metaphysics of emptiness (groundlessness) and 
emergence (dependent origination).  
This is very much in line with Heidegger’s later works, which suggest that Dasein is 
the work of essencing- or disclosing within a context of meanings. As he says, “the 
essence of truth, is the truth of essence.” In this he articulates that thinking is itself the 
creation of essences, further these essences in their creation disclose whole new worlds 
or ontologies. To this fundamental equivalence (between truth and essence) we can add 
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innovation – the verb Heidegger appropriated was essencing - the relationship between 
truth and essence. 
In this way we can say, ‘that the essence of innovation, is the innovation of essence’ – 
the fundamental work of the innovator is in facilitating the emergence of new essences 
from empirical understanding, which are grounded in experience. In the unconcealment 
of these essences, with it we find new worlds based on new truths, that in time become 




Figure 15 The four disclosures of social innovation 
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The Ethics of Experience 
 
Ethics is not often a concept associated with the practice of business model innovation, 
in fact it would seem that innovation in our society is steeped in technical rationality - 
concerned centrally with the development of technology for technology’s sake. We 
have become a society obsessed with improved efficiency, greater and greater 
computational power and ever more elaborate methods to distract ourselves. With this 
we have entered a world in which there are massive ecosystemic breakdowns 
(Scharmer, 2011) and societal breakdown. As Scharmer articulates: 
 
“We live in a time of massive institutional failure, collectively creating results 
that nobody wants. Climate change. AIDS. Hunger. Poverty. Violence. 
Terrorism. Destruction of communities, nature, life—the foundations of our 
social, economic, ecological, and spiritual well-being.”(Scharmer, 2011) 
 
The key point I’d like to highlight from the excerpt above is that “we are creating results 
that nobody wants.” This is significant because it implies causality, moreover that the 
current understanding of causality has left us blind to the effects of our own 
machinations. As we have explored extensively in this research, the view of reality that 
values presence and first principles has been the foundation for a mode of thinking that 
has borne a world of objectivity, scarcity and self-obsession. Heidegger explored these 
themes decades ago in his essays on technology, philosophy and thinking (described 
earlier), and asks for a complete transformation in our basic mode of being. Scharmer 
calls for the same transformation today: 
 
“This time calls for a new consciousness and a new collective leadership 
capacity to meet challenges in a more conscious, intentional, and strategic way. 
The development of such a capacity will allow us to create a future of greater 
possibility.”(Scharmer, 2011) 
 
Following this we find ourselves between basic ontologies, and have been grappling 
with this shift for most of the postmodern era. Indeed the postmodern movement could 
be said to be an over-throwing of the basic foundations of modernist thinking. 
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For the sake of this argument I’d like articulate and compare these two traditions from 
their basic ontological beliefs and the ethical consequences of these stances. As 
Heidegger articulated, the advent of the ‘information age’ and in particular cybernetics, 
showed the completion of the Aristotlean doctrine of essences. This holds the 
ontological claim of essential natures – that in a way things are eternally present. The 
world shows up as a derivation of essential natures into specific objects – therefor the 
metaphysics privileges either the immediately present or the eternal. Moreover this 
distinction between presence and eternity or specific and general are mutually 
specifying and have determinate relations between each other. This relationship is 
defined by the crowning achievement of Aristotlean tradition: deductive and inductive 
logic – which has been the foundation of science, philosophy and religion in the West 
for hundreds of years.  
 
Let us explore the ethical implications of such a position. Heidegger explains that this 
view discloses being as standing reserve, and further that this disposition aims to 
exercise power over being – to manipulate, process and exploit. In further articulation 
of this, he emphasises that this metaphysics of presence has formulated the notion of 
our selves as separate and inherently existing. This view has emphasised our perception 
of ourselves as lord of being – that our ultimate role is to exert force in our exploitation 
of being. This has created a world in which human endeavour has been marked in the 
formulation of higher and higher abstraction of thought in order to bend the resources 
to our will. By not seeing ourselves as interdependent and contingent beings, we do not 
see the non-linear effects of our actions. Further, essentialism has sullied our actions in 
that we believe implicitly that we and the world of essences around us exist eternally. 
There is a very direct ecological effect of such a position. For example we are not 
concerned with the eradication of species, nor the ecological disasters, which we stand 
at the cusp of because as essences they exist eternally, as do we.  
 
In contrast if we take the view that we are contingent beings that we exist in dependence 
of each other; a fundamentally different ethic is found. We may say that of course we 
understand this, that it is obvious that we exist in a world of relationships. However the 
point here is to explore this within the prereflexive background of understanding – 
although we may have an intellectual understanding of this it has not become an innate 
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and embodied aspect of humanity. We still perpetuate the same mechanisms of 
exploitation founded on a non-linear causal relationship. 
 
To effectuate this transformation of sense, we must innovate within the machinery of 
sense making itself. In Heidegger’s essay The End of Philosophy and The Task of 
Thinking (1966), he describes the moment of unconcealment of the metaphysics of 
presence. In this piece of writing we find at once a sense of deep admiration for 
Aristotle’s discovery, while a sense of complete, deep concern for the world it has 
borne. There is great admiration, in that by unearthing the foundations of Aristotle’s 
project he also shows the work of ontological design, of unconcealment of a whole new 
world. The problem we have faced since then is taking this one disclosure as the only 
disclosure of being. Moreover as we have shown this metaphysics leaves us separated 
from our innate capacity as shepherds of being. Heidegger’s great work then, was in 
revealing the mechanics of unconcealment, how we can conceive of creating new 
axioms that form the basic of new truths and new worlds. 
 
This dynamic can be seen perfectly through the distinction between propositional logic 
and abductive logic. Where propositional logic proposes what is, abductive logic 
proposes what could be.  This abductive leap relates to our innate ability to disclose 
new worlds, to conceive of what could be true. It is in this step that we hold the 
responsibility to conceive of different ways of being. In this understanding of being as 
becoming, we find ourselves centrally as disclosers of new worlds that innovate within 
the machinery of sense. However this creative act is not in detachment from being, from 
our histories or from each other but one that is borne from within the crucible of the 
very context itself.  
 
Deleuze affirms in Difference and Repetition (1994) that at difference, it is not the mere 
difference of one moment of individuation, but the difference of the whole of being. In 
this way every act, every thought every instantiation of being at once creates the self 
and the world around it. This is a key ethical understanding. 
 
If we take Nagarjuna’s tetralemma  (discussed earlier) we find a beautiful insight into 
this. The fundamental proposition that Nagarjuna aims to debunk is that A=A, that is 
to say that is we articulate a proposition A, that is all we are proposing. However every 
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proposition at once affirms itself  (A) and also a whole history, context and world from 
which it ensues (not A). Therefor the affirmation of self at once affirms the details of 
the world of that self.   
 
In Hofstadter’s terms the self is the central analogy of being through which we see the 
world, therefor our conception of our own being determines the way the world shows 
up. This is not meant in a merely conceptual or mental way but in a fundamental way 
– Hofstadter explains how analogies give rise to an n-dimensional space of possibilities 
or Hilbert Space. Further we see in the enactive tradition that autonomy is the basic 
condition for cognition – in that the world ensues from that point. 
 
Therefor in ontological design, we are asking the question of ourselves in-the-world, 
of what could be possible.  Therefore by innovating within the self, we create the 
perceptive abilities to see new things – very much like a painter over time is able to see 
many more colours that the average person, or the way a concert musician is able to 
hear subtleties in sound, normally unheard. So too the discloser of new worlds develops 
a sensitivity to possibility, in line with the construction of an analogical tensegrity. 
 
So from an ethical standpoint, if we perceive ourselves as inherently existing, absolute 
things the world too appears as a realm of objects, inanimate and lifeless. If however 
we see the world, ourselves, others, in fact all phenomena as one inextricably bound 
tapestry, we are affronted with a fundamentally different ethical disposition.  
 
If we see ourselves as dependent arising, if we truly see this, the natural feeling is great 
compassion for all things. This is the fundamental heuristic that our perceptual 
apparatus is focused on the emptiness of self in its co-dependent origination. The points 
of significance then are not merely primitively to preserve the self, but ultimately to 
live in a world of harmonious evolution.  
 
Every act of the self is an affirmation of itself, that is, every act is an affirmation of the 
ontological assumptions inherent in it. Therefor we must be mindful not only of our 
thoughts but our prereflexive condition in our actions. By engaging in the process of 
teleological design, that is designing the architecture of our beliefs – we determine our 
cognition, which is we determine what is significant for us. In this determination we 
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act, when we act we produce worlds in which we live. Therefore of central importance 




Business (like everything else) is Fractal 
 
If we take all business models to be formal systems – that it is a system comprising of 
a basic set of axioms that creates a coordination of activities. Further, taking our 
discussion of Gödel, we find that in every formal system there is a phenomenon, which 
is true, but that cannot be explained within the constraints of the system. In this way all 
systems are incomplete, and in evolution.   
 
Particularly in business these ‘Gödel statements’ are the fractal bifurcations of new 
businesses, industries and technologies from existing ones. Any disruptive technology 
holds this as its fundamental operation. That is, it looks at an existing system and finds 
certain propositions, which can become, create new worlds, with fundamentally 
different axioms. In discovering these new truths a new system of understanding is 
demanded and so new ventures are born. For example if we take the evolution of 
computing from massive industrial computing machines, to enterprise level computing 
machines and then finally to the personal computer – we find at every stage the next 
evolutionary leap was determined by distinctions in the previous systems and their 
effect on the world. In this way every new technology develops in recursive manner –
the same that is not identical. 
 
The question of disclosure then is, why do some discoveries change the world and 
others merely remain at the level of instrumental innovation, while even others are a 
huge failure? In it is my suspicican, through engaging in this  deep process of 
teleological design that there is a determinate relationship between the inner state of the 
intervener and the nature of the discovery. This is the maxim: 
 
“The quality of an intervention is dependent upon the interior state of the 
intervener.”(Scharmer quoting Bill O’Brian, 2007) 
 
Business is always in evolution, as are our societies and organisations, however the 
quality of intervention is often from the point of a technical rationality. If we change 
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the field of possibilities for this change, we can move business in a direction that can 
address the great ecosystemic breakdowns we face. This depends firstly on a 




The objective of the research was to explore the phenomena that present themselves 
within the practice of innovation. The reasoning behind this approach is grounded in 
the fact that little can be gained from abstract theorising about such a deeply pragmatic 
art. Therefore rather than attempting to describe complete theory of practice, this piece 
of work attempts the humble description of those phenomena encountered within this 
specific instance. In this way, the following key insights may be articulated: 
 
1. Business model innovation is grounded in existential inquiry, analysis and 
indeed even crises. Furthermore through mindful inquiry, non-ordinary types of 
knowledge must be realised to make sense of the fundamental meaning of one’s 
life – this is the very medium of the innovation process. 
2. Building on the existential process explained above, the development of a 
purpose within the context of the intervention is a necessary precondition for 
the practice of innovation. 
3. Through the exploration of the context of intervention in conjunction with the 
development of a shared vision within the context of the intervention, a inferred 
object emerges as a field of possibilities. This ‘phase-space’ is a central 
aspect of the work of the innovator. 
4. Through abductive and simulative processes, analogical thinking is an 
important phenomenon in the creative act of the innovator. This aspect is not 
only central to the initial creative insight but also into the development and 
design of the new model through an engagement with prototypic forms of 
thinking and knowledge. 
5. Business model innovation is ‘ radical’ , that is to say in line with the 
etymology of the word, which mean to get to the root. Therefore we can say that 
the innovation process aims to address basic and fundamental principles of the 
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business model and through an ontological design process evolve, reconfigure 
and re-create them according to its context. 
6. Lastly the business model process is an important one in the ever-increasing 
need of business to address our world in crises. This is because the innovation 
we seek, what we may term social innovation (Nilsson & Paddock, 2013; 
Mulgan, 2006) is  the ontological design of a new world. This  inclusive and 
integral approach to business is most fundamentlaly, an ethical renewal in the 
essential function and meaning of business. 
 
These six outcomes, transcribe the main outcomes of the phenomenological inquiry. In 
this, we should understand that these phenomena mark the boundaries of this instance 
and does not describe the findings into the general phenomena of the same topic, the 
lived experience of business model innovation. To achieve such a goal, a far broader 
research agenda would have to be pursued into the experiences of a much larger group 
of experiential epistemologists. This gives much room for further study and research in 
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